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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Benjamin J. Birkinbine
Doctor of Philosophy
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Title: Incorporating the Commons: A Political Economic Analysis of Corporate 
Involvement in Free and Open Source Software
Free (libre) and open source software (FLOSS) emerged in the 1980s as a radical 
alternative to proprietary software.  Fighting back against what FLOSS enthusiasts 
viewed as overly restrictive intellectual property protections placed on proprietary 
software, FLOSS was designed with the intent of granting users the right to study, 
modify, adapt, or otherwise tinker with the source code of software.  As such, FLOSS 
users were able to collaborate in producing software that could be distributed freely and 
widely to others, who could, in turn, make changes to the software.  As FLOSS projects 
grew in popularity, the productive process was spread throughout a broad network of 
distributed users, all of whom could work on the code.  The result of this process was the 
creation of robust, effective, and efficient forms of software that could compete with 
those offered by large software companies.  
Increasingly, however, some of those large software companies became involved 
in the development of FLOSS projects.  On its face, this may seem to be a contradiction 
of interests.  Why would a for-profit company invest in the development of software that 
is made freely available for others to use?  This is the contradiction that lies at the heart 
of this research project.  More specifically, this project looks at the dynamics that exist 
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between communities of FLOSS developers and the corporations that are involved in or 
make use of their projects.  Working from a critical political economy perspective, this 
study complicates theories of the commons and commons-based peer production by 
illustrating how FLOSS processes and products are being incorporated into broader 
corporate structures and strategies.
The three case studies presented – Red Hat, Microsoft, and Oracle's acquisition of 
Sun Microsystems – exemplify different elements of this dynamic.  Red Hat provides an 
example of how a company that relies exclusively on free software can be turned into a 
profitable business.  The Microsoft case demonstrates why the company has undergone a 
transition from vehement opposition to FLOSS toward a more supportive position.  
Finally, Oracle's acquisition of Sun Microsystems demonstrates how FLOSS 
communities cope with changing ownership structures and unwanted corporate 
interference into their projects.
v
CURRICULUM VITAE
NAME OF AUTHOR: Benjamin J. Birkinbine
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:
University of Oregon, Eugene, OR
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Carbondale, IL
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, Green Bay, WI
DEGREES AWARDED:
Doctor of Philosophy, Media Studies, 2014, University of Oregon
Master of Arts, Media Theory and Research, 2010, Southern Illinois University 
Carbondale
Bachelor of Arts, Communication, 2005, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay
AREAS OF INTEREST:
Political Economy of Communication
Open Source Technology
Communication Theory
Media Studies
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Graduate Teaching Fellow, School of Journalism and Communication, University 
of Oregon, 2010-2014
Teaching/Research Assistant, College of Mass Communication and Media Arts, 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2008-2010
Instructor, Department of Communication, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, 
2006-2008
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS
The Dallas Smythe Award, Awarded by the International Association of Media 
and Communication Researchers for the paper, “Incorporating the 
commons: Toward a political economy of corporate involvement in free 
and open source software,” 2014.
Digital Scholarship Center Graduate Affiliate, 2014
vi
Rapid Response Grant, Co-sponsored by the Open Society Foundation and the 
International Association for Media and Communication Researchers, 
2014
The Columbia Scholarship, School of Journalism and Communication, University 
of Oregon, 2013
Outstanding Teaching by a Doctoral Student, School of Journalism and 
Communication, University of Oregon, 2013
Glenn Starlin Fellowship, School of Journalism and Communication, University 
of Oregon, 2013
Nominee for Doctoral Research Fellowship, School of Journalism and 
Communication, University of Oregon, 2013
The Columbia Scholarship, School of Journalism and Communication, University 
of Oregon, 2011
Lucien P. Arant Scholarship, School of Journalism and Communication, 
University of Oregon, 2010
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
No project as formidable as a dissertation can ever be undertaken in complete 
isolation.  Along the way, I've had inspiration, assistance, advice, critiques, clarifications, 
and collaboration with numerous people who made this possible.  I cannot do justice to 
the entire community who helped, but I would like to thank a few in particular.
I thank my dissertation committee for their patience, comments, and critiques.  
Janet Wasko was an incredibly gracious, accommodating, and fun adviser throughout the 
process.  Bish Sen provided critical feedback and always pushed me to think about the 
broader implications of my work.  Gabriela Martinez was equally supportive, provided 
great feedback, and was always available for conversations.  Finally, Eric Priest became 
one of the few law professors to serve on a dissertation committee at the University of 
Oregon.  He deserves additional credit for coordinating his involvement while the law 
school followed a different academic calendar than the rest of the university.  
I thank the members of my cohort – Toby Hopp, Erica Ciszek, Francesco 
Somaini, Brant Burkey, and Fatoumata Sow – who were sources of inspiration, support, 
and friendship.  In addition, I would like to thank Jeremy Swartz for the introduction to 
open source and the guided tour of my first Open Source Convention (OSCON) in 
Portland in the summer of 2011.  That experience, along with the ensuing discussions 
about the broader implications of open source, led to a change in my academic focus that 
ultimately provided the impetus for this study.  I'm also thankful for the support and 
friendship of Brenna Wolf-Monteiro, Tewodros Workneh, Randall Livingstone, Jacob 
Dittmer, Lauren Bratslavsky, Glenn Morris, Karen Estlund, Andre Sirois, Jolene Fisher, 
and Geoff Ostrove.  
viii
Outside the School of Journalism and Communication, Kat at the ResNet Help 
Desk helped me with my first Linux install.  Without her initial help, this journey may 
have not been possible.  I am now happy to say that I've passed the gift along to others.  
John Russell and everyone at the Digital Scholarship Center provided support and were 
always willing to assist in whatever way they could.  In addition, the members of the 
Eugene Unix Gnu Linux Users Group (EUGLUG) were an incredibly welcoming group 
of people who were kind and patient enough to help a total noob like myself with various 
Linux questions.  I would especially like to thank Larry Price and Jacob Riddle for setting 
aside extended periods of time to help me with this project and related topics.  
Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my family.  I thank my mother 
and father for their years of support and patience as I've pursued graduate studies.  
Undoubtedly, without you, none of this would be possible, and I am forever indebted.  
My sister, Ann, inspires a wealth of adjectives: congenial, affable, good-humored, 
gregarious, etc., and I'm thankful for the years of fun we've shared.  My son, Caden, was 
only two years old when this journey began, and he is now well on his way to becoming a 
young man.  I've enjoyed watching you grow over these years, and I look forward to 
many more.  You are a blessing.  Finally, my love and inspiration, Roberta, meu coração.  
You have truly been wonderful throughout all these years.  In the past, I have seen other 
writers thank their partners, they allude to the fact that a great deal of patience is 
necessary to cope with someone who is going through the process of writing a 
dissertation.  I now know what they mean, and I am truly fortunate to have had you as a 
companion throughout this process.  You are truly a gift.
ix
For the community, and para o meu coração.
x
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1
Situating Free (Libre) and Open Source Software................................................. 6
History of Computing and Software................................................................ 7
The Size and Scope of FLOSS........................................................................ 13
Hacking, Cracking, and Motivation................................................................. 17
Justification for the Study and Its Contribution to Scholarship............................. 19
Overview................................................................................................................ 25
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND LITERATURE REVIEW..................... 27
Political Economy of Communication................................................................... 28
Of Marx and Machines.................................................................................... 29
Communication Labor, Free Labor, Digital Labor.......................................... 35
The Commons........................................................................................................ 40
Commons-Based Peer Production................................................................... 43
The Threat of Enclosure................................................................................... 49
Open Source Business Models.............................................................................. 54
Summary................................................................................................................ 58
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY.......................................... 61
Research Questions................................................................................................ 62
Methodological Approach...................................................................................... 65
Research Methods.................................................................................................. 67
Document/Textual Analysis............................................................................. 68
xi
Chapter Page
Interviews......................................................................................................... 74
Recruitment Process.................................................................................. 75
Interview Setting........................................................................................ 76
Interview Participants................................................................................ 76
Data and Analysis............................................................................................ 78
Human Subjects Research and Institutional Review Board.................................. 79
Summary................................................................................................................ 80
IV. FROM THE COMMONS TO CAPITAL: RED HAT, INC. AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY................................................................................... 82
The Political Economy of Red Hat, Inc................................................................. 83
Red Hat's Core Commodities and Intellectual Property.................................. 88
Red Hat Linux............................................................................................ 90
Red Hat Enterprise Linux and the Fedora Project..................................... 91
Ownership, Governance, and Intellectual Property in Fedora................... 92
Red Hat, Trademark, and CentOS............................................................. 96
Core Commodity Conclusions................................................................... 98
From the Commons to Capital............................................................................... 99
V. SHIFTING TOWARD THE COMMONS: MICROSOFT'S LONG AND
WINDING HISTORY WITH FREE SOFTWARE..................................................... 103
The Rise of Microsoft 1975-1990.......................................................................... 106
MS-DOS.......................................................................................................... 108
Microsoft Windows.......................................................................................... 110
Apple Computer vs. Microsoft Corporation.................................................... 112
xii
Chapter Page
Microsoft in the 1990s........................................................................................... 115
The Browser Wars............................................................................................ 116
Mosaic and Netscape................................................................................. 117
Microsoft Responds................................................................................... 119
The United States vs. Microsoft Corporation........................................................ 121
Effects of the Decision..................................................................................... 123
The Halloween Documents.................................................................................... 126
Shifting Toward the Commons.............................................................................. 131
Microsoft Shared Source................................................................................. 132
Microsoft Open Technologies.......................................................................... 134
Why Open Source? Why Now?............................................................................. 136
VI. CONFLICT IN THE COMMONS: ORACLE CORPORATION AND ITS
ACQUISITION OF SUN MICROSYSTEMS............................................................ 140
The Oracle Corporation and Sun Microsystems.................................................... 141
A Brief History of the Market for Operating Systems..................................... 144
OpenSolaris...................................................................................................... 146
MySQL............................................................................................................ 148
StarOffice, OpenOffice, LibreOffice............................................................... 151
Protecting the Commons........................................................................................ 156
VII. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................... 159
Major Findings....................................................................................................... 160
Research Question #1...................................................................................... 160
xiii
Chapter Page
Red Hat, Inc............................................................................................... 160
Microsoft Corporation............................................................................... 162
Research Question #1A................................................................................... 165
Oracle's Acquisition of Sun Microsystems................................................ 165
Research Question #2...................................................................................... 167
Contributions of the Study..................................................................................... 168
Limitations of the Study........................................................................................ 172
Concluding Thoughts: Capital and the Commons................................................. 174
APPENDICES............................................................................................................. 178
A. RECRUITMENT LETTER OR EMAIL.......................................................... 178
B. INFORMED CONSENT LETTER................................................................... 179
C. INTERVIEW GUIDE....................................................................................... 182
REFERENCES CITED................................................................................................ 184
xiv
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
4.1. Red Hat Annual Revenues 1998-2013.................................................................. 87
4.2. Red Hat Annual Net Profits 1998-2013................................................................ 88
5.1. Netscape Navigator Usage Data 1994-2006......................................................... 120
5.2. Microsoft Annual Revenues 1999-2013............................................................... 125
5.3. Microsoft Annual Net Profits 1999-2013............................................................. 125
6.1. Oracle Corporation's Annual Revenues 1998-2013.............................................. 142
6.2. Oracle Corporation's Annual Net Profits 1998-2013............................................ 143
6.3. Development of StarOffice Derivatives................................................................ 155
xv
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
2.1 Possibilities for Common Ownership.................................................................... 42
2.2 Types of Open Source Business Strategies............................................................ 55
xvi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In March of 2012, The Linux Foundation released a report entitled, “Linux Kernel 
Development: How Fast it is Going, Who is Doing It, What They are Doing, and Who is 
Sponsoring It.”  The kernel is an essential part of an operating system that facilitates 
communication between computer hardware and software, and the Linux kernel 
development project is considered to be “one of the largest cooperative software projects 
ever attempted” (The Linux Foundation, 2012, 1).  Aside from a technical overview of 
how kernel development has changed over time, the authors included a curious note in 
the report's highlights: Microsoft was one of the top 20 contributors to the kernel.  This 
marks the first time that Microsoft appeared as a top contributor, but was not the only 
corporation in the top 20.  Other corporate contributors included Intel, IBM, Google, 
Texas Instruments, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, and Samsung, as well as others. The Linux 
operating system is a form of Free (Libre) and Open Source Software, or FLOSS, which 
allows users to freely study, use, copy, modify, adapt, or distribute the software.  Why, 
then, would major corporations contribute directly to a FLOSS project, especially when 
that project seemingly does not directly contribute to corporate profits?  This question 
becomes even more curious when one considers that many of the companies contributing 
to the kernel not only compete with one another in the market for information technology, 
but companies like Microsoft and Google are direct competitors with Linux in the market 
for operating systems.  
Indeed, Steve Ballmer, the Chief Operating Officer of Microsoft, once referred to 
Linux as “a cancer that attaches itself in an intellectual property sense to everything it 
touches” (Greene, 2001).  Ballmer was referencing the GNU General Public License, or 
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GNU GPL, which is the most commonly used free software license.  The GPL grants 
users of GPL-protected software the right to study, use, copy, modify, or adapt the 
software as he or she wishes.  In addition, users are granted the right to redistribute the 
software, as well as a modified version, and the user may even charge a fee for the 
modified version, provided that the distributor does not place greater restrictions on the 
rights granted by the GPL.  By granting such rights, the GPL does not preclude 
corporations from modifying free software or charging a fee for their modified versions, 
but the corporation must still grant free software rights to end users.  Ballmer's quote 
implies that free software is antithetical to commercial software companies.  If this were 
the case, then Microsoft or any other commercial software firm would have no incentive 
to contribute directly to one of the largest open source projects.  This seemingly 
contradictory stance lies at the heart of this dissertation project.  To further exacerbate 
this contradiction, consider the fact that Ballmer made his denunciation of Linux on June 
1, 2001.  Merely 27 days later, on June 28, 2001, the United States Department of Justice 
found Microsoft guilty of monopolistic business practices in violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act primarily for bundling its Internet Explorer web browser with its Microsoft 
Windows operating system as a way to rapidly increase its share of the market for web 
browsers.  However, Microsoft has dramatically changed its position on Linux and open 
source since 2001, as signified by its inclusion in the top 20 contributors to the Linux 
kernel.
In 2012, Microsoft created Microsoft Open Technologies, Inc., a wholly owned 
subsidiary dedicated to facilitating interoperability between Microsoft and non-Microsoft 
technologies, while promoting open standards and open source.  What changed during 
this twelve-year period that Microsoft would so dramatically reposition itself in relation 
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to FLOSS?  Moreover, why are so many other corporations contributing to open source 
projects?
In this project, I am primarily concerned with the seemingly contradictory 
relationship between FLOSS communities and for-profit corporations.  The dissertation 
explores the nature of this relationship by focusing on three case studies that illustrate 
different ways that corporations have been involved in FLOSS projects.  However, I am 
also interested in whether corporate involvement in FLOSS projects will change the 
dynamics of the broader FLOSS community over time.  In other words, this project 
investigates the extent to which corporations like Red Hat, Microsoft, and Oracle wield 
power over or within FLOSS projects.  If so, in what ways?  In this sense, the issue of 
corporate power is the center of the analysis.  Finally, one of the proposed outcomes for 
this project is to speculate as to whether increasing corporate involvement in FLOSS 
projects will have consequences for the future of FLOSS communities and what those 
consequences may be.  To sum up, then, the current project is guided by the following 
research questions:
RQ1: What is the relationship between proprietary, for-profit corporations and 
free and open source software communities, and how has this relationship 
changed over time?
RQ1a: What are the power dynamics between corporations and the FLOSS 
community?  In other words, does one party hold the ability to 
exert influence on the other and how?
RQ2: What constitutes value for each of these stakeholders?  What value do 
corporations provide for the FLOSS community, and what value does the 
FLOSS community provide for corporations?  Do any external factors or 
stakeholders exist that may profit from this relationship?
To address these questions, three case studies illustrate different types of 
relationships that FLOSS projects have with corporations.  Specifically, I focus on Red 
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Hat, Microsoft, and the Oracle Corporation's acquisition of Sun Microsystems. These 
case studies were strategically chosen because they represent three very different 
examples of corporate involvement in FLOSS projects.  Red Hat is the largest and only 
publicly traded company providing software and services that are completely based on 
free software.  As such, Red Hat cannot rely on traditional copyright protections to 
exclude others from using the underlying source code included in its software.  Thus, I 
explore how Red Hat has been able to create a profitable business based on free software.
Microsoft was chosen because it has been viewed as the antithesis to FLOSS 
throughout its corporate history.  Now, however, Microsoft has signaled that it is 
committed to and supportive of FLOSS projects.  Consequently, the chapter on Microsoft 
traces the company's long and winding history with FLOSS, but focuses specifically on 
key moments throughout the company's history that demonstrate contradictions between 
the public claims made by the company and its actions.  Whereas the investigation of Red 
Hat was driven by an interest in how the company uses FLOSS, the investigation of 
Microsoft is interested in why the company has shifted its position to FLOSS.
Finally, the third case study focuses on what happens when a company that 
supports various FLOSS projects is acquired by a company that does not.  Specifically, 
Sun Microsystems provided support for various FLOSS projects, but was later acquired 
by the Oracle Corporation, which had different plans for those projects.  In that chapter, I 
focus on the diverse destinies of three such projects – the OpenSolaris operating system, 
the MySQL relational database management system, and the OpenOffice productivity 
software – and the ways that the communities involved in those projects resisted Oracle's 
encroachment into their projects.
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When considered together, these three case studies are indicative of the general 
tendencies of corporate involvement in FLOSS projects.  Moreover, all three companies 
are some of the largest software companies in the world.  While Red Hat may not have 
the same level of revenue as Microsoft and Oracle, the company is the largest and only 
publicly traded company operating almost exclusively in FLOSS.  As such, Red Hat was 
chosen because it illustrates how FLOSS can be transformed into a profitable business.  
Microsoft and Oracle were selected because they are the two largest software companies 
in the world when measured in total revenue.  An explanation of how, why, and when 
these companies compete or cooperate with FLOSS communities offers a germane 
moment for understanding the dynamics existing between corporations and FLOSS 
communities.
Furthermore, an increasing amount of our lives spent on the Internet where we 
communicate with friends and colleagues, read news, watch movies and television, and 
listen to music, among other activities.  When we connect to the Internet and visit web 
sites, our requests for information are relayed through a network of interconnected 
servers that facilitate communication between other clients on the network.  The 
operating systems running those servers are increasingly FLOSS projects like Linux or 
FreeBSD, but Microsoft also designs server software.  This provides another example of 
FLOSS projects competing with proprietary companies like Microsoft.  Therefore, 
whether we realize it or not, our ability to connect to the Internet may depend, in part, on 
the ability of FLOSS projects to work together with proprietary software.  Consequently, 
understanding the ways in which proprietary software and FLOSS projects work together, 
as well as what happens when these relationships break down, is an important step in 
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unpacking the relationships that enable and, at times, constrain our ability to connect with 
others online.  This is precisely the purpose of this project.
To explain exactly how this project research was completed, CHAPTER III 
provides a more in-depth overview of methodology and method.  The remainder of this 
chapter will focus on providing an introduction to FLOSS.  Readers who are already 
familiar with the history of FLOSS and its defining characteristics may wish to skip 
directly to the next chapter, which more succinctly outlines the theoretical frameworks 
drawn upon for this study, as well as an overview of the relevant literature that 
contextualizes the study.
In the following sections, I situate FLOSS within the history of computing and 
provide some basic information about its size and scope.  In addition, I draw distinctions 
between free software and open source by focusing on the foundational figures associated 
with each community.  While there are differences between free software and open 
source, I will be using the combined term FLOSS throughout this dissertation unless a 
specific reference to one or the other is required. After clarifying the differences between 
free software and open source, some of the individual motivations for those contributing 
to FLOSS projects are addressed.  After this introductory material, I discuss the relevance 
of this study and its contribution to a broader corpus of knowledge.  Finally, the chapter 
concludes with an outline of the remainder of the dissertation.
Situating Free (Libre) and Open Source Software
Although free software and open source communities are related and, in some 
cases, not mutually exclusive, each of them have distinct characteristics that can best be 
described by reference to the ethos underlying each movement.  To contextualize the 
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emergence of FLOSS within the evolution of the computing and software industries, a 
brief history of these industries is provided below.  Following that discussion, I focus on 
situating two key figures associated with FLOSS within their historical context: Richard 
M. Stallman and Linus Torvalds.  These two figures represent free software and open 
source, respectively.
History of Computing and Software
Prior to the use of machines for processing information or calculating differences 
in numbers, human beings performed such work.  But human calculations were, at times, 
prone to errors.  To reduce this uncertainty, Charles Babbage, a philosopher and 
mathematician working at the University of Cambridge in 1822, proposed that it was 
“only by the mechanical fabrication of tables that such errors can be rendered 
impossible” (Gleick, 2011, 95).  Such was the proposition for Babbage's Difference 
Engine, which performed routinized calculations mechanically, and was arguably the 
genesis for modern computers as we know them today.  Later, Babbage expanded on his 
idea planned a new type of machine that was capable of being controlled by instructions 
that could be encoded and stored to facilitate operation.  The new iteration of the idea was 
called the Analytical Engine, but this still only provided the idea for the hardware or 
mechanisms necessary for such processes to occur.  What was needed for this hardware 
was software.
The idea for software arguably originates with Augusta Ada Byron King, the 
Countess of Lovelace, or otherwise known simply as Ada Lovelace.  She developed the 
idea that Babbage's Analytical Engine could perform a series of operations beyond the 
mere calculation of numbers.  By abstracting from the differences between two things, 
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Lovelace posited that the Analytical Engine could be programmed to perform operations 
that relied on symbols and meaning, which, in turn, could be communicated to the 
machine.  Although Lovelace's idea was never realized in her lifetime, she is credited 
with developing the idea for software and is known as the first programmer (Computer 
History Project, 2008).
While Babbage and Lovelace are credited as pioneers in developing the ideas for 
modern computers and software, the construction of such machines did not begin until 
World War II.  Developments in the field of computer science and information theory – 
like Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorem, Alan Turing's idea for a Universal Turing 
Machine, Claude Shannon's mathematical theory of communication, and Norbert 
Wiener's cybernetics – provided the intellectual inspiration for the development of such 
machines.  Before, during, and after World War II, many of the developments leading to 
modern computers were used for military purposes.  Most notably, perhaps, were the 
German Enigma machine that was used to encrypt secret messages and the electro-
mechanical bombes used by the United Kingdom to decipher those messages (Smith, 
2011).  However, in 1941, Konrad Zuse, a German electrical engineer, built the Z3, which 
is regarded as the first electro-mechanical, programmable, fully automatic digital 
computer (Zuse, et al., 2010).  The first comparable computer in the U.S. was developed 
by John Atanasoff at Iowa State University in 1942 (Copeland, 2006).  Only one year 
later, the first fully functioning electronic digital computer was put to use by the 
cryptanalysts working at Bletchley Park in the U.K. as part of the Government Code and 
Cypher School.  The Colossus, as the new machine was known, was programmed to 
decipher German communications during the war.  By the end of the war, Bletchley Park 
had 10 Colossi working to decode German communications (Copeland, 2006).
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Following these initial developments, the development of modern computers 
accelerated as many of the early pioneers began working for academic institutions and 
private companies after the war.  In the U.S., Grace Hopper, who served in the United 
States Navy Reserves as a member of the Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency 
Service (WAVES) during World War II, was assigned to the Bureau of Ships Computation 
Project at Harvard University.  While there, she worked on the Mark I computer project, 
which was built by IBM.  Later, after she began working for private companies, Hopper 
popularized the idea of machine-independent programming languages.  This led to the 
development of the Common Business-Oriented Language (COBOL).  Hopper is also 
credited with popularizing “debugging” as a term for removing defective material or code 
from a program.  While Hopper may not have invented the term, she popularized it by 
literally removing a moth from a Mark II computer at Harvard University after it had 
caused the machine to short circuit (Deleris, 2006).1
During the 1960s, the creation of microprocessors drastically reduced the cost of 
computing.  As such, communities of hobbyist programmers and computer enthusiasts 
began to experiment with the technology.  For example, Gordon French and Fred Moore 
began the Homebrew Computer Club, which met at the Community Computer Center in 
Menlo Park, California, and provided a forum for hobbyists to trade parts and advice 
about the construction of personal computers.  More will be said about this specific 
hobbyist community in CHAPTER V when the rise of Microsoft is discussed.  However, 
aside from these hobbyist communities, the majority of computer development occurred 
within the military, academic institutions, and private companies.
1 Interestingly, a photo of the moth that was removed from the machine is available from the Naval 
Historical Center at http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h96000/h96566kc.htm (last accessed 
August 2, 2014).
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Most notable were the initial developments within the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects (DARPA), as well as the Artificial Intelligence Lab at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).  Programmers working at the time were 
using a proprietary programming language called Unix, the intellectual property rights for 
which were owned by AT&T.  One of the programmers working at MIT at the time was 
Richard Stallman, who found that when he wanted to work with the Unix programming 
language outside of officially sanctioned spheres, he was denied access to the code by 
AT&T.  In protest, he posted a message to a computer-based bulletin board saying that he 
was developing a Unix-based language that would be available for free so that others 
could use the language however s/he saw fit.  The programming language was called 
"GNU," a recursive acronym standing for "Gnu's Not Unix."  Along with the 
programming language, Stallman developed the GNU Public License (GPL), which 
stipulated that anyone could access the source code for free, and that anyone using the 
GPL agreed to make their contributions available under the same conditions.  This would 
ensure that computer programmers could freely share their work with one another, 
thereby creating a common form of property that developed in opposition to its 
proprietary and closed counterparts.
Stallman thus became the impassioned leader of the crusade against proprietary 
software.  He viewed access to source code as a fundamental right, which he wanted 
others to believe in as well.  He summed up this view in his famous dictum, "Free as in 
freedom, not as in free beer," thus positioning free software as a moral right (Stallman, 
2002). In addition, the free software definition stipulates that “users have the freedom to 
run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve the software” (Free Software 
Foundation, 2012).  As the principles of free software grew beyond the borders of the 
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U.S., others have tried to reduce the confusion over the English term "free" by using the 
French term libre rather than gratis.  Stallman developed the Free Software Foundation 
(FSF) as a way to promote his crusade against proprietary software, and he represents an 
impassioned counter-cultural figure who still continues to espouse his free software 
philosophy.
While Stallman is generally considered to be the leader of the free software 
movement, open source software is generally associated with Linus Torvalds.  In many 
ways, Torvalds and Stallman have similar stories, but differ on philosophical terms.  
During the 1980s, free software projects were being developed but generally on a smaller 
scale.  Free software had not yet found a way to coordinate efforts on a grand scale.  
Torvalds wanted to work on kernel development for an open-source operating system.  
Rather than relying on numerous programmers all working independently on such a task, 
Torvalds released the source code for his project, which he was calling "Linux," a 
portmanteau of his name, Linus, and the language he was working with, Minix (itself a 
simplified derivative of AT&T's Unix).  Torvalds suggested that anyone who was 
interested in contributing to such a project was encouraged to do so, provided that they 
release their work back to the community so that others could progressively work toward 
completing the kernel.  The project proved to be successful, and eventually led to the 
creation of the open source operating system, Linux.  Coordinating such a large-scale 
programming project was accomplished by asking those working on the code to release 
their work, no matter how small the changes seemed.  The rationale was that coordinated 
efforts reduce the amount of redundant work, which was summed up in the adage “with 
many eyes, all bugs are shallow,” which Eric Raymond refers to as “Linus's Law” 
(Raymond, 2000).
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Stallman and Torvalds differ with respect to how free software projects ought to 
relate to proprietary software.  Whereas Stallman tends to be somewhat more rigid in his 
opposition to proprietary software, Torvalds is less so.  Williams (2002) describes the 
decisive moment at a conference in which Stallman and Torvalds appeared on a 
discussion panel together.  Torvalds expressed admiration for the work that Microsoft was 
doing and suggested that free software advocates could even work together with 
companies.  Such a suggestion was generally seen as taboo since Stallman was perceived 
with esteem by the programming community, and the Free Software Foundation 
generally took a very adamant stance against proprietary software companies.  However, 
this was apparently a watershed moment in which the fervor of the free software 
movement thawed a bit and Torvalds came to represent a more liberal approach to free 
software.
In sum, then, we can understand the free software and open source movements 
within these differing philosophies.  Stallman and free software advocates tend to make 
moral claims against supporting proprietary software, while Torvalds and open source are 
associated with a more liberal and inclusive stance.  While Stallman and Torvalds have 
been used to illustrate the differences between free software communities and open 
source communities, they should not be viewed as mutually exclusive communities, nor 
should Stallman and Torvalds be seen as representative of the entire free software and 
open source communities.  One of the peculiarities of the free and open source software 
community is that, although the overall community is united in their belief that software 
ought to be free for users to study, modify, adapt, or customize, its members will often 
vehemently defend their preferred free software project while deriding others.  In a sense, 
this signals to others where their loyalties lie and engenders stronger ties within niche 
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communities that exist within the larger FLOSS community.  The present project is less 
concerned with these intra-group fissures than the relationship of the community as a 
whole to the corporations that rely on their labor.  To that end, the combined term “Free 
(Libre) and Open Source Software” or “FLOSS” is used to refer to the overall 
community.
The Size and Scope of FLOSS
Since its emergence in the 1980s and 1990s, FLOSS has proved to be a 
tremendously efficient and effective way of producing software.  As an example of the 
size and scope of some FLOSS projects, consider the Linux kernel, which was discussed 
in the introduction to this chapter.  When it was first released in 1991, the Linux kernel 
featured approximately 10,000 lines of code.  Version 3.10 of the Linux kernel was 
released in June of 2013 and featured almost 17 million lines of code, which was 
produced by nearly 1,400 developers and 243 companies (The Linux Foundation, 2013).  
Aside from the sheer growth in its size and complexity, Linux as an operating system has 
become widely used.  For example, Linux enjoys more than 96% market share in the 
market for supercomputer operating systems (Top500.org, 2014).  While Linux does not 
yet have a significant share of the personal computing desktop market, the operating 
system has been customized and used within a variety of contexts.
Between 1999-2001, four cities and municipalities in Brazil – Amparo, 
Solonópole, Recife, and Ribeirão Pires – passed laws that required government agencies 
to use or give preference to Linux (Tramontano & Trevisan, 2003; Festa, 2001).  The 
decision to switch to free software systems was mainly economic, as Brazil reported 
spending nearly $1 billion on software licensing fees to Microsoft between 1999-2004 
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(Kaste, 2004).  By switching to free and open source software, Brazil estimated that they 
could save approximately $120 million per year (Kingstone, 2005).  Similar measures 
were taken in Kerala, India, during 2008, as the state banished Microsoft and allowed 
only GNU/Linux free software to be used for the mandatory state information technology 
exams (Kochi, 2008).  The German city of Munich developed its own version of Linux 
called LiMux (Linux in Munich), which it uses as an operating system for its 15,000 city 
council members instead of Microsoft Windows (Saunders & Morrison, 2014).  The 
National University of Defense Technology in China has also developed its own Linux-
based operating system called Kylin.  In addition, the computers used for the One Laptop 
Per Child project, which was founded with the goal of bringing low-cost computers to 
developing countries for educational purposes, featured a free and open source operating 
system based on Fedora.  Within the United States, Linux is used for high-level military 
operations.  For example, the United States Navy announced that its new $3.5 billion 
warship, the USS Zumwalt, will effectively serve as an armed floating data center that 
features server hardware running various Linux distributions and more than 6 million 
lines of code (Gallagher, 2013).  In addition, the Linux Foundation (2014) claims that the 
International Space Station will migrate to Linux to power the station (The Linux 
Foundation, 2014).
Beyond the increasing use of Linux, open-source principles have been used in 
areas outside of information technology.  For example, open source hardware increases 
access to physical goods, including furniture, musical instruments, construction materials, 
and wind turbines for generating renewable energy.  Such projects are particularly 
attractive to those living in developing countries, where access to information, goods, and 
services may be restricted or limited.  One of the more ambitious projects in this area is 
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the Open Source Ecology project, which offers “open source blueprints for civilization,” 
and includes instructions for building industrial machines with recycled or low-cost 
materials (Open Source Ecology, 2014).  While this is just one notable example, it 
demonstrates the optimism and creativity involved in applying open source principles to a 
whole way of living rather than simply information technology.  However, the core 
values inherent in these projects do not necessarily originate in open source software.  
Rather, the cultural values of openness and sharing are what hold the most value.  When 
applied throughout an entire community, these principles hold the promise of a more 
sustainable future, especially when such principles are linked with environmental and 
ecological preservation practices.2  But these principles only become radical propositions 
in a system that discourages or provides little incentive for such behaviors.
What these examples should illustrate is that Linux in particular, but FLOSS more 
generally, has become more than just a tool used within the computer hobbyist 
community.  Its widespread and increasing adoption across the globe within a variety of 
high-level contexts demonstrates the power of the FLOSS production model as well as 
the effectiveness of its products.  As FLOSS continues to be used within an increasing 
variety of contexts, understanding the ways in which corporations, governments, non-
profit organizations, and other types of institutions are involved in FLOSS projects will 
become increasingly important.  Therefore, FLOSS provide an important area for 
research not just because of its increasing ubiquity, but also because of the claims that 
have been made about the democratic, egalitarian, and non-market characteristics of its 
2 These practices and the potential of environmental media were explored in greater detail during the 
Inaugural History and Theory of New Media Unconference at the University of Oregon in 2012 (Jher 
& Birkinbine, 2012).
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products and processes.  This is precisely how this project seeks to contribute to such 
debates.
Before concluding this brief introductory overview, however, I would like to 
clarify some additional terminology as well as situate the activities of the FLOSS 
community within a broader context.  FLOSS communities comprise a socio-technical 
system insofar as their activities are made possible by and exist within a technologically 
mediated realm.  However, in larger cities or in cities with a relatively large community 
of people working in the information technology industries, one can find local Linux 
Users Groups, or LUGs, where regular meetings are held to promote FLOSS, to assist 
new users with installing FLOSS, to troubleshoot any issues that may arise when using 
FLOSS, or to simply meet other people interested in FLOSS.  In this sense, the social 
connections that exist within these groups are mediated by their mutual interest in 
technology.  Because members of the FLOSS community are brought together by their 
mutual appreciation of technology, their cultural practices depend upon and are supported 
by interconnected network technologies.  As more people become connected to the 
network, the opportunities for additional participants in these communities grow.  This 
also means that those who lack a network connection will have a difficult time 
contributing directly to the cause of free software or open source software development.  
Therefore, both free software and open source communities exist within a very 
particular and privileged technological realm that requires a certain level of intellectual 
and economic development.  Furthermore, having a network connection is not necessarily 
enough to enable direct participation to FLOSS projects; Stallman and Torvalds are 
computer programmers who have the ability to read and write code.  As such, they are not 
just users of software, but they have the ability to actively engage with the software, to 
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make changes to its code.  In this sense, both Stallman and Torvalds can be called 
“hackers.”
Hacking, Cracking, and Motivation
The term “hacker” has taken on negative connotations recently, but the term is 
generally used to describe anyone who "tinkers" with or makes changes to technology to 
create something new.  In this sense, the practice of hacking could be seen as a form of 
innovation, although profitability is not always a prerequisite motivation for hacking.  
Steven Levy (1984) outlined the principles of the hacker ethic.  Among other elements, 
Levy claimed that computers can be used for creative purposes, hackers ought to be 
judged by the quality of their work rather than any other characteristic (gender, race, 
ethnicity, etc.), and that having the ability to hack is a prerequisite for hacking.  This last 
caveat may seem obvious but, in order to perform a hack, a hacker must have access to 
the technology (in this case, the source code).  For hackers, closed, proprietary 
technologies that do not allow for tinkering are unjust.
The practice of removing proprietary restrictions on closed technologies is known 
as “cracking,” which can be performed on a CD or DVD that does not allow copying, a 
video game console that requires users to only purchase games and software from a 
company (Microsoft Xbox, Nintendo Wii, Sony Playstation), or on proprietary software 
or operating systems.  An important distinction to make here is that crackers and/or 
hackers may not necessarily be interested in the consequences of their crack/hack.  
Rather, they are motivated by the desire to signal to other crackers/hackers that they 
deserve credit for the sophistication of their crack/hack.  This signaling motivation is also 
recognized within open source software communities (Lakhani & Wolf, 2005), but 
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whereas crackers are interested in freeing technology from its restrictive measures, 
hackers are interested in remixing, modifying, adapting, or creating something new from 
a given product.
The same signaling motivation that is used to explain why hackers do what they 
do has been used to understand why programmers contribute to FLOSS projects.  
Lakhani & Wolf (2005) explain that signaling can take place within at least a couple 
levels.  At the level of the individual, a single hacker may perform a hack in order to 
signal his or her skills to others.  Hackers might also use this type of signaling as a way to 
communicate their skills to potential employers to secure paid employment.  Gaining 
recognition within the broader community for performing certain programming tasks 
effectively can translate into increased job opportunities with companies looking for 
specific skills.  However, a different type of signaling takes place between groups of 
hackers.  Groups or collectives may signal their prowess to others by shutting down a 
web site or otherwise disrupting services.  Often, this is done in the spirit of competition, 
but can also be explicitly driven by a particular ideology.  For example, nationally based 
hacker groups can be found in Syria where a pro-Syrian government hacking group 
called the Syrian Electronic Army has waged hacking battles against the pro-rebel 
hackers associated with the Free Syrian Army (Fitzpatrick 2012).  In these situations, 
hacker groups strategically target the web sites of their opponents to signal the strength of 
their movement.  
Although the signaling motivation appears to be the most prevalent motivation, 
Weber (2004) identifies other motivations as well.  In a survey of self-identified hackers, 
respondents reported their primary motivation for contributing to FLOSS development 
was a desire to challenge oneself and perform creative work.  This seems to support what 
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Levy (1984) identified as a primary tenet of the hacker ethic: creativity and aesthetics.  
Weber (2004) also found additional motivations reported in the survey, including the 
belief that all software should be free, which echoes the philosophy of Richard Stallman 
and the Free Software Foundation.  Weber concludes that motivations are diverse and that 
the results from these surveys need to be properly contextualized.  For instance, many 
contributors to FLOSS development do not disclose their identity or any institutional 
affiliation.  Indeed, a look at the credits file for users contributing to the development of 
the Linux kernel shows that most contributors are listed in the "unknown" category.  This 
means that a large portion of the FLOSS community simply chooses not to self-identify.  
Therefore, the results of any survey that claims to represent the entire FLOSS community 
must be approached somewhat skeptically.  
While motivations represent one category of questions about the FLOSS 
community, the more robust questions about FLOSS community are related to the 
economics and governance of FLOSS as both a process and the products created by the 
community.  These topics will be covered in more detail in CHAPTER II because they 
are reflective of certain theories about the commons and commons-based peer 
production.  In what follows, however, the scope and focus of the study are discussed, 
including how the study will contribute to a broader body of literature.
Justification for the Study and Its Contribution to Scholarship
FLOSS products and the productive process that make those products possible 
have been widely lauded as revolutionary changes that enable greater degrees of freedom 
and autonomy on behalf of users and contributors (Benkler, 2006; Raymond, 2000; 
Stallman, 2002).  This project intervenes in these debates by tempering these claims with 
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a critical approach to understanding technological change and systems of production 
within a broader capitalist system.  Although some of the more celebratory arguments 
about FLOSS are notable for explaining the internal dynamics of FLOSS production and 
the unique social, technical, and legal characteristics of FLOSS products that make peer 
production possible, these analyses have not placed commons-based peer production 
within a broader social context to illustrate how such production intersects with capitalist 
production.  The purportedly revolutionary changes brought about by FLOSS and 
commons-based peer production are now becoming incorporated into corporate strategies 
and corporate structures.  As such, FLOSS projects constitute a contested terrain, 
whereby these projects are faced with a number of organizational difficulties.  These 
difficulties are primarily associated with the benefits and detriments of finding corporate 
sponsors to support those projects.  In these cases, a community of developers must cope 
with varying degrees of corporate influence in defining the direction of the project.  In 
many cases, employees of the corporation and members of the community are not 
mutually exclusive.  More specific cases will be discussed in the chapters that follow, but 
the primary intention of this project is to highlight the diverse ways that both corporations 
and the broader FLOSS community cope with co-presence.
Aside from tempering the claims of novelty by those who use FLOSS as a 
primary example of commons-based peer production, this project also contributes 
directly to our understanding of commonly held resources under capitalism.  As will be 
discussed in greater depth in the following chapter, the commons are often held in 
contradistinction to capitalism.  The rise of capitalism saw the enclosure of the commons 
and the end of common right.  The work of Elinor Ostrom (2005; 1990) has helped to 
broaden our understanding of the diverse array of commonly held resources as well as 
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institutional diversity designed to protect them, particularly in the face of capitalism.  
That said, the knowledge commons are also subjected to types of enclosure.  James Boyle 
(2008) referred to this as the Second Enclosure Movement, whereby knowledge and 
information are becoming enclosed by restrictive intellectual property protections.  
Copyleft, most notably in the form of the GNU General Public License, seeks to maintain 
common rights for knowledge or informational resources.  This project demonstrates how 
FLOSS as a knowledge commons is not becoming enclosed in the absolute sense of total 
exclusion, but how knowledge commons and their attendant cultural practices are 
becoming incorporated into corporate strategies and corporate structures.
By looking at three different case studies that illustrate the different ways that 
FLOSS is being incorporated into corporate structures, this dissertation also engages with 
broader debates about the political economy of communication, digital labor, 
participatory culture, and information politics.  The project contributes most immediately 
to the field of political economy of communication in that FLOSS remains a relatively 
understudied phenomenon within the approach.  Those working within the political 
economy of communication approach are broadly interested in working toward more just 
and democratic communication systems that truly serve the needs of local communities.  
A large part of this work has been to critique both corporate and state power, particularly 
in terms of the way it operates within media systems for the transmission of ideological 
messages.  While this project does not specifically focus on message transmission, I am 
interested in analyzing the products and processes of FLOSS development by placing 
issues of corporate power at the center of the analysis.  By doing so, this project 
highlights the dual challenge of the FLOSS community's need to ensure the long-term 
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survival of their projects and the corporations' desire to harness the collective labor power 
of the FLOSS community.
By focusing on this dynamic, the current project also engages directly with 
debates about digital labor (Lazzarato, 1996; Terranova, 2004; 2000; Scholz, 2013).  
Debates about digital labor have focused on fan cultures and other forms participatory 
cultures whereby individuals voluntarily contribute to the creation of novel cultural 
artifacts (De Kosnik, 2013).  But these debates have also focused on the unpaid free labor 
performed by individuals online as value is extracted from data about their browsing 
habits (Andrejevic, 2012; Fuchs, 2012).  In addition, Fuchs (2013) has focused on issues 
of class and exploitation, while Bauwens (2013) has focused on the possibilities of peer-
to-peer organizing.  This project contributes directly to these debates by focusing on the 
dynamics between laborers in the FLOSS community and the corporations that profit 
from their labor.  This project is unique in that it focuses on the intersection between the 
digital labor of FLOSS programmers and the corporations using FLOSS as a part of their 
business operations.  As will be made more clear in the literature review, previous studies 
have focused either solely on the ways businesses can use FLOSS to their advantage, or 
on how FLOSS enables greater degrees of freedom and democracy.  By focusing on the 
intersection of labor and corporations, this project is also unique within the broader body 
of literature on free and open source software.
Insofar as this project focuses on forms of collective labor that produce digital 
texts, it is also broadly concerned with the changing institutional context of participatory 
media.  Jenkins (2006) used the term “participatory culture” to describe the ways in 
which networked communications technologies enable novel forms of meaning-making 
to arise, whereby consumers can remix cultural artifacts in new and creative ways.  In 
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this sense, consumers are transformed into “prosumers” because their relationship with a 
particular commodity is no longer solely based on consumption, but they have the 
opportunity to produce new and unintended meanings.  While Jenkins primarily focused 
on audience members' relationships with commodities, free and open source software 
projects might also be framed as a form of participatory culture.  However, the 
differences between these types of participatory culture need to be distinguished 
carefully.  While the processes of production may be similar in the sense that they rely on 
a variety of inputs from geographically dispersed populations who contribute to an 
overall project, the end product in each case is quite different.
Analyses of participatory culture tend to focus on cultural artifacts that are often 
held under strict copyright protections by their ultimate owners.  FLOSS, on the other 
hand, relies on an increasing repository of code that is protected by copyleft and other 
alternative intellectual property licenses that encourage and allow other users to build 
upon the work that has been performed previously.  Another key difference in this respect 
is the form of the end product itself: in most instances of participatory culture, the end 
products come in the form of content designed for literary, artistic, political, or 
entertainment purposes (fan fiction, remixes, mash-ups, culture jamming, etc.), while the 
end product in FLOSS is source code, with which others can study, modify, adapt, or 
build upon.  In this sense, the end product of FLOSS tends to be more technical, in the 
literal sense of the word (of or relating to the applied and industrial sciences), than the 
end products of participatory culture.  This distinction is, perhaps, a crude one.  I am not 
trying to imply that FLOSS projects cannot be artistic, political, or even literary, nor am I 
trying to imply that a mash-up or remix cannot be technical.  Both of these creations 
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involve a certain level of craft, but it seems to me that there is still a fundamental 
difference in the end products even if the productive processes are similar.
Finally, in an increasingly networked world that is mediated by the use of 
information and communication technologies, the struggle for ownership and control of 
information has risen to the forefront of many national and international debates.  In this 
sense, the current project can be contextualized within broader conversations and debates 
about informational politics.  The revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013 (and, at the 
time of writing, still ongoing) that exposed the massive and widespread collection of 
personal communications data by the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United 
States revealed how the NSA systematically collected personal communications data 
from citizens both within the United States and around the world.  These revelations have 
opened up a new space for debate about the right to privacy in the digital age.
The majority of these debates have focused on curbing the power of the state to 
collect massive amounts of data on its citizens.  However, these criticisms can also be 
directed at the corporations who were either coerced into cooperating with the NSA or 
complicit in such collection.  While this project does not specifically focus on the 
individual's right of privacy, the project does focus on the ways in which information – in 
the form of source code – can provide a contested terrain in which struggles over 
intellectual property and informational resources take place.  The FLOSS community 
often uses alternative intellectual property licenses to ensure that their creations remain 
freely available as commons-based resources rather than becoming enclosed by 
restrictive or exclusionary intellectual properties for use as a corporate commodity.  
Throughout this study, I focus on the ways in which this is happening, why it is 
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happening, and how the FLOSS community responds to corporate encroachment into its 
communities.
Overview
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows: CHAPTER II begins 
with an overview of two main areas of theory used to provide a framework for the study.  
Specifically, I draw from a critical political economy of communications approach to 
study corporate involvement in FLOSS projects, and discuss why such an approach can 
be advantageous for understanding corporate power.  In addition, theories of the 
commons are discussed, including different types of commons and how those commons 
can be subject to various forms of enclosure within a capitalist system.  CHAPTER II 
concludes with some of the previous literature used to understand corporate involvement 
in FLOSS projects.  Having provided a conceptual framework for the current study, 
CHAPTER III explains the specific methodology and research methods used.  That 
chapter also revisits the research questions that framed this investigation, as well as a 
discussion of the potential shortcomings of the research because of the chosen 
methodology and methods.
CHAPTERS IV through VI present the main findings of the study.  Each chapter 
provides the results of the three case studies.  CHAPTER IV focuses on how Red Hat, 
Inc. has become the largest and only publicly traded corporation with a business model 
that relies almost entirely on free software, for which the company is unable to rely on 
traditional copyright protections to exclude others from using the underlying source code. 
CHAPTER V charts the history of the Microsoft Corporation and its relationship to 
FLOSS.  Specifically, the chapter focuses on why Microsoft has undergone a 
transformation from total opposition to FLOSS toward embracing FLOSS through the 
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creation of a new division of its company entirely focused on supporting FLOSS projects. 
Throughout that chapter, key moments in the history of Microsoft illustrate how the 
company relies on strong intellectual property protections to exclude others from using its 
software, but also how this strategy is somewhat contradictory to its own strategy of 
negotiating partnerships and licensing agreements that either enable widespread adoption 
of its software or provide the foundation for its development.  Finally, whereas 
CHAPTERS IV and V focus on how and why two corporations are involved in FLOSS 
projects, CHAPTER VI illustrates what happens when a company that was supportive of 
FLOSS projects is acquired by another company that does not support such projects in 
the same way.  CHAPTER VI focuses on the Oracle Corporation's acquisition of Sun 
Microsystems and the effect that acquisition had on three separate FLOSS projects: the 
OpenSolaris operating system, the MySQL relational database management system, and 
the OpenOffice office productivity suite of software.  The goal of this chapter is to 
demonstrate the ways in which the FLOSS community copes with undue corporate 
encroachment into its projects by focusing on its ability to leverage its collective labor 
power to resist such influence.
Finally, CHAPTER VII summarizes the major findings and presents conclusions 
from the study.  The intent of the chapter is to illustrate what increasing corporate 
involvement in FLOSS projects means for the FLOSS community and the corporations 
involved in FLOSS projects, and what this dynamic can tell us about commons-based 
peer production under capitalism.  In addition, the chapter acknowledges the limitations 
of the study, and suggests germane areas for future research.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND LITERATURE REVIEW
To properly ground the current study within established theories and extant 
literature, this chapter provides an overview of the primary areas of theory that are drawn 
upon to understand corporate involvement in FLOSS projects.  To that end, the chapter 
begins with a discussion of the political economy of communication and how a critical 
economic perspective in particular offers a useful lens for investigating corporate 
involvement in FLOSS projects.  Then, I discuss the ways that FLOSS has been 
understood theoretically by focusing on theories of the commons and the ways that 
information and knowledge have been understood as a type of commons.  After 
establishing this basic understanding of the types of commons that FLOSS represents as a 
resource (or product), I focus more specifically on how the processes that enable FLOSS 
have been understood as a form of commons-based peer production or non-market 
production (Benkler, 2006).  After theoretically situating FLOSS as both a product and 
process, I consider the ways that the commons – both common land as well as the 
knowledge commons – become enclosed under capitalism.
The argument presented in the theoretical overview is that even though we have a 
relatively robust understanding of FLOSS as both a product and process, there is still a 
gap in our understanding of how commons-based peer production and non-market 
production are enmeshed in processes of capitalist production.  This project is specifically 
aimed at filling this theoretical gap by focusing on the different ways that capitalist firms 
make use of FLOSS products and processes.  To that end, the chapter concludes with a 
review of relevant literature that has sought to provide a typology of FLOSS business 
models.  While this typology is useful for understanding various business strategies, we 
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have yet to link this typology with theorizations of commons-based peer production and 
non-market production in a way that complicates our understanding of capitalist firms 
that make use of FLOSS products and processes.
Political Economy of Communication
This research project has been informed by the political economy of 
communication.  At the heart of this approach is a concern for the “social relations, 
particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and 
consumption of media resources” (Mosco, 2009, 24).  By investigating power relations, 
those working from a political economic perspective are concerned with the ways in 
which power manifests itself not just as a resource to achieve particular goals, but also as 
a form of control that is embedded within a broader set of social relations.  As such, 
power itself is omnipresent throughout the social system and structures the way that 
certain relationships exist and tends to reproduce those structures over time.
To that end, those working within within political economy or, more specifically, 
a critical political economy of communication (CPEC), are interested in “uncover[ing] 
connections between ownership, corporate structure, finance capital, and market 
structures to show how economics affects technologies, politics, cultures, and 
information” (Meehan, Mosco, and Wasko, 1993, 347).  However, the concerns of those 
working within the CPEC tradition are not only scholarly; rather, they are often 
concerned with praxis or theoretically informed practice, in which scholarly activity is 
pursued with the goal of achieving more just and democratic forms of communication 
(Mosco, 2009).  Most often, this is done by exposing the ways in which power is 
manifested within communications industries, whereby the control of informational 
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production, distribution, and access or exhibition is concentrated within only a handful of 
corporations.  These large, often multinational and trans-industrial conglomerates often 
hold oligopolistic power within media markets, which limits the possibility for alternative 
or counter-hegemonic forms of communication to take place (Bagdikian, 2004; Meehan, 
2005).  By limiting the extent of available alternatives, these corporations reinforce 
systems of ideology that, in turn, tend to reinforce institutions of cultural hegemony 
(Gramsci, 1971).  The CPEC approach is therefore rooted in a tradition of critical inquiry, 
which has roots in the work of Karl Marx and his critique of classical political economy.
Of Marx and Machines...
By understanding FLOSS production from a critical and materialist perspective, 
which derives its force from the work of Marx, we can debunk some of the claims that 
digital technologies by themselves have the power to change the course of human history. 
The unique technological features of FLOSS – mainly, the availability of the source code 
and the ability to study, modify, adapt, or change the program for one's needs – is only 
one part of the equation and does not, in itself, constitute the core value of FLOSS.  
Rather, the collective labor power of the broader FLOSS community is what constitutes 
the true value of FLOSS.  Because FLOSS production as a process allows for highly 
efficient, collaborative, and speedy development, the end products of FLOSS production 
tend to be more secure, adaptable, and progressive because they are under constant 
revision and improvement by members of the FLOSS community.  From the standpoint 
of corporations like Microsoft or Oracle, which rely on the sale of proprietary software or 
services, FLOSS production offers an attractive option for investment because it 
decreases in-house labor costs while effectively outsourcing development of core 
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components that can be integrated within their proprietary services.  The exact details of 
how this is done will be the focus of the following chapters.
Marx (1867) was not the first to investigate the inner workings of capitalism and 
the processes by which wealth is created.  However, he does represent a shift in the study 
of political economy due to his criticism of previously existing political economic 
thought.  His three volumes of Capital offer some of his most thoroughly developed 
arguments about political economy, and some of the key arguments made can provide a 
framework for understanding technology and technological change within a broader set 
of social relations.  This background will prove useful as we consider the ways in which 
digital technologies have either continued or extended such relations or whether they 
mark a radical shift.
Marx (1906) begins his analysis of capitalism with a discussion of the commodity. 
He explains how life appears to be an endless procession of commodities.  The 
commodity form, however, contains two different values: use value and exchange value.  
To use a simple example, an apple has a use value if I eat the apple and receive its 
nutrients, but it can also have an exchange value if I decide to trade the apple for some 
other commodity.  Although a commodity may contain two values simultaneously, the 
commodity form is still a product of human labor.  That is, the process of human labor 
creates products in the form of commodities.  Although different types of commodities 
require different types of labor, what is common to all commodities is human labor. The 
value of commodities, then, is determined by the socially necessary labor time required to 
produce the commodities.  This is the labor theory of value.
In early economic configurations, the trading of goods for other goods could be 
expressed in the simple formula: C -- C (commodity for commodity trading), which 
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characterizes economies based on barter and trade.  In order for such a trade to take place, 
however, the producers of such goods need to agree on an equivalence in trade (i.e., ten 
apples equate to one chair).  This form of trading relies on the availability of equivalent 
goods in order for such a market to operate effectively.  In such a system, an apple farmer 
who wanted to trade apples for a chair needs certain conditions to be met in order to 
obtain the chair.  First, a chair needs to be produced.  Second, the chair needs to be 
available for trade.  Third, the person who produced the chair would have a need for 
apples.  If these criteria are met, then an exchange can occur.  To reduce the uncertainty 
of supply and demand in such a situation, the money form (M) was introduced as a 
universal equivalent to which the value of all other commodities can be equated.  So 
instead of trading ten apples for a chair, the apple farmer can sell the apples for $5.  The 
money can then be used to buy a chair when one becomes available.  The introduction of 
the money form, then, introduces a new type of market exchange, expressed as C -- M -- 
C (commodity for money for another commodity).
Capitalism, however, relies on larger scale production and a reinvestment in the 
productive process.  In such a system, we can invert the C -- M -- C circuit to be 
expressed as M -- C -- M', whereby money is invested in the production of a commodity 
with the intention of re-selling it for profit (M' or, simply, more money).  This is possible 
in a system in which certain individuals do not have any commodity to sell other than 
their labor power.  In such a system, a division exists between those who own the means 
of production and those who do not.  As such, the owners of the means of production will 
employ others who do not own the means of production.  Importantly, however, the 
owners of the means of production will only pay laborers enough to satisfy their demand, 
for the ultimate goal is to increase profits.  By doing so, those who own the means of 
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production can continuously reinvest their money into the means of production (buying 
more land, developing technology, etc.).  Consequently, those who own the means of 
production extract a certain amount of surplus value from the productive process.  Thus, 
society is divided into classes based on ownership of the means of production (capital vs. 
labor).  In order to see the ways in which this form of exploitation continues, Marx 
suggests that we delve into "the hidden abode of production” (Marx, 1906, 195).
In perhaps the most important section of Capital, Marx discusses surplus value in 
depth, including the ways in which capital continues to realize surplus value, while labor 
is subjected to various forms of exploitation.  Particularly relevant for the current study, 
however, are Marx's discussion of co-operative labor and the use of machinery.  Before 
proceeding, it is important to note that machinery is not given a determining role, per se.  
Rather, machinery is just one way in which capital constantly reinvents itself to further 
exploit labor.  The focus on machinery is therefore simply to frame the discussion of new 
digital technologies and the ways that they have been used by capital and labor alike.  
Although technological change constantly ensures that labor is always at the mercy of 
capital because labor does not own the means of production, the argument presented here 
is that it is entirely possible for technologies to be used as tools of resistance against 
unwanted encroachments by capital.  When put into the service of capital, technology is 
constantly used to increase the efficiency of production and thereby increase corporate 
profits while further alienating labor from the production process.  However, technology 
may be used by labor as a broader part of social resistance and social struggle.
Capital is constantly looking for ways to increase surplus value, which requires 
more productivity by labor.  This can be accomplished in at least two ways: absolute 
surplus labor and relative surplus labor.  Absolute surplus labor is used to describe a 
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condition in which labor is asked to work beyond the normally required working time in 
order to increase productivity.  For example, workers could be asked to work through the 
weekend as one way of increasing productivity.  On the other hand, relative surplus labor 
is realized when machinery supplements or supplants the time normally spent working by 
labor.  In this sense, workers can still work the same amount of time, thereby keeping the 
wages owed to them constant, while human labor costs can be supplemented or 
supplanted by investment in a technology that performs the same function as human 
labor.  With only limited exceptions, such a machine can be worked without the fear of 
fatigue or the need for sleep.  Therefore, production increases without the need to pay 
additional wages to workers.  This, then, is the key for understanding machinery (i.e., 
technological change) within the operation of capitalism: technology, when put in the 
service of capital, increases productivity, exploits labor, and is used for the realization of 
greater surplus value.
Continuing this line of argument, Braverman (1974) specifically provided an 
extended discussion of machinery.  Braverman's task was to begin a critical history of 
technology, which would account for the specific ways that technology has been put in 
the service of capital as a way to further exploit labor.  Braverman demonstrated how 
technological change has constantly forced labor to learn new skills in order to operate 
machinery.  Furthermore, machinery has been used to supplement and supplant human 
labor, which drove members of the working class out of work and into unemployment.  
Anyone wishing to become employed again was forced to learn how to operate new 
machinery, which furthered the cycle of exploitation.  Thus a vicious cycle of technology 
development, unemployment, and re-education was implemented as a way to constantly 
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reinvigorate the productive process while demanding that labor constantly acquire new 
skills.
Marx's analysis offers a useful framework for understanding the relationship 
between capital, labor, value and machinery.  These four factors are all intertwined in the 
relationships that exist between FLOSS programmers, their collective labor power, the 
software they create, and the corporations that make use of their software.  The labor 
theory of value can be used to understand why FLOSS as a process is so valuable.  The 
model of FLOSS production expands the possible labor force working on a piece of 
software exponentially beyond those projects that are centralized within one firm.  With 
more programmers contributing changes to the core software project, it can grow more 
efficiently and rapidly.  The contributions to the core software take the form of fixing 
bugs, developing new features, or increasing functionality in some other way.  In 
addition, and because the code is made open for anyone to view, FLOSS projects can be 
more secure than proprietary software as well, although this is not an absolute certainty.3 
While FLOSS as a process has been lauded as a highly efficient, effective, and 
innovative production model, these treatments of FLOSS often focus on how the Internet 
has made such production possible or how this model of production can change the 
nature of commercial firms.  However, the true value underlying this form of production 
is the cooperative labor of the software developers and programmers who contribute their 
labor time to the development of a FLOSS project, whether this labor is paid labor time 
or voluntary labor time.  By understanding FLOSS from the perspective of the labor 
theory of value, we shift the focus away from organizational models, the nature of the 
3 For example, in April 2014, a major security flaw was found in the open-source cryptography project, 
OpenSSL.  At the time of its discovery, the flaw, known as Heartbleed, was estimated to have affected 
nearly 66% of all Internet users.
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firm, or the technology that makes such coordinated labor possible.  Instead, we can 
focus on the people who actually perform the work and recognize that they constitute a 
larger labor force than any one firm could possibly employ.  As long as firms can 
continue to attract development from the FLOSS community for their projects, they will 
continue to enjoy the benefits of this collective labor power.
As we will see, however, corporations make use of FLOSS projects in a variety of 
ways.  Some firms view FLOSS as an existential threat to their business model and use 
specific strategies to combat FLOSS production.  Others have begun to embrace FLOSS 
because of the efficiency of its productive process and the effectiveness of its products 
even if they were once vehemently opposed to FLOSS.  Finally, firms like Red Hat have 
found a way to turn completely free software into a successful business model.
Communication Labor, Free Labor, Digital Labor
A critical understanding of capitalist production, and particularly its consequences 
for labor, is useful for understanding the ways that information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) operate today.  Political economists of communication have called 
for increased attention to be paid to communication laborers (McKercher and Mosco, 
2007; Mosco, 2006).  Communication labor encompasses a wide variety of labor, 
including those who work directly in various media industries (i.e., television, film, 
music, video game, and software industries, etc.), but it also includes various types of 
knowledge work, digital labor, and types of free labor (McKercher & Mosco, 2007; 
Scholz, 2013; Lazzarato, 1996; Terranova, 2004).
The terms “immaterial labor” and “digital labor” have found increased currency in 
contemporary debates about online life.  FLOSS labor can be viewed as a form of 
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“immaterial labor” insofar as the final products of work are “immaterial products such as 
knowledge, information, communication, [or] a relationship” (Hardt & Negri, 2005, 108). 
The term “immaterial labor” was first introduced by Lazzarato (1996) and has since been 
debated by critical scholars.4  Similar debates have occurred within critical scholarship 
circles about the nature of “digital labor” (see Scholz, 2013).  The primary concern with 
these debates has been the nature of work and labor within the information, knowledge, 
and communication industries with a particular focus on forms of unpaid labor occurring 
online (see Andrejevic, 2007, 2012; Fuchs 2012).  In these cases, users' online behaviors 
are tracked and can be transformed into an audience commodity in the same way that 
Dallas Smythe (1981) identified with broadcasting.  Whereas Smythe argued that media 
programs constitute a “free lunch” used for producing audiences for advertisers, the same 
occurs online where companies and others seek the attention of users while data is 
collected about users' browsing habits.  As most of us spend an increasing amount of time 
online during both work and non-work time, our digital labor – socially necessary time 
spent online – offers a more sophisticated form of the audience commodity as browsing 
data is extracted and transformed into value by service providers and other third-party 
elements (Fuchs, 2011a).
Similarly, Schiller's (1999) “digital capitalism” approach demonstrates how the 
growth of digital networks originated within the context of neoliberal policy in order to 
expand marketing opportunities across the globe.  In this sense, digitally networked 
technologies function merely as another way to expand capital's reach across time and 
space, while decreasing the amount of time necessary to send and receive information 
4 A fully developed account of the digital labor debates is not offered here, especially because it has been 
applied to many different types of activities online.  However, for a critique of “immaterial labor” as an 
analytical concept, see Sayers, 2007.
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about markets.  Furthermore, “digital capitalism” enables other types of market 
manipulation, especially when internetworked digital devices facilitate access to and 
greater control of information (Schiller, 1999; 2007).  In a free market, perfect 
information would be a fundamental component of buyers and sellers' abilities to make 
rational decisions.  When information can be controlled and manipulated, it completely 
undercuts the ability of markets to function equitably let alone perfectly as free markets 
(see Taibbi, 2013; Salmon & Stokes, 2010).
Similarly, Streeter (2011) has argued that the Internet and attendant 
romanticization of individualist entrepreneurs like Bill Gates arose within the neoliberal 
period.  The growth of large tech firms like Microsoft contributed further to the neoliberal 
ethos that the romantic individualist was to be glorified along with the growth of his 
company.  While this type of subjectivity continues today in so-called “creative 
industries” or in the romanticizing of start-up businesses and culture, the fragility and 
precariousness of these industries were laid bare when the dot-com bubble burst in the 
early 2000s.  The optimism about the revolutionary potential of digital devices around the 
turn of the 21st century drove massive investment capital into dot-com companies, which 
created a speculative investment bubble (Cassidy, 2002).  The companies emerging from 
that crash are now some of the most recognizable and dominant Internet-based companies 
today: Google, Amazon, eBay, Microsoft, and Yahoo!
That said, however, digital technologies have made it possible for diverse groups 
of people across vast distances to connect with one another in new ways and to produce, 
or remix, cultural artifacts.  For this reason, others have celebrated rather than critiqued 
the Internet and digital technologies.  Within this optimistic camp, scholars like Henry 
Jenkins (2006) celebrate “media convergence” and “participatory culture.”  For Jenkins, 
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media convergence is the process by which previous media formats (i.e., print, film, 
television, music, etc.) converge onto a digitally networked environment.  The fact that a 
computer allows these previously diverse forms of media to be reduced to digital 
information, which can be distributed freely across a network, provides a watershed 
moment in media history.  The argument is that users have the freedom to remix cultural 
artifacts in ways that allow them to participate in diverse meaning-making practices 
because convergence enables such interconnection.  To illustrate this, Jenkins provides 
examples of fan communities who choose to write original stories using characters from 
media franchises like Harry Potter.  This type of fan fiction can feature Harry Potter 
engaging in any number of different scenarios created by “fan-fic” authors.  Thus, media 
convergence, enabled by interconnected digital technologies, engenders a participatory 
culture in which meaning-making resides within online communities.
While Jenkins celebrates the freedom for creative cultural expression, others have 
focused on what digital technologies mean for our understanding of economics.  Tapscott 
and Williams (2006) argue that the lessons to be learned from Wikipedia mean that 
projects of mass collaboration have literally "changed everything" (which is included in 
the title of their book).  The lesson is that businesses can learn from these changes in 
order to position themselves for the future.  In addition to these works, Yochai Benkler 
(2006) offers perhaps the most sophisticated exposition of what digitally networked 
technologies mean for economics, politics, and culture.  Specifically, he focuses on the 
greater degrees of freedom, autonomy, and creativity that are made possible by such 
technologies.  In response to these celebratory approaches, however, critical political 
economists have offered more sobering accounts of how the Internet and digital 
technologies have been used in the service of global capitalism.
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In sum, we can see two distinct perspectives on digital technologies.  On the one 
hand, there are those scholars who celebrate the cultural practices made possible by 
digital technologies.  On the other, there are those scholars who claim that digital 
technologies originated with the intent to more fully network the global capitalist system 
and have only exacerbated previously existing inequalities.  In the interest of reconciling 
these two approaches, at least in some way, we can accept some of the claims of the 
digital celebrants.  Mainly, we can acknowledge that the Internet and digital technologies 
have made it possible to connect and collaborate with others in novel ways.  
Interconnection can make possible mass collaboration, commons-based peer production, 
as well as both celebratory and critical forms of meaning-making.  In addition, these 
changes have caused us to rethink some of our assumptions about economic behavior and 
the motivation for contributing to collaborative projects.  However, although technology 
has changed, the underlying class distinctions and social antagonisms that lie at the heart 
of capitalist development have not changed.  In other words, no matter how purportedly 
revolutionary or novel the technology, the technology exists within a capitalist system 
that has certain well-documented tendencies that cause it to remain relatively constant.
In this sense, Raymond Williams (1975) asserted that technology itself does not 
constitute a determining factor.  Rather, technologies are situated within a social system 
that has the ability to shape how a technology is used.  What matters is not the technology 
itself, but how it is used.  Technology, for Williams, is just one part of a broader social 
struggle that may be put to alternative uses that were previously unforeseen by its 
inventors.  While the Internet may have originated with the intention of facilitating 
greater interconnection within the global capitalist market, digital technologies may also 
be used to disrupt the flow of global capital in other ways (see, for example, “Operation 
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Payback”).5  These alternative uses of technology become important particularly when a 
commons-based resource is threatened.  To understand how FLOSS has been understood 
as a commons-based resource, the following section provides an overview of the 
commons as well as commons-based peer production and the consequences such 
practices have for the nature of capitalist firms.
The Commons
The concept of the commons has been used to describe FLOSS projects (Benkler, 
2006; Lessig, 2006, 2001).  However, FLOSS represents a particular type of commons: 
knowledge or digital commons, which have different characteristics from the more 
traditional meanings ascribed to the term.  In medieval England, the commons referred to 
a portion of land owned by the lord of the manor, in which certain tenants had the right to 
use the land for their needs.  This included cultivating the soil, producing crops, allowing 
livestock to feed, and other activities.  The concept has since been expanded from this 
very specific meaning to encompass any resource that is owned by a community or to a 
resource that may be accessed by a broader community of people.  The concept of the 
commons was critiqued most famously by Garret Hardin (1968), who developed the 
"tragedy of the commons" argument.  In Hardin's critique, he argued that the commons 
were ultimately unsustainable.  By using the example of sheep herders allowing their 
sheep to graze on a commonly owned pasture, he argued that each sheep herder, acting in 
his or her own self-interest, would want to increase their flock.  As more sheep are added 
to the pasture, it would eventually become depleted of its natural resources.
5 “Operation Payback” was a series of coordinated attacks against opponents of Internet piracy carried 
out by Internet activists operating collectively under the name, Anonymous.  For more information 
about the operation, see the Wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Payback (last 
accessed July 30, 2014).
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One of the more robust contributions to theorizing the commons comes from 
Elinor Ostrom (2004, 1990).  Ostrom (1990) provided some nuance to the way that we 
understand commons, especially because they were often placed in a binary opposition: 
either state provision of common property (socialism) or private property ownership 
(capitalism).  Ostrom focused on the diverse ways that different commons – fisheries, 
waterways, tribal lands – are managed.  In addition, Hess and Ostrom (2007) critiqued 
Hardin's argument against the commons on two points: first, Hardin assumes that the 
sheep herders are acting according to the principles of neoclassical economics and are 
individually acting in their self-interest rather than allowing for forms of common 
governance, whereby concessions are made to the other sheep herders.  Second, Hardin 
frames the issue within the binary choice between socialism and capitalism described 
above.  However, the framing is fallacious for a couple reasons.  The commons under 
feudalism were owned by a private individual and not the state.  Furthermore, Ostrom 
(1990) demonstrates how different types of commons can be governed collectively so 
that the individual short-term gains can be compromised for the long-term survival of the 
common resource.
Table 2.1 illustrates the possibilities for commons ownership by using a simple 
matrix of two factors: rivalry and excludability.  Rivalry refers to the extent to which a 
resource is finite or requires reproduction.  Highly rivalrous goods tend to be finite 
objects like apples, which need to be planted again in order to reproduce the crop, while 
low rivalry goods tend to be intangible goods that can be reproduced without much 
additional cost, like ideas, information, or knowledge.  Excludability refers to the extent 
to which an owner of such goods can exclude others from accessing or using that good.  
Highly excludable goods are protected by private property rights, whereas goods with 
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low excludability may be used by anyone.  Following from these terms, the matrix for 
rivalry and excludability would look something like this:
Table 2.1. Possibilities for Common Ownership
Excludability
High Low
Rivalry
High Individual property(finite resource)
Common property
(Infrastructure)
Low Intellectual property(books, music, consulting) 
Knowledge commons
(FLOSS)
Source: Table adapted from Hess & Ostrom (2007) and Frischmann (2012).
FLOSS represents a knowledge commons in which knowledge – in the form of 
source code, README files, software packages, and the shared documentation required 
in collaborative production – is freely available for anyone to use and at no additional 
cost for reproduction.  One of the unique characteristics of free software as a knowledge 
commons is that it avoids the free-rider problem, whereby someone who consumes or 
uses a resource does not give back to the community.  An example is the Linux-based 
operating system, Ubuntu.  I currently use Ubuntu, but did not need to pay for it, nor any 
of the software included on my computer.  While I may not yet have the skills to make 
full use of the options available to me (i.e., writing or adapting code, tinkering with 
software packages, etc.), I can still use programs and report any flaws or “bugs,” I 
encounter while using the software.  I can report these bugs directly to the development 
community when I encounter them, or I can choose to share certain data about my 
operating system's performance with the community upon installing it.  When reported, 
someone within the community can work on fixing the issue and ultimately submit his or 
her fix to the project manager for inclusion in a subsequent release of the software, or the 
fix may be distributed as an update to all users.  This process is reflective of the adage 
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“with many eyes, all bugs are shallow,” (Raymond, 2000) which makes it possible for the 
programs and operating system to maintain a high quality over time.  In effect, my use of 
free software serves as a form of quality control.
Commons-Based Peer Production
Because FLOSS exhibits the unique characteristics of knowledge commons and 
because FLOSS production takes place within a digitally networked environment, some 
scholars have focused specifically on the production process enabled by digitally 
networked technologies (Benkler, 2006).  Specifically, Benkler (2006) highlights the 
ways in which commons-based peer production constitutes a new form of organization 
that is “radically decentralized, collaborative, and nonproprietary; based on sharing 
resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely connected individuals who 
cooperate with each other without relying on either market signals or managerial 
commands” (60).  Benkler positions social production in general and peer production in 
particular in contradistinction to market-based production, arguing that these forms of 
production constitute a form of non-market production.  While these spheres are not 
mutually exclusive, Benkler argues that diverse forms of non-market production, like 
FLOSS, have the capability to influence market production.
Peer production can challenge market-based production in at least a couple of 
ways.  First, peer production can develop goods that will compete directly with those 
produced by commercial firms.  In this case, the commercial firm has a few different 
options: compete, do nothing, or adopt and adapt.  If the firm chooses to compete, it will 
simply be required to somehow create a better product than that offered by the non-
market rival, although this may come at considerable cost to the firm.  On the other hand, 
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the firm can choose to do nothing.  In this case, the firm is basically relying on the belief 
that its products are superior to the non-market option and that the non-market option will 
not gain additional market share.  This is a risky strategy for the commercial firm.  In the 
event that the non-market option does gain an increasing share of the market, the 
commercial firm, or at least its product that directly competes with the peer-produced 
option, runs the risk of becoming obsolete.  The third option is to adapt to the changing 
forces in the market by adopting some of the strategies of the non-market forces.  This 
type of strategic reorientation to non-market forces can have the consequence of altering 
the basic structure of an organization.  As Benkler (2006) notes,
As  the  companies  that  adopt  this  strategic  reorientation 
become more integrated into  the peer-production process 
itself,  the  boundary  of  the  firm  becomes  more  porous. 
Participation  in  the  discussions  and  governance  of  open 
source development projects  creates new ambiguity as to 
where, in relation to what is 'inside' and 'outside' of the firm 
boundary, the social process is (125).
Altering the firm's position in relation to peer production, which exists outside the 
firm, arguably offers a higher form of risk for the firm.  The firm gives up a certain level 
of control over the production process.  The traditional view of a firm's control over its 
informational resources or, more specifically, knowledge, is that knowledge can be 
viewed as an asset to be managed as an investment (Machlup, 1962).  However, the peer-
production process in general is seen as far more innovative and efficient than centralized 
production, including outside the realm of software production (Von Hippel, 2005).  As a 
knowledge commons, FLOSS advocates encourage users to tinker, adapt, improve upon, 
or otherwise create something new.  In this sense, FLOSS projects rely on intellectual 
property rights that allow users to make changes to a project.  Proprietary and closed 
forms of production rely on strong intellectual property protection and the ability to 
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exploit those property rights across a variety of platforms.  For example, before 
contributing to Linux kernel development, Microsoft was (and, in many ways, still 
remains) notorious for particularly strong protection of its intellectual property.  
Microsoft's model of production demands that only employees of the company have 
access to and work with their proprietary code.  This differs from the open source model, 
whereby small, incremental changes to the open code are released early and often so that 
many eyeballs can study the code and make improvements.  Von Hippel (2005) argues 
that innovation is much more effective in this latter model.  Although he does not limit 
his analysis specifically to software development, Von Hippel argues that users of 
products like bicycles and surfboards routinely customize or adapt such products to their 
particular needs.  When someone buys a bicycle, he or she is free to add or remove other 
parts or components of the bicycle to fit his or her particular need.  Indeed, it would be 
absurd to think of a bicycle that was protected in such a way that did not allow users to 
change a tire.  Keeping products like bicycles or software open enough for users to 
customize, adapt, modify, or improve upon fosters a system of innovation that is much 
more connected with users' unique needs.  This type of open innovation is opposed to 
closed and proprietary innovation, which is driven by a single corporation's in-house 
capability, potential profitability, and perceived market need rather than real user demand.
Technologies that are sufficiently “open” enough to allow for this type of 
tinkering and adaptation are known as generative technologies (Zittrain, 2008).  Zittrain 
(2008) identifies five principle factors in measuring the generativity of a technology.  
First, how extensively does the technology leverage a set of possible tasks?  In other 
words, the more functions that a particular technology can serve is directly related to the 
extent to which a technology can produce change.  More possibilities equate to greater 
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opportunities for change.  Second, how well can the technology be adapted to a range of 
tasks?  In other words, how easily can the technology be built upon or modified?  Third, 
how easily can new contributors master the technology?  Fourth, how easily accessible is 
the technology to those ready and able to build on it?  Finally, how easily can the changes 
be transferred to other users and, especially, non-experts?  By applying these five 
questions, we can measure the extent of a technology's generativity.
Importantly, Zittrain's (2008) argument is based on emerging trends that he sees as 
threatening the generativity of the Internet.  Specifically, he identifies three specific ways 
that the generativity of the Internet is being attenuated.  The first trend is tethered 
appliances, which refers to the centrally controlled information devices we use to access 
the Internet (i.e., mobile phones, gaming consoles, and tablets).  While tethered 
appliances make it very easy to assure functionality and distribute updates as they 
become available, users are generally not allowed to make changes to these devices or the 
software running on them.  Control of the device is centralized by the vendor.  Zittrain 
argues that this is, on balance, a problematic trend for two reasons.  This increases the 
possibility for regulating both the Internet and the devices used to access the Internet, 
while also decreasing the possibility for disruptive innovation to occur.  In effect, tethered 
devices enable a system of more complete surveillance and control so that unintended 
uses or modifications of the technology become criminal activities.
The second trend that Zittrain sees as threatening the generativity of the Internet is 
through software as a service (SaaS).  Whereas his argument against tethered appliances 
focused on hardware, Zittrain's argument against SaaS focuses on software.  In SaaS, the 
storage and maintenance of software becomes centralized by a vendor.  While this can 
ensure functionality and ease the distribution of security updates, the end users do not 
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have control over their software.  They cannot study, modify, adjust, or make changes to 
the software for their own purposes.  In effect, the user's software is stored in “the cloud,” 
which places it out of the control of the user.  What makes SaaS even more problematic is 
that user data is sent to the software vendor, effectively serving as a form of spyware or 
surveillance of users' activities.  Zittrain uses the metaphor of a walled garden to illustrate 
how SaaS functions.  In effect, the carrier or service provider has control over 
applications, content, or media, while restricting convenient access to non-approved 
applications or content.  This is in contrast to an open platform, where users are granted 
unrestricted access to applications or content.
Finally, the third trend threatening the generativity of the Internet is perfect 
enforcement.  This trend synthesizes the concerns of the previous two – tethered 
appliances and SaaS – to identify the broader concerns of operating under such a system 
and the ways that user behavior can be controlled.  Vendors may preempt unforeseen or 
unintended uses of technology by placing greater protections on the technology.  For 
example, stronger intellectual property protection can restrict user behavior by 
criminalizing certain uses.  In addition, vendors may issue specific injunctions against 
certain types of behavior.  These would take the form of tailored remedies to any issues 
after they arise, such as security updates, fixes, or retroactive edits of software.  Finally, 
the last way that perfect enforcement is made possible is simply through surveillance.  
Vendors can gather data about user practices and, perhaps, adjust future designs to cater 
more directly to user preferences.  For example, Apple gathers data on which applications 
are downloaded onto a user's iPhone.
Zittrain's argument about the future of the Internet is important, especially if we 
consider the ways in which generativity is important for innovation.  But, even on a more 
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general level, Zittrain's arguments can be contextualized within broader considerations of 
the way we frame information as a resource.  Fritz Machlup (1962) was one of the first 
scholars to propose that knowledge could serve as an economic resource, and Machlup's 
work was one of the first to popularize the idea of the information society.  However, 
knowledge and information are typically viewed from a supply-side perspective, 
especially in economics literature that treats these factors as investment costs for the firm. 
Arguing from an alternative perspective, Frischmann (2012) suggests that we can view 
knowledge, information, and cultural resources as a form of intellectual infrastructure.  
Doing so will position these resources as “basic inputs into a wide variety of productive 
activities,” which “often produce public and social goods that generate spillovers that 
benefit society as a whole” (Frischmann, 2012, xii).  Such an argument resonates nicely 
with the arguments in favor of promoting commons-based peer production for the 
purpose of enabling greater innovation (Benkler, 2006; Von Hippel, 2005).  By framing 
knowledge and information as an infrastructural component of social development, 
protecting the knowledge commons becomes crucially important to the survival of 
commons-based peer production. 
The concept of the commons is useful for thinking about informational resources.  
Given the increasing interconnectivity between people across vast spatial boundaries with 
the ability to communicate and collaborate in online environments, maintaining a base of 
commonly held resources that can be used for peer-production remains a central concern 
for facilitating more open and democratic forms of communication.  This is particularly 
the case because the commons are subjected to the threat of enclosure, whereby the 
commonly-held resource is privatized in a such a way that the right of access to the 
commons is stripped away.  Exactly how this occurs, however, differs depending on the 
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type of commons under consideration.  To explain how enclosure threatens different 
types of commons, the following section focuses on enclosure.
The Threat of Enclosure
The commons are generally held in contradistinction to private property.  In other 
words, once the commons become commodified or privatized, they cease to be commons 
and are in the service of capital.  The process by which commons become transformed 
into private property is known as enclosure.  Historically, the enclosure of common land 
in England took place in varying degrees between the 15th century to the 19th century.6  
Enclosure took various forms throughout this period, including voluntary enclosures, 
forced enclosure, parliamentary legislation, and others.  Throughout this process, 
ownership of common land was transferred to private owners, who then had the right to 
restrict access to the land.  This effectively ended the open field system, whereby 
commoners had a traditional right to use open fields for feeding livestock, farming, or 
harvesting from the land.  While historians still debate the extent to which enclosure 
exacerbated class divisions and played an integral role in the development of capitalism 
in general, the process nonetheless drastically affected the relationship between 
commoners, capitalists, and the commonly held resources that once provided a means of 
subsistence for commoners.  Moreover, the state played a crucial role in facilitating 
enclosure through the Enclosure Acts, which were passed between the 18th and 19th 
centuries in England and Wales (Polanyi, 2001).
6 A fuller historical account of English enclosures is not possible here, especially because of the diverse 
ways that common lands were enclosed. For some interpretations of this process, see Neeson, 1993; 
Thompson, 1966; and Marx, 1906, especially Chapter 27: “Expropriation from the Agricultural 
Population from the Land,” which is freely available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch27.htm 
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Enclosure of common land was accomplished by literally erecting fences around 
previously open fields.  Enclosure of knowledge commons, however, depends on 
restricting access or prohibiting certain uses of informational resources.  James Boyle 
(2003) refers to the process of enclosing the knowledge commons as the Second 
Enclosure Movement, whereby increasingly protective intellectual property rights are 
restricting access to those things which were once considered common property.  
Focusing more on the consequences of the enclosure of digital spaces, Mark 
Andrejevic uses the term digital enclosure to refer to the process by which two distinct 
classes are formed online: “those who control privatized interactive spaces (virtual or 
otherwise), and those who submit to particular forms of monitoring in order to gain 
access to goods, services, and conveniences” (Andrejevic, 2007, 3).  In other words, 
Internet users, as a class, have nothing to sell but their data, which serves as a form of 
value production for Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which represent a class that 
controls the means of digital production.  In this sense, the ISPs can restrict access to 
their sites unless users agree to the Terms of Service (ToS) or End User Licensing 
Agreement (EULA).  These non-negotiable contracts place restrictions on how users may 
interact with the site.  The effect of these agreements is to enclose informational 
resources, which are controlled by ISPs.
Concerns about digital enclosure are conceptually similar to Zittrain's (2008) 
arguments about how the generativity of the Internet is being threatened.  In addition, 
Tim Wu (2010), argues that new technologies generally follow a pattern, which he simply 
calls “The Cycle.”  The cycle begins when a new technology is introduced and a 
relatively chaotic period of experimentation and innovation occurs.  Gradually, however, 
as multiple producers vie for control of the technology and, by extension, control of an 
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industry, a free, open, and competitive market tends to become institutionalized when one 
or a few firms control the vast majority of production.  In such a state, competition 
becomes moribund and the dominant firms strategically work to maintain the status quo 
until a new disruptive technology enters the market and the cycle from an open to 
controlled market repeats itself.  Murdock and Golding (1973) describe a similar 
situation, whereby media industries move from differentiation to concentration: 
Firstly, small-scale or personalized production of a cultural 
product expands. Distribution and selling become separated 
anc commercialized. As new technology enters the medium, 
production  becomes  industrialized  and  consumption 
becomes  large-scale  and  impersonal.  This  process  of 
differentiation is succeeded by a period in which the growth 
of the industry reaches saturation and is hit by a series of 
pressures  due  to  rising  costs,  declining  revenue,  and  a 
changing  pattern  of  demand...The  final  stage  in  this 
sequence  involves  a  developing  tension  between  new 
technological potentialities on the one hand and economic 
concentration on the other (207). 
Notably, for Murdock and Golding (1973), the focus is on general trends within industrial 
economic activity, and the authors situate new technological development between its 
potential for democratic use and its use in the service of capital.  For Wu, on the other 
hand, the focus is on the technology itself and the ways that technology is used.  Wu 
warns that the cycle of the Internet is trending toward a closed market, whereby it is 
being subject to greater regulation by governments and fewer big firms are wielding 
power.  Indeed, McChesney (2013) demonstrates how a few dominant companies now 
control much of what takes place online.  These companies are those that survived the 
dot-com crash of 2001 and have become recognizable names: Google, Amazon, eBay, 
Apple, Microsoft, and others.  All of this suggests that the digital commons are indeed 
becoming enclosed in certain ways.
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Digital enclosure would seem to follow a similar pattern to more traditional forms 
of enclosure.  However, the process or act of enclosing a commons generally denotes a 
linear process with a predefined outcome.  As capitalist relations expand, resources 
generally move from open to closed systems.  In this sense, resources are generally 
thought of in dichotomous terms as either open or closed systems.  While a finite 
resource such as land may be thought of in these terms, knowledge or digital commons 
have certain unique characteristics that resist such an easy interpretation.  Knowledge can 
be reproduced and distributed more easily than finite resources and, as such, knowledge 
commons can contain elements that are proprietary as well as elements that are protected 
as a commons-based resource.  Indeed, this is most often the case for FLOSS code that is 
supported by or used within proprietary software companies.  This blending of both 
commons-based and proprietary resources can lead to struggles for control of 
informational resources, which are often legal battles for control over intellectual 
property.
As Rossiter & Zehle (2013) argue, however, the commons are not purely “given 
as a fragile heritage to be protected” against enclosure, but they must be actively 
constructed.  FLOSS communities actively produce knowledge commons as code is 
produced and licensed under intellectual property licenses that permit users to use the 
code and adapt it for their own purposes.  These alternative intellectual property licenses 
take many different forms.  The original copyleft license to see widespread use was the 
GNU General Public License.7  Other notable examples of alternative intellectual 
property licenses, particularly because of their widespread use, are the many variations of 
7 The text of the GNU General Public License (GPL) can be found at 
http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html (last accessed July 7, 2014).
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the Creative Commons licenses,8 which allow varying levels of use for the protected 
property under conditions set by the creator.  For example, users may make their creation 
freely available and permit others to use it, as long as those users provide attribution to 
the original author.  In addition to these licenses, certain companies have created licenses 
that have different levels of restriction and permission.  Most often, these licenses are 
designed with a particular goal in mind, with the company wanting to allow certain uses 
of the code while protecting against others.9  As CHAPTER VI demonstrates, the licenses 
created by corporations can often lead to conflicts over commons-based resources.
As an increasing number of corporations are choosing to get involved in FLOSS 
projects, there is a risk that FLOSS project development may increasingly be driven by 
corporate imperatives.  In the final section of this chapter, the different types of 
involvement that corporations can have with FLOSS projects are discussed.  The purpose 
of this final section is simply to introduce a typology for understanding these dynamics.  
While the typology identifies general tendencies for corporate involvement in FLOSS, 
this does not mean that contradictions or differences cannot be found within particular 
case studies.  Indeed, a more in-depth discussion of the ways corporations are involved in 
FLOSS projects is reserved for the following chapters and includes the ways that 
corporations have profited from FLOSS, the ways they have tried to fight FLOSS 
projects, and the ways that the broader FLOSS community has resisted unwanted 
corporate encroachment into their projects.  
8 The Creative Commons Licenses can be found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last accessed 
July 7, 2014). 
9 A full examination of the rights granted by different types of alternative copyright licenses is beyond 
the scope of the present study.  Certain licenses will be discussed in the case study chapters, but 
Wikipedia features a good comparison of free and open source software licenses for those who are 
interested. The Wikpedia page can be found at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_free_software_licences (last accessed July 7, 2014). 
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Open Source Business Models
The previous sections of this literature review focused on the ways in which 
FLOSS as a knowledge commons is beneficial for development, production, innovation, 
and democracy.  I also discussed why a political economy of communication approach 
can be useful for understanding the ways that FLOSS as a knowledge commons may be 
subject to undue corporate influence and, perhaps, enclosure.  In this final section, the 
focus is on how FLOSS has been used by corporations, which establishes a framework 
for understanding the different ways that businesses have tried to profit from involvement 
in free software.  This framework relies heavily on the typology developed by Deek and 
McHugh (2008), since they provide one of the few attempts at categorizing the different 
ways in which businesses have approached FLOSS.
As part of their broader treatment of open source software, Deek and McHugh 
(2008) develop a typology of open source business models (Deek & McHugh, 2008, 
272).  The typology contains five different models that have been used in trying to profit 
from FLOSS.  Table 2.2 provides an illustration of this typology, providing the types of 
business strategies employed, a description of the strategy, and an example of a company 
or product that is representative of the strategy.
The first business model relies on dual licensing, in which the owner of 
copyrighted software provides free and open distributions for nonprofit users but requires 
for-profit customers to pay a fee to use the software.  The exemplary case here is 
MySQL, which is an open source database management system.  The company provides 
a free version of its software under the General Public License (GPL), which stipulates 
that any derivative software using the GPL-licensed software must also be made available 
under the same license.  MySQL also provides an advanced commercial version of its 
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software to for-profit corporations, which can be customized to the users' specific needs 
or integrated with that company's proprietary software.
Table 2.2. Types of Open Source Business Strategies
Business Strategy Description Examples
Dual Licensing
Owner of copyrighted software 
provides free and open 
distributions for non-profit 
users, but requires for-profit 
users to pay a fee to use the 
software.
MySQL
Consulting
Company assists other 
companies with planning, 
strategy, and implementing 
appropriate open source 
solutions within their business.
OSSCube, Olliance 
Consulting (a division of 
Black Duck Software), LQ 
Consulting
Distribution & Services
Company provides services for 
non-expert computer users by 
handling the compilation of 
stable, updated, and 
prepackaged software suites 
that are distributed to users 
(clients).
Red Hat, Canonical
Hybrid Open/Proprietary – 
Vertical Development
Using open source software as 
a base upon which proprietary 
software can be built.
Google, Sun Microsystems 
(i.e., StarOffice and 
OpenOffice)
Hybrid Open/Proprietary – 
Horizontal Arrangements
For-profit company becomes 
directly involved in supporting 
open source projects to 
supplement its own business 
operations.
IBM, Microsoft
Source: Table is adapted from Deek & McHugh (2008, 272).
The second type of business model is one in which a company provides 
consulting services for FLOSS.  Quite simply, companies that adopt this model assist 
other companies with planning, strategy, and implementing appropriate open source 
solutions within their business models.  Among other things, Black Duck Software 
provides consulting services through its Olliance Consulting division.
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The third business model is one in which a company provides FLOSS 
distributions and services, and the exemplary company here is Red Hat.  Unlike MySQL, 
which owns the copyrights for its software, Red Hat creates and provides its own 
distribution of Linux.  In addition, Red Hat provides training, eduction, documentation, 
and support for its Linux distribution.  In other words, Red Hat provides a service for 
non-expert computer users by handling the compilation of stable, updated, and 
prepackaged software suites to be distributed to users.  In some ways, then, Red Hat 
behaves similarly to a proprietary software provider, except that it does not own the 
intellectual property rights for the software it sells and services.  Rather, the company 
sells and provides its own Linux distribution, which it is able to do because of the open 
licensing model of Linux.
Whereas the first three business models are solely related to FLOSS, the 
remaining two rely on a hybrid of both open and proprietary software.  The fourth model 
is a hybrid of both proprietary and open software that relies on vertical development with  
FLOSS.  Vertical development means using open source software as a base upon which 
proprietary software can be built.  One of the major corporations that uses this model is 
Google.  In fact, Google does not sell its software at all; it develops and maintains its own 
software in-house, while selling services provided by its software to other customers.  Of 
course, Google's search engine is proprietary, but Google uses the Linux core to support 
its proprietary search services.
The final model is a hybrid of proprietary and open software, but one in which the 
company relies on horizontal arrangements.  This is the business model that lies at the 
heart of this dissertation project.  In these relationships, for-profit corporations become 
involved in open source projects.  Drawing from Fogel (2005), Deek and McHugh (2008) 
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claim that the reasons for corporate involvement are diverse, but include everything from 
spreading “the burden, cost, and risk of software development across multiple enterprises 
to allowing companies to support open source projects that play a supportive or 
complementary role to their own commercial products” (277).  IBM is one example of 
this type of business model.  For example, IBM's WebSphere application, which enables 
end-users to create their own applications, was built using the Apache web server, which 
is open source.  Thus, by supporting open source projects like Apache, IBM is indirectly 
supporting its own interests.  Furthermore, IBM directly competes with Microsoft as a 
platform for applications.  Because IBM supports Linux, it is not only investing in the 
reliability of its own products but may simultaneously weaken Microsoft's market 
position, especially because Linux is also a direct competitor of Microsoft.
In sum, then, this section has discussed how FLOSS has been used in differing 
ways by drawing on the typology developed by Deek and McHugh (2008).  The most 
fruitful area of study for the purposes of this project was the hybrid open/proprietary 
model that relies on horizontal arrangements, although other projects are discussed, like 
MySQL, which represents other types of business strategies.  The corporations that rely 
on horizontal arrangements are most interesting because of their direct involvement in 
FLOSS projects.  Thus, these companies need to maintain a good relationship with the 
broader FLOSS community.  When the norms of the community are violated by a 
company, the community can abandon a project, which can effectively end commons-
based production on the project.  In this sense, the FLOSS community leverages its 
collective labor power against undue corporate influence in its commons-based resources. 
This was the case when the Oracle Corporation acquired Sun Microsystems.  This case 
will be discussed in greater detail in CHAPTER VI.  For now, however, it is important to 
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note the two different examples of companies using hybrid horizontal agreements to two 
different ends.  In the case of IBM, the company was able to maintain a relatively stable 
relationship with the open source community.  In the other, Oracle overstepped its bounds 
by violating the norms of the community.  As more and more corporations become 
involved in FLOSS projects, the relationships that exist between the community and the 
corporations that rely on their collective labor power will be subject to changes.  These 
dynamics are the primary concern of this dissertation.
Summary
This chapter focused on how FLOSS production can be understood as both a 
process as well as the products created by that process.  The focus was on how FLOSS 
can be understood as a commons and, more specifically, as a knowledge commons with 
certain unique characteristics.  Mainly, they are resources characterized by low rivalry 
and low excludability, which do not make them susceptible to the same types of 
enclosure that befell common lands.  Rather, knowledge commons can, at times, contain 
both proprietary and nonproprietary elements.  This, in turn, can lead to conflict within 
the commons.  Most often, this conflict comes in the form of licensing disputes when a 
corporation makes an ownership claim to the commonly held resource.  In this sense, 
knowledge commons like FLOSS may be susceptible to total enclosure but, more often, 
are incorporated into a corporation's broader strategy.  As such, corporations see a certain 
value in FLOSS production and FLOSS projects.
Because this dynamic can lead to conflict and contradiction within the commons, 
the political economy of communications approach can be a useful framework for 
understanding this phenomenon.  Informed by critical political economy, this approach 
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focuses on the ways by which corporations wield power over communication resources.  
Drawing from Marx's dialectical understanding of labor and capital, the critical political 
economic approach to the study of commnication resources stresses the primacy of 
human labor that underlies communicative resources.  Rather than focusing on the 
innovative or purportedly revolutionary nature of the technology itself, critical political 
economy responds by refocusing our attention on the specific cultural practices and 
collective labor that make up both the technology and its attendant practices.  Indeed, this 
chapter argued that FLOSS production is powerful because of the scale of its collective 
and co-operative labor power.  Furthermore, many of the unique characteristics of FLOSS 
labor make FLOSS projects an attractive option for corporations that are looking to 
harness such power.  On the other hand, increasing corporate presence in the commons 
may have detrimental effects for the broader FLOSS community.
This points to a gap in the previous theoretical literature on FLOSS products and 
processes.  FLOSS products have been understood as a form of knowledge commons, 
whereby anyone has the right to study, modify, adapt, or otherwise make changes to the 
resource to suit his or her own needs.  The productive processes used within FLOSS 
communities have been theorized as commons-based peer production, which enables 
forms of non-market production.  Finally, some of the previous literature has attempted to 
arrive at a typology of different strategies that businesses can use to profit from FLOSS 
products and services.  What becomes clear, however, is that these treatments either 
overgeneralize and fail to address the idiosyncrasies of various types of FLOSS projects, 
or they establish hard boundaries between market-based and non-market production.  
This study seeks to complicate these understandings of FLOSS by providing examples of 
how corporations are making use of commons-based resources and commons-based peer 
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production by becoming involved in FLOSS projects.  Rather than a unified theory to 
explain these strategies, the following chapters provide only certain examples of the 
different ways that corporations have approached involvement in FLOSS projects.  
Furthermore, this project seeks to identify strategies used by the FLOSS community to 
resist undue corporate influence.  Before presenting these case studies, the following 
chapter explains how the research was conducted.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER II laid out some of the main issues and contradictions that are at the 
center of this project.  Specifically, I explained why a critical political economy of 
communication approach is a particularly useful research framework for addressing these 
questions because of its focus on the production, distribution, and exhibition or 
consumption of communications resources.  More specifically, political economists are 
interested in how power relations manifest themselves within communication industries.  
Since FLOSS depends upon and is constituted by communicative activity, political 
economy is well suited to address the primary concerns of maintaining just and 
democratic forms of communication.  Then, I focused on how FLOSS can be understood 
as a knowledge commons with certain unique characteristics.  Finally, I complicated this 
framing of FLOSS resources by describing the ways that commons become enclosed and 
how FLOSS may be at risk of enclosure in certain ways.  While CHAPTER II 
highlighted the central tension at the heart of this project, CHAPTER III focuses 
primarily on how the current project was approached methodologically and what specific 
research methods were used in the course of research.
To that end, this chapter begins by revisiting the research questions guiding the 
project.  Following this review, the following section discusses the methodological 
approach employed in this study and the specific methods used to address the research 
questions.  Finally, and because this study included human subjects as part of the research 
process, the chapter concludes with some brief information about the review and 
approval of this project by the institutional review board.
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Research Questions
Free and open source software has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars 
and, increasingly, the broader business community.  Most of this attention has focused on 
the novel productive process enabled by commons-based peer production or the potential 
for profitable business practices.  Significantly less attention has been given to the 
dynamics that exist between FLOSS communities and the corporations that make use of 
their intellectual labor.  While business models may change and adapt to emerging trends 
as corporations seek higher profits, the underlying labor that comprises the power of the 
productive process does not change – at least insofar as the products of collective 
intellectual labor are sold for profit.  As discussed in the previous chapters, extant 
research has largely focused on how companies or society, writ large, can leverage the 
collective labor power of the FLOSS community to foster innovation or democratize 
productive processes.  This project focused more specifically on the ways that 
corporations make use of this collective power in different ways and to what extent these 
corporations wield power within FLOSS communities to focus development on certain 
projects that are instrumental to the goals of the corporation.  In sum, the current study is 
guided by the following research questions:
RQ1: What is the relationship between proprietary, for-profit corporations 
and free and open source software (FLOSS) communities, and how has this 
relationship changed over time?
RQ1a: What are the power dynamics between corporations and the 
FLOSS community?  In other words, which party holds the ability to 
exert influence on the other?
RQ2: What constitutes value for each of these stakeholders?  What value do 
corporations provide for the FLOSS community, and what value does the 
FLOSS community provide for corporations?  Are there any external factors 
or other stakeholders who may profit from this relationship?
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To expound on these research questions, RQ1 exists at a descriptive level: the 
question required an assessment of the current relationship between FLOSS communities 
and corporations, as well as an historical account of how this relationship has developed 
over time.  RQ1a supplemented the descriptive information provided by RQ1 by 
investigating the power dynamics between corporations and FLOSS communities.  The 
goal of this question was to determine who is able to influence what projects are 
undertaken, whether they will succeed, and whom they will benefit.  FLOSS has been 
characterized as a more democratic form of organizing communication (Benkler, 2006), 
thus RQ1a investigated whether corporate involvement in FLOSS provides some 
evidence that this seemingly democratic form of organizing communication is becoming 
institutionalized.
RQ2 was essentially an economic question, which also required a description of 
how corporations and FLOSS communities provide value for one another.  FLOSS 
communities have been described as gift economies (Söderberg, 2008) or a form of 
commons-based peer production (Benkler, 2006).  However, the intention of this project 
was to critically assess these claims by determining what value FLOSS communities 
produce for corporations as well as what value corporations produce for FLOSS 
communities.  While this question required analysis of what value each party holds for 
one another, or a relational value, the value within each community was studied as well.  
This question also allowed me to investigate whether FLOSS products can be called 
commodities in the traditional sense, and in what ways they differ, if at all.  Finally, RQ2 
necessitated an analysis of any additional stakeholders are involved in the relationship 
between corporations and FLOSS communities.
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To address these research questions, a largely qualitative multi-method approach 
was used, including document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and some basic data 
mining of FLOSS projects.  Since this project was concerned with gaining an 
understanding of the dynamics that exist between corporations and the FLOSS 
community, both document analysis and semi-structured interviews were used to 
understand corporate structures and strategies, as well as to understand FLOSS 
communities.  FLOSS projects depend on extensive and accurate documentation to make 
the development of projects run effectively and efficiently, and these documents are made 
publicly available so that other developers can work on the project.  The source code is 
one form of documentation, which enables users to understand how a project works, but 
many FLOSS projects also contain credits files, licensing disclosures, README files, 
and other documents that provide essential information to users.  This information, as 
well as the information found on publicly available discussion lists, was combined with 
qualitative disclosures from interview subjects to understand the dynamics between the 
corporations and the community.  Furthermore, the information gathered from these 
sources were combined with personal experiences using Linux and attending a variety of 
different events and meetings focused on FLOSS.10  A more thorough discussion of the 
methods and materials used for this project follows the next section, which discusses the 
methodological approach.
10 Specifically, these included a trip to OSCON, the Open Source Convention, in Portland, OR, as well as  
involvement in Eugene Unix Gnu Linux User's Group (EUGLUG) meetings and public talks in 
Eugene, OR.  
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Methodological Approach
Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring 
out  empirically,  and  without  any  mystification  and 
speculation,  the  connection  of  the  social  and  political 
structure with production. The social structure and the State 
are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite 
individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in 
their own or other people’s imagination, but as they really 
are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as 
they  work  under  definite  material  limits,  presuppositions 
and conditions independent of their will (Marx, 1845, 41).
The quote from Marx comes from a section of The German Ideology that 
discusses the essence of historical materialism.  The quote represents a methodological 
approach to inquiry that is guided by particular assumptions about how reality can be 
understood and described.  The quote also nicely summarizes the goals of researchers 
working within the critical political economy of communication – that is, to connect the 
definite processes of material production with broader social and political structures.
Most often, the inquiries of critical political economists of communication are 
directed at large corporations that hold extensive market power and the ability to 
influence the production, distribution, exhibition, or access of communication resources.  
In the process of investigation, the aim of critical political economists is to empirically 
investigate the material operations of corporations and connect those operations to the 
broader social system.  The connections made to the social system can be situated within 
national boundaries while accounting for the attendant institutions (religious, legal, 
cultural, etc.) that encourage or discourage certain types of behavior, but can also be 
made across those boundaries (internationally, regionally, globally).
By making these connections, political economists search for the general 
tendencies of corporate behavior within a particular social system rather than seeking to 
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establish absolute laws.  This allows the inquiry to remain open to the possibility of 
contradictory factors, while also allowing for an account of diverse corporate practices 
both within and across media industries.  Indeed, the contradictory factors provide the 
illuminating moments for critical researchers, particularly because they provide 
opportunity for critique and resistance.  To this end, critical political economists of 
communication have provided important critiques of media corporations, especially the 
ways in which they operate in conjunction with the general tendencies of a broader 
capitalist system.  As Meehan (1999) notes, “critical scholars share an ethical obligation 
to produce knowledge that accurately describes the media and reveals the hidden 
dynamics whereby media corporations attempt to commercialize and control expression 
in service to advertisers and ultimately to capital” (162).
To search for such hidden dynamics, the current study employed a critical 
interpretive methodological approach often used by critical political economists of 
communication (CPEC).  Maxwell (2003) describes this approach as used by Herbert I. 
Schiller, a pioneering scholar working within the CPEC tradition.  When working from a 
critical perspective, one situates research findings within broader bodies of knowledge 
and looks for disjunctures or contradictions arising from within the field of study.  These 
contradictions or disjunctures can provide germane moments for research, from which 
previously accepted understandings can be challenged and refined.  In this sense, CPEC 
scholars tend to resist interpreting research findings according to their face value or as 
prima facie evidence.  Rather, the research findings are brushed against the grain of 
alternative bodies of knowledge as a way to situate the results within a broader set of 
relationships.  Similarly, Mosco (2009) describes his epistemological stance as being 
constitutive.  That is, CPEC scholars resist causal, linear determinations as well as the 
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assumption that units of analysis are fully formed wholes.  Instead, critical political 
economists favor an epistemological position that is based on mutually constitutive 
processes, which act on one another throughout various stages of formation.  In this 
sense, the approach is dialectical in that it considers both particular and more general 
phenomenon as part of a totality of processes.  These concerns are carried with the 
researcher throughout the research process, regardless of what type of evidence is being 
investigated or how it is being gathered.
To facilitate this type of investigation, critical political economists use a variety of 
methods.  However, the selection of method is often driven by the amount of access that 
the researcher has to the subject being studied.  When direct access to corporation is 
available, critical political economists rely on research methods such as interviewing, 
participant observation, ethnographic methods, and other methods that allow for direct 
observation of the life-processes of definite individuals as they operate or produce 
materially.  In turn, these observations can be linked with the “definite material limits, 
presuppositions and conditions independent of their will” (Marx, 1845, 41).  When we do 
not have direct access to corporations, critical political economists rely on documentary 
evidence of corporate operations and the material production taking place within the 
corporation.  Most often, this data comes from documents that are produced by and about 
the corporation.  To that end, the following section discusses the specific methods used in 
this study.
Research Methods
The methods used in this study focused primarily on document or textual 
analyses, but documentary data was supplemented by qualitative, semi-structured 
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interviews with programmers and other representatives from the open-source community. 
The original intent of this project was to include similar interviews with representatives 
from the corporations under investigation, but these plans needed to be slightly altered 
during the course of study after I was unable to secure any meaningful interactions with 
corporate representatives, particularly at Microsoft.  Consequently, I needed to rely more 
heavily on documentary sources throughout the study.
The documentary or textual, and interview analysis methods were conducted at 
two levels of analysis.  On the one hand, the research focused on corporations or 
institutions involved in FLOSS projects, but they also focused on the broader FLOSS 
community, including programmers or others involved with FLOSS projects in some 
way.  In what follows, I describe how each of these research methods were used in the 
course of study.
Document/Textual Analysis
Documents come in many forms, but in this study, documents are defined as any 
artifact which has as its central feature an inscribed text which contains intentional 
messages (Scott, 1990).  This definition is sufficiently broad enough to include many 
different types of documents regardless of their material basis, which includes electronic 
or digital sources as well as material sources.  To investigate the productive processes of 
corporations – including its corporate structure, ownership structure, financing, joint 
agreements, properties, and labor practices – CPEC scholars rely on a wide variety of 
documents, which come from both primary and secondary sources.  That is, documents 
may be produced directly by the corporation and serve some function within its overall 
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operation (primary documents), or they may documents produced by another party about 
the corporation (secondary documents).
Primary documents include budgets, press releases, internal memos, financial 
statements, web sites produced by the organization, government filings, and other 
documents produced directly by the corporation.  CPEC scholars have historically relied 
on government documents to investigate corporations.  For example, to research the 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company and the Bell Telephone System, Danielian 
(1939) relied on documents from The Telephone Investigation, carried out by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in 1935, which produced “sixty volumes of 
transcript, more than 2000 exhibits and more than seventy volumes of staff reports,” all 
of which was public record at the time but remained unpublished (preface, i).  The 
documents provided some of the most detailed and comprehensive data about AT&T's 
sixty-year history.  Although the FCC's report from the investigation relates specifically 
to the problem of telephone rates, Danielian used the data contained within the 
documents to present a social evaluation of the company's immense market power, 
including its corporate structure, financial data, relations with independent telephone 
companies, public relations and propaganda campaigns, and its influence on radio and 
film industries. 
Similarly, CPEC scholars have historically relied on disclosures made to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the United States.  The Securities Act of 
1933 requires that all publicly held companies in the U.S. disclose their properties, 
business activities, certain financial information, and information about company 
management to the SEC.  Although these documents may not reveal a complete or wholly 
truthful state of a corporation's structure and business activities, these documents can be 
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used as a means to gather data that would otherwise not be available in trade press 
publications and other popular media sources.
The SEC filings used in this study, specifically Form 10-K annual reports, often 
include favorable statements about the corporation's performance as well as “forward-
looking statements,” whereby representatives from the corporation make predictive 
statements about the company's future business plans or performance.  Some of the most 
useful disclosures in these documents come from statements about partnerships, 
acquisitions, key properties, or the ownership structure of the company.  These 
disclosures can help researchers obtain the names of the key stakeholders involved in the 
corporation's operation.
However, documents of this type are not required of privately held firms, 
including private equity firms even if these firms hold an ownership stake in the public 
company.  As Bettig (2009) points out, private equity firms are playing an increasing role 
in media industries, which limits the ability of citizens and researchers to determine the 
activities of media corporations.  Many of the private equity firms and venture capital 
firms discussed in this study were not necessarily central to the analysis, but 
understanding their involvement can illustrated the massive investment in companies that 
specifically cater to FLOSS projects.  To the greatest extent possible, I investigated 
private equity firms by relying on trade press publications, news stories, and other 
publicly available documents.
The increasing presence and lack of information about private equity firms is not 
the only challenge researchers face when using documents to analyze corporations.  Scott 
(1990) identifies four central categories to consider when assessing documents: 
authenticity, representativeness, credibility, and meaning.  The concern for authenticity is 
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related to whether a document originates from where it is said to have originated.  In 
other words, does the document represent a direct disclosure from the source under 
investigation?  A highly authentic document would be primary source material that 
originated directly from the primary author.  Conversely, secondary sources may be 
authentic, but those documents do not originate from an original author, which may call 
into question the representativeness of the disclosures.  Representativeness refers to 
whether the information contained in the document is representative of the phenomenon 
under investigation.  Highly representative documents contain data that provides a clear 
and comprehensible picture of what it claims to represent.  On the other hand, a 
document that is not representative may only provide a small amount of data about the 
phenomenon under investigation and may not be representative of general trends or 
tendencies.  Credibility is somewhat related to representativeness, but refers specifically 
to whether the information contained within the document is trustworthy.  That is, does 
the document accurately represent what it claims to represent?  Moreover, the 
information contained in the document may need to be verified by consulting additional 
sources.  Finally, meaning is associated with whether or not the information holds any 
value for the researcher, as well as what meanings are associated with the document 
itself.  In this sense, the concept of meaning is doubly significant; it refers to both the 
content contained in the document as well as the entire document itself within a broader 
context.
Two other factors affecting the reliability of documentary sources are selective 
deposit and selective survival (Webb et al, 1981).  Selective deposit refers to the 
information that is contained within the document as well as what may have been 
purposefully left out.  After all, documents are created for specific reasons, especially by 
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corporations.  Determining what information is contained in the document may also help 
the researcher determine why the information is there at all.  Similarly, the concept of 
selective survival helps the researcher determine why the document itself was created.  
Documents are generally created because they fulfill some function for the corporation.  
Why was the document created, and for what reason does it still exist?  These two 
questions draw attention to the broader context within which the document must be 
situated.
These concerns about documentary evidence not only apply to official primary 
documents created on behalf of the corporation, but to secondary documents as well.  In 
the course of this research project, many different types of secondary documents were 
consulted, including trade press publications, news articles, and online tools like blogs, 
forums, and listservs that are specifically related to the topic under investigation.  The 
advantage of researching FLOSS communities is that nearly all FLOSS projects have 
unique forums, bulletin boards, or wikis dedicated to providing documentation and 
facilitating communication about the project.  These sources typically contain repositories 
of the project itself, but they also offer community discussion and historical data about 
the project's development.  This, in turn, can provide documentary evidence of ongoing 
and past events in a way that is open to public.  For example, the Fedora Project,11 which 
is discussed in CHAPTER IV, features a wiki that contains extensive documentation 
about the project, including news, events, recent changes, user guides, and links to 
various sub-projects associated with the main Fedora Project (The Fedora Project, 2014).  
Similar sources can be found for all the FLOSS projects discussed in this study.  In 
11 Additional information about The Fedora Project can be found at 
http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_Project_Wiki (last accessed July 9,2014).
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addition to the project wiki, I also relied on documentation from Wikipedia as well, 
especially for links, figures, and disclosures about Oracle's acquisition of Sun 
Microsystems, which is discussed in CHAPTER VI.  However, rather than drawing 
information only from the Wikipedia pages, additional sources were consulted to confirm 
that the information was correct.
Using wikis for this study was a conscious decision to try to lend some credibility 
to the wiki as a platform for conducting research, especially research about FLOSS 
projects and contributors.  Because FLOSS projects rely on extensive documentation to 
facilitate development of the project and to coordinate productive activity, FLOSS 
communities comprise communities of practice whose productive activities are mediated 
by information technology.  The collective productive activity of these communities can 
be found, nearly in its entirety, in the project's documentation, although full 
documentation of the project may be distributed across numerous platforms.  For 
example, even conversations that take place via an online chat or Internet Relay Chat 
(IRC) system can be archived and made available somewhere online.  In this sense, these 
conversations can be preserved in their entirety, and function similarly to minutes that are 
kept during corporate board meetings.  Indeed, CHAPTER VI provides a discussion of 
the community's reaction to Oracle acquiring Sun Microsystems.  Some of the most 
illuminating reactions were revealed during an IRC conversation with the board members 
of the OpenOffice project when the community members decided to leave the 
OpenOffice project.
In addition to these individual project pages, specialized trade publications and 
news sources that cater to open source were invaluable resources throughout the research 
project.  Specifically, publications like Ars Technica, ReadWriteWeb, CNet, and ZDNet 
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offer coverage of free and open source developments.  Moreover, these publications 
provide some of the best documentation, from an historical standpoint, of corporate 
maneuvering within the open source industry.  Although these publications do not 
necessarily reveal opinions about how corporate activities were perceived, they do 
provide information about the key individuals, the venture capital firms, and the 
monetary value of some of the mergers and acquisitions discussed throughout this study.
Interviews
Aside from the non-reactive or non-invasive research of document analysis, I also 
relied on interview data for the study.  These interviews were intended to come from two 
different sets of people: individuals representing the corporations discussed in the study 
as well as members of the broader FLOSS community.  As a way to solicit perspectives 
from the corporations, I sought interviews with those individuals working directly with 
FLOSS projects within the companies.  For example, some companies specifically 
employ an open source strategist or project coordinator.  Other companies, like Red Hat, 
rely completely on FLOSS projects to support their business model, and I attempted to 
communicate with anyone working for the company, especially those involved in 
defining a strategic vision for the company.
In order to get a sense of how corporate involvement within the broader open 
source community is perceived, I relied on interviews with open source programmers, 
advocates, or activists.  These individuals were primarily from local groups like the 
Eugene Unix Gnu Linux Users Group (EUGLUG), but others were located regionally 
and even internationally.  All interview participants from the broader FLOSS community 
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were either supporters or directly involved with the development of FLOSS projects in 
some way.
Recruitment Process
The initial contact with interview participants from the FLOSS community was 
with those individuals whom I had already established contact.  From these initial 
contacts, I used a snowball sampling method, whereby I asked these individuals if they 
were familiar with anyone else who would be interested in speaking with me about the 
topic.  After this initial round of recruiting, I then turned to local groups involved in 
FLOSS, like the EUGLUG.  After using similar snowball sampling from within these 
local groups, I then relied on personal contacts.  Specifically, I consulted individuals in 
Brazil who are involved in FLOSS communities as either researchers or activists.
For individuals representing corporations, however, I used a more selective 
sampling process to solicit participation.  Specifically, I was looking for those individuals 
with knowledge of the company's operations relating to FLOSS projects.  In the case of 
Red Hat, the entire company is related to FLOSS projects, and I was able to attempt 
speaking with nearly anyone as a way to understand Red Hat's involvement in FLOSS 
projects.  In the case of Microsoft, I was looking for very specific people since Microsoft 
is a large company with diverse operating segments.  Most of these individuals were 
identified by using publicly available documents, like press releases and trade press 
publications, which specifically identified them as being involved in the company's 
FLOSS-related activities.  Once I had identified these individuals, I attempted to contact 
them through a variety of means (email, phone, social networking sites, or personal 
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contacts).  Whenever anyone was contacted for an official interview, I used the 
recruitment script that can be found in APPENDIX A.
Interview Setting
The interviews for this project were conducted in settings and formats that were 
most convenient for the interviewees.  Because the members of the EUGLUG are locally 
based, I was able to meet with members of the group at public locations.  However, I also 
attended the group's local meetings whenever possible.  When travel was not possible in 
order to conduct an interview, the interview took place via the Internet by using a voice 
over Internet protocol (VoIP) service, like Skype.  For example, I conducted certain 
interviews with personal contacts in Brazil using this method.  In addition, I was also able 
to rely on email correspondence with those contacts with whom I had already established 
a relationship.
Interview Participants
In the end, nearly twenty interviews were conducted with members of the broader 
FLOSS community.  All of these participants were either actively involved in coding 
FLOSS projects or had worked on FLOSS projects in the past.  All participants tended to 
be supportive of FLOSS in general, although to varying degrees.  Many of them 
recommended that I interact directly with the communities who were currently working 
on the FLOSS projects chosen for inclusion in this study.  When I was unable to 
communicate directly with members of specific projects, I relied on the documentation 
found on the project's web pages and other sources.
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The individuals interviewed from the broader FLOSS community were 
tremendously helpful to this study.  Those interviews provided the initial impetus for 
exploring additional aspects of the chapter about Red Hat as well as Oracle's acquisition 
of Sun Microsystems.  In addition, those interviews provided invaluable insight into some 
of the technical features of FLOSS projects, as well as providing some technical support 
when it was needed.
Those interviewed had varying degrees of direct experience with the cases chosen 
in this study.  For example, some of the interviewees were actively using or working with 
Red Hat's products, including both Fedora and Red Hat Enterprise Linux.  Others had 
direct experience with Sun's products before the acquisition by Oracle, and those 
individuals were really helpful in understanding the links between the various properties 
and their fate after the acquisition by Oracle.
The one shortcoming of the interview research, however, was a lack of connection 
with those directly associated with Microsoft's involvement in open source projects.  The 
interview subjects were able to provide feedback on some of Microsoft's history in 
relation to the FLOSS community, especially the creation of the Shared Source program, 
but none of them had direct access to the projects being developed at Microsoft Open 
Technologies.  Therefore, the focus of the Microsoft chapter shifted to concentrate more 
on the historical trajectory of Microsoft's involvement in FLOSS projects.  To accomplish 
this, documentary evidence was used to a greater extent in the Microsoft chapter as a way 
to understand the company's relationship with the FLOSS community and its reasons for 
doing so.  Particularly helpful in this regard were the court cases and subsequent antitrust 
investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  The findings of fact and final 
ruling documents prepared by the DOJ in their investigation, plus additional secondary 
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sources about the company's compliance with the consent decrees provided detailed 
information about Microsoft's operations.  In addition, the publicly available documents 
by or about the Microsoft Open Technologies division provided the bulk of the 
information for that portion of the study.  Because the division was newly created in 
2012, however, the information available about the division was still somewhat limited 
and changed periodically throughout the study.
Data & Analysis
In the end, the data gathered from both documentary sources as well as interviews 
was used to identify key moments or projects in the history of corporate involvement in 
FLOSS that illustrated the dynamic between the community and corporations.  For the 
interview data, I was specifically interested in the participants' perceptions, opinions, 
beliefs, or other qualitative disclosures about practices associated with corporate 
involvement in open source software.  In addition, the interviewees were asked about 
specific cases that exemplify some of the ways that this relationship was perceived as 
successful, as well as examples of when the relationship was strained and how.  From 
these disclosures, I was looking for moments of contradiction or disjuncture from 
information found in documents to determine whether there was a difference between the 
ways that members of the community perceive corporate involvement and the way that 
the corporations perceive their involvement.  For this study, the primary unit of analysis 
was the corporation, and I used the qualitative disclosures from the interviews as a way to 
supplement the evidence from documents.
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Human Subjects Research and Institutional Review Board
Because this study involved methods for research including human subjects 
(interviewing), the study was reviewed by the University of Oregon Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) and Research Compliance Services.  The protocol for this research 
(04222013.022) was determined to be a minimal risk research protocol that qualified for 
exemption from IRB review under 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2) on May 28, 2013.  Further 
review of this research would not be required unless the research continued for more than 
five years.  Benjamin J. Birkinbine was the primary and sole investigator for this study, 
and he completed the Collaborative IRB Training Initiative (CITI) on October 24, 2012 
with an expiration date of October 24, 2014.  All interactions with the human subjects for 
this research strictly adhered to the regulations and ethical considerations set forth by the 
IRB and Research Compliance Services.
As approved by the IRB, interview subjects were emailed the approved 
Recruitment Letter or Email (Appendix A), notifying them of the purpose of the study 
and why they were being selected.  The letter also indicated that their involvement was 
completely voluntary and they would be able to opt out at any time.  In many cases, a 
recruitment letter was not needed.  Rather, I approached many interview subjects directly 
through my involvement with the Eugene Unix Gnu Linux Users Group (EUGLUG) 
during weekly meetings.  These meetings were held for general Linux questions or 
discussion, but more formalized topical presentations were scheduled once per month.  
For example, the EUGLUG hosted speakers from nearby organizations who were 
involved in FLOSS in some way, and the group also held workshops on a range of topics 
from cryptography and Bitcoin to interfacing with GitHub.  Prior to conducting any 
formalized interviews with these individuals, however, interviewees completed the 
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Informed Consent Form (Appendix B), which listed the risks and benefits of participating 
in the study, as well as reiterating the voluntary nature of their involvement.  In addition, 
the Informed Consent Form contained information about confidentiality, including the 
right for interview subjects to remain anonymous.  In the case that interview subjects 
preferred to remain anonymous, they were asked to select a pseudonym.  If an 
interviewee did not select a pseudonym, one was created for use in the study (DevOp1, 
DevOp2, etc.).
Summary
In sum, then, the methodological approach of this research project can be 
described as critical interpretive.  The methods used in the research process were 
document or textual analysis as well as interviews.  I drew from both primary and 
secondary sources, as well as interviews with representatives from the broader FLOSS 
community.  The goal, again, is to arrive at an understanding of the relationship between 
corporations and the FLOSS community.
In the chapters that follow, I discuss three separate case studies are discussed.  
CHAPTER IV focuses on Red Hat, Inc., which is the largest and only publicly traded 
corporation operating solely on free software.  The primary focus of the chapter is to 
describe how Red Hat has been able to accomplish this.  CHAPTER V focuses on 
Microsoft Corporation's long and checkered history with the FLOSS community.  The 
chapter charts the history of Microsoft's involvement in FLOSS projects by focusing on 
the company's antithetical stance to FLOSS during its earlier years to more recent 
attempts to become more involved in FLOSS projects.  The primary focus of the chapter 
is to try to understand why Microsoft's position toward FLOSS has shifted.  Finally, 
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CHAPTER VI focuses on Oracle's acquisition of Sun Microsystems.  The primary focus 
of that chapter is to illustrate what happens when a company that is generally not 
supportive of FLOSS projects acquires a company that had previously supported FLOSS 
projects.  The discussion details the ways in which the FLOSS community coped with the 
corporate acquisition by discussing the OpenSolaris operating system project, the 
MySQL relational database management project, and the OpenOffice office productivity 
software project.
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CHAPTER IV
FROM THE COMMONS TO CAPITAL: RED HAT, INC. AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY
The previous chapters focused on establishing a framework for the present study.  
This chapter, as well as the two subsequent chapters, offer in-depth case studies on the 
different ways that companies are involved in free and open source software projects.  
And, in turn, how the FLOSS community has responded to this involvement.  This 
chapter begins with an overview of Red Hat, Inc., which is the largest and only publicly 
traded company whose business model relies entirely on free software.  Within the 
typology established by Deek and McHugh (2008), Red Hat's business model follows the 
distribution and service model.  Beyond situating Red Hat's business practices within this 
typology, this chapter explains how Red Hat incorporates free and open source software 
protected under the GNU General Public License (GPL) by using trademark law since it 
does not (and cannot) restrict access to the underlying source code that is used to build its 
products.  In doing this, Red Hat has found a way to move from the commons to capital.
To illustrate exactly how Red Hat represents this model, the chapter is structured 
accordingly: first, some basic historical information about the company is provided, 
including economic performance data and how the company has changed over time.  The 
specific focus is on its core commodities – previously Red Hat Linux and now Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux – both of which rely on collaborative commons-based peer production 
from within the FLOSS community.  Then, the ways in which Red Hat negotiates 
relationships with the FLOSS community through Contributor Licensing Agreements 
(CLAs) are explained.  These agreements separate authorship from ownership in a way 
that protects Red Hat against any claims to ownership by community members.  Since the 
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intellectual property rights of user contributions are centralized within Red Hat, the 
company then embeds its trademarked corporate logo into the distributions it sells, which 
gives it the ability to restrict access to and redistribution of its commodities.  Finally, the 
chapter concludes with reflections about the Red Hat business model and what it means 
for the broader FLOSS community.  The argument throughout this chapter is that Red 
Hat's business model is based on its ability to serve as an intermediary between the 
FLOSS community and other businesses.  However, its ability to perform such a function 
requires that it centralizes commons-based peer production under its corporate trademark, 
which the company can then use to protect its core commodities.
The Political Economy of Red Hat, Inc.
Red Hat Software, Inc. was founded in 1995.  At that time, Linux, the open-source 
operating system was still an emerging phenomenon but was growing rapidly.  Linus 
Torvalds released the code for his Linux kernel project in 1991.  Those who supported the 
open-source project were extremely dedicated to its cause, but the market for software 
and the market for operating systems in particular was still dominated by large firms, 
most notably Microsoft and its Windows operating system.  In 1993, Bob Young formed 
a company called the ACC Corporation, which primarily sold Unix and Linux related 
accessories and books.  In 1994, Mark Ewing created his own distribution of Linux called 
Red Hat Linux.  One year later in 1995, Red Hat Software, Inc. (simply referred to as 
“Red Hat” from here) was founded after Bob Young's ACC Corporation merged with 
Mark Ewing's company.  Red Hat was founded with the purpose of making open source a 
commercially viable business model by lending credibility to the emerging open-source 
phenomenon.  In effect, Red Hat was a way to bring the power of open-source to other 
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businesses by providing packaged solutions to customers, while funneling their earnings 
back into the open-source community by supporting free software projects.  As Bob 
Young described in 1999,
We recognized  the  value  of  giving  customers  control  of 
their software, and sought to bring brand reliability to the 
Linux product. We would offer support to customers and 
accelerate  development  of  the  operating  system  by 
investing our own R&D [research and development] dollars 
in new Linux technology that would then be given back for 
free  to  the  community,  for  any  Linux  programmer  or 
distributor to use.  We had no intention of ever 'owning' the 
intellectual  property  we  created.   Instead,  our  business 
model  was  based on quickly  expanding  the  market,  and 
earning a small amount of revenue from a large number of 
customers who would buy a product that was better quality 
that  that  being  offered  by  the  industry  leader,  Microsoft 
(Young & Rohm, 1999, 10).
The “better quality” that Young is referring to is the Linux-based operating system.  
Previous chapters have already discussed the purported benefits of collaborative 
development, most notably its efficiency, innovativeness, and security, but Red Hat 
offered an operating system that could be easily adapted to the needs of the customer.  
This was particularly important in a time when hardware vendors were reliant on large, 
proprietary firms like Microsoft to develop operating systems that could make use of 
their hardware.  The speed at which new versions of proprietary operating systems could 
be developed was much slower compared to the open-source options.  Consequently, Red 
Hat received and continues to rely on strategic partnerships with hardware manufacturing 
companies like Intel, IBM, Dell, CISCO, Hewlett-Packard, Sony, and others.
These partnerships are beneficial to both Red Hat and their partners for a couple 
reasons.  First, Red Hat is able to pursue its original goal of lending credence to free and 
open source software (FLOSS) solutions by receiving backing from major information 
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technology firms.  Second, Red Hat continues to position itself as a leading company 
dealing solely in FLOSS.  Third, Red Hat can continue to funnel funding back into 
FLOSS projects that ultimately benefit the developer communities who work on these 
projects.  In this sense, Red Hat does serve as a intermediary between large information 
technology firms and the FLOSS community.
However, Red Hat also benefited from venture capital investment, particularly at a 
time when the “dot-com” investment bubble was on the rise.  Frank Batten Jr., through 
Landmark Communication, was an early investor in Red Hat and committed $2 million to 
the company in 1997 (Young & Rohm, 1999).  Landmark Communication was famous 
for investing in the Weather Channel, and the company remains a privately held 
investment firm but now operates under the name Landmark Media Enterprises.  Red Hat 
also received investment capital from Greylock Limited Partnership and Benchmark 
Capital, a company based in Menlo Park, CA, and known for its investment in and 
support of the open-source community.  All three of these parties – Landmark 
Communication, Greylock, and Benchmark Capital – became major shareholders in Red 
Hat after its initial public offering (IPO) in 1999.
Red Hat held its IPO in August of 1999.  The previous rounds of investment 
coming from venture capital firms, plus the company's partnerships with major 
information technology companies, led to rapid growth of the firm's value.  In September 
of 1999, Red Hat's stock price rose to more than $122 per share, which was up from its 
original price of $14 per share.  At the time, Frank Batten Jr. owned 15 million shares of 
the company, while Greylock Limited Partnership owned 8.7 million shares, and 
Benchmark Capital owned 5.8 million shares (Kanellos & Shankland, 1999).  However, 
in the interest of giving back to the FLOSS community that Red Hat relied upon for their 
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business model to work, the company tried to compile a list of all the FLOSS developers 
who contributed to Linux and other FLOSS projects.  While arriving at a fully 
comprehensive list was not possible, the company managed to develop a list of 
approximately 5,000 developers.  The intention was to make these developers stock 
holders in the company so they could benefit from the company's growth.  Doing so was 
seen as a way for the company to give back to the FLOSS community.  While Securities 
and Exchange Commission regulations prevented a large portion of these developers 
from becoming investors, more than 1,000 of the eligible 1,300 developers became early 
investors in the company (Young & Rohm, 1999).  Making this effort at including 
members of the FLOSS community as shareholders in the company is one example of 
how Red Hat has tried to maintain a good relationship with the FLOSS community.
In the years following the IPO, Red Hat continued to enjoy growth in revenues.  
Figure 4.1 provides an illustration of Red Hat's rising revenues from 1998 until 2013.  
What is particularly striking about this illustration is the fact that Red Hat's revenues 
were not adversely effected by the dot-com bubble crash between 1999-2001.  Red Hat 
emerged from this period and continued to grow.  This is most likely because of the 
strategic partnerships Red Hat was able to negotiate with large information technology 
firms in the lead up to the dot-com crash.  Those firms – Intel, Cisco, IBM, Dell, etc. – 
also survived the dot-com crash and have solidified their positions within the market for 
information and communication technologies.  Even though Red Hat was a start-up 
company at the time, the partnerships that the company formed with these larger firms 
ensured that Red Hat would be supported by these businesses into the future.  
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Figure 4.1. Red Hat Annual Revenues 1998-2013
Looking at the trajectory of Red Hat's net profits, on the other hand, exhibited a 
noticeable dip during the dot-com bubble crash (see Figure 4.2).  Red Hat's profits dipped 
from 1998 until 2002, but rose again in 2003.  This performance almost perfectly 
coincides with changes in management, and can also be explained by a shift in Red Hat's 
business strategy during those periods.  In 1999, the original co-founders of the company, 
Bob Young and Mark Ewing, left the company.  In 2001, Paul Cormier joined the 
company and began to lobby for shifting the company's business model.  Specifically, 
Cormier wanted to provide FLOSS solutions at the enterprise level rather than in the 
consumer market.  To more fully explain the nuances of this shift, the following section 
contains an in-depth discussion of Red Hat's core commodities, how those commodities 
shifted focus over time, and how Red Hat was able to centralize intellectual property 
within its corporate structure.  
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Figure 4.2. Red Hat Annual Net Profits 1998-2013
Red Hat's Core Commodities and Intellectual Property
Red Hat's business model relies primarily on its ability to provide an easy-to-use 
and accessible version of Linux by producing packaged distributions of the operating 
system, while also providing additional services and customer support that cater to its 
products.  Red Hat's revenues then come from these two streams.12  The majority of Red 
Hats' revenues comes from a subscription model, whereby clients get both products and 
support from Red Hat in exchange for a fee.  The types of products and services provided 
depend on the level of subscription.  The effectiveness of this subscription model is 
based, to a large degree, on two interrelated factors: Red Hat's recognition as a 
trustworthy provider of FLOSS products and services, as well as Red Hat's position as a 
legally recognized institution, which can be held liable for the products and services it 
provides.
12 Unless otherwise noted, the information from this section comes from Annual Reports (Form 10-K) 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States between the years 2000-2013. 
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Most importantly for its customers, Red Hat is able to provide a way to outsource 
services that may otherwise be too expensive to perform within one's own company.  
Indeed, any one of Red Hat's customers could perform the work done by Red Hat, 
especially because the underlying code that Red Hat relies on is available for free.  Red 
Hat does not own the intellectual property rights for the free software that its services are 
based upon, and the company is not necessarily trying to exclude others from this 
intellectual property.  Indeed, Red Hat has built its business model based solely on free 
software that is protected by the GNU General Public License (GPL).  As such, any of its 
customers could, in theory, produce the same software that is sold by Red Hat, but they 
would need to perform the work themselves.  However, Red Hat is a legally recognized 
institution that can be liable for the products and services it supplies.  Because of this, its 
customers can feel comfortable with the sense of security they get when they sign a 
contract with Red Hat, and this, in turn, is how Red Hat has been able to become the 
market leader providing FLOSS distributions and services to earn its revenues.  Prior to 
its founding, FLOSS projects had differing degrees of trustworthiness.  By forming a 
corporate entity that could be held liable for the products and services provided, Red Hat 
served as a way to legitimize a system of production that was massively distributed and 
seemingly anarchic.  To its customers, then, Red Hat serves as a legally recognized entity 
providing an assurance for the free software products and services it supplies.
But to understand the types of products and services that underlie Red Hat's 
market position, we will need to examine exactly how Red Hat has been able to profit 
from free software, especially as it does not own any of the intellectual property that 
makes up its business model.  To do so, this section begins with a discussion of Red Hat 
Linux, which was the original operating system sold to customers from 1994-2004.  
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Then, the shift that occurred when Red Hat focused more on providing enterprise 
solutions through their Red Hat Enterprise Linux offering is discussed.  The relationship 
between Red Hat's core commodities and Fedora, which is the primary FLOSS project 
supported by Red Hat, is also described.  
Red Hat Linux
When Red Hat first began offering products and services in the early 1990s, it 
began selling a compact disc for approximately $50, which contained a Linux distribution 
called Red Hat Linux, some additional applications, and documentation.  Red Hat Linux 
was based purely on computer code that was protected by the GPL – that is, code that 
needs to remain freely available for distribution, modification, adaptation, etc.  Red Hat 
Linux provided the principle source of revenue for Red Hat during its early years.  
Revenues came primarily from sales of Red Hat Linux to distributors and original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for inclusion on their hardware.  These companies are 
some of the same who invested directly in Red Hat during its early years: Dell, Cisco, 
Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and Intel.  Because Red Hat had the power of a potentially very 
large and distributed labor force behind it, like the FLOSS community, its business model 
was highly scalable.  That is, Red Hat had the ability to quickly expand its market 
without incurring increased investment costs.  In other words, the Red Hat Linux product 
could be distributed to a large number of customers without need for more investment.  
This was precisely Red Hat's strategy: to rapidly increase the market, deriving a small 
amount of revenue from a large number of transactions, while reinvesting its earnings 
back into the FLOSS community.
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While Red Hat Linux provided the primary commodity for Red Hat during its 
early years, the bulk of its work was coming from the support it provided for this 
software.  Red Hat's employees provided customer support, education, training, and 
technical support to its clients who were using Red Hat Linux.  This strategy, along with 
Red Hat's strategic partnerships, allowed the company to begin picking up market share 
during its early years.  While the company's revenues were still growing up until 2004, it 
still had not become a profitable business.  This was, in part, due to its acquisitions of 
other software firms before the dot-com bubble crash, but also because the company had 
not yet found a way to substantially increase subscription sales at the enterprise level to 
other businesses.  This is precisely the change that occurred when the company shifted its 
focus to Red Hat Enterprise Linux, which became its core commodity and continues to be 
today.  The final stable version of Red Hat Linux was released in 2003, which was the 
same year that Red Hat Enterprise Linux was released. 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux and the Fedora Project
In 2003, Red Hat split its Red Hat Linux project into two separate projects: Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux and the Fedora Project.  Red Hat Enterprise Linux continued as a 
core commodity for Red Hat in the same way that Red Hat Linux had been before.  The 
Fedora project, however, became a community-based FLOSS project.  Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux relied on the same model as Red Hat Linux in terms of providing 
packaged distributions of a free operating system but, rather than selling individual 
compact discs containing the software, Red Hat Enterprise Linux was made available 
through a subscription model.  Depending on the level of subscription, customers could 
get access to customized versions of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system plus 
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different levels of support services for the operating system.  In effect, Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux was a sufficiently similar product to Red Hat Linux with a different 
model for how the product would be provided to customers.  Red Hat then used the 
revenues from sales of Red Hat Enterprise Linux to support the Fedora Project.  The 
relationship between these two projects provides perhaps the most interesting insight into 
how Red Hat incorporates the commons.
The split into Red Hat Enterprise Linux and the Fedora Project in 2003 was made 
with the intention of finding a mutually beneficial way for the community and Red Hat to 
collaborate on developing software.  Red Hat Enterprise Linux continues to serve as the 
primary core commodity of Red Hat, and the company profits from subscription sales to 
its customers.  The Fedora Project was meant to be a community-sponsored project that 
would provide an incubator for innovation.  In return, the innovation that occurred within 
the Fedora Project could then be implemented into Red Hat's commercial offerings.  This 
was possible was because of the ownership and governance structure of the Fedora 
Project, as well as the worker contracts established with contributors to the project.  
Ownership, Governance, and Intellectual Property in Fedora
The Fedora Project is ultimately owned by Red Hat.  However, the Fedora Project 
is led by the Fedora Project Board, which has nine members.13  Of those nine members, 
five are elected by the community of developers who contribute to the Fedora Project.  
The remaining four members are appointed directly by the Fedora Project Leader, who is 
a full-time employee of Red Hat.  The Fedora Project Leader also serves as Chair of the 
13 Information about the Fedora Project Board is publicly available on the project's wiki, which is 
available at: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Board (last accessed July 7, 2014)
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Fedora Project Board and holds veto power over any decision made by the board.  Any 
person involved in the Fedora Project, whether a Red Hat employee or community 
member, may be elected to serve on the Fedora Project Board.  This suggests, however, 
that Red Hat ultimately holds power over the decisions made by the community.  While 
Red Hat does have an incentive not to abuse this veto power, the power still exists.  
CHAPTER VI will discuss in greater depth how the community reacts to an abuse of 
governance power by corporations that sponsor FLOSS projects.  
The ownership and governance structure of the Fedora Project ultimately gives 
Red Hat the power to direct the types of development that occur within the community.  
Red Hat supports the community by sponsoring the project, but it then uses the work 
performed by the community in its commercial offering, Red Hat Enterprise Linux.  The 
second reason Red Hat is able to appropriate the labor performed within the community 
is because all contributors to the Fedora Project have had to sign a contributor's 
agreement.  These agreements have changed throughout the history of the Fedora Project, 
but both have similar effects.  Originally, contributors needed to sign the Individual 
Contributor Licensing Agreement (ICLA), which effectively assigned the contributors' 
copyright to the Fedora Project.14  However, the ICLA was later abandoned for the Fedora 
Project Contributor Agreement (FPCA), which no longer assigned copyright to Red Hat 
but specified the types of licenses that could be included in the Fedora Project.15  This 
shift made it possible for code that had already been licensed under a previous licensing 
14 Information about the Individual Contributor Licensing Agreement can be found on the project's wiki 
at http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Legal:Licenses/CLA (last accessed July 7, 2014)
15 Information about the Fedora Project Contributor Agreement can be found on the project's wiki at 
http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Legal:Fedora_Project_Contributor_Agreement   (last accessed July 7, 
2014).
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scheme to be included in the Fedora Project, as long as the licenses were compatible with 
the guidelines established by Fedora.
Both the ICLA and the FPCA enable Red Hat to centralize control and ownership 
of commons-based peer production into into its corporate structure.  In the case of the 
ICLA, it provided a direct assignment of a contributor's copyright to Red Hat, whereas 
the FPCA does not necessarily assign copyright to Red Hat.  In this sense, the FPCA can 
be viewed as less restrictive because it allows contributors to assign licenses to their work 
prior to submitting the work to the Fedora Project.  However, those licenses must be 
compatible with the goals of the Fedora Project, and the Fedora Project wiki maintains a 
Software License List that identifies the acceptable and unacceptable licenses that can be 
included in Fedora.16  Code protected by these licenses can still be legally defended by 
Red Hat.  In the event that content other than code is included in the submission (text, 
images, logos, etc.), the contributor must waive his or her moral rights to the content.  
This ensures that Red Hat will not be subject to infringement claims.  In effect, these 
licensing agreements provide a way for Red Hat to control what is included in the 
commons-based project (Fedora) so that when that material is included in their 
commercial offering (Red Hat Enterprise Linux or other software), the company will not 
be subject to intellectual property infringement claims.  
By taking these preventative measures to control what is included in Fedora, Red 
Hat can provide its customers with a guarantee that they will not need to fear a potential 
claim against intellectual property infringement.  Red Hat does this through its Open 
Source Assurance Program.  The details of the program are codified in the Open Source 
16 The Software License List can be found at http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Licensing:Main?
rd=Licensing#Software_License_List (last accessed July 7, 2014). 
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Assurance Agreement17 contract, which states that in the event that a third party alleges 
infringement of intellectual property in the software provided to the client by Red Hat, 
the company will,
(i)  defend  Client   against  the  Claim  and  (ii)  pay  costs, 
damages and/or attorneys fees that are included in a final 
judgment against  Client (without right of appeal)  or in a 
settlement  approved  by  Red  Hat  that  are  attributable  to 
Client's use of the Covered Software; (Red Hat, Inc., 2014)
Furthermore, if the Client's use of Red Hat's software is found to infringe the third party's 
intellectual property rights, then Red Hat will
(i) obtain the rights necessary for Client to continue to use 
the  Covered  Software  consistent  with  the  Support 
Agreement(s); (ii) modify the Covered Software so that it is 
non-infringing; or (iii) replace the infringing portion of the 
Covered  Software  with  non-infringing  code  of  similar 
functionality  (subsections  (i),  (ii)  and  (iii)  are  the  "IP 
Resolutions"); provided that if none of the IP Resolutions is 
available  on  a  basis  that  Red  Hat  finds  commercially 
reasonable,  then  Red  Hat  may  terminate  the  Support 
Agreement(s) without further liability under this paragraph, 
and,  if  Client  then  returns  the  Covered  Software  that  is 
subject  to  the  Claim,  Red  Hat  will  refund  any  prepaid 
subscription fees  related to  Covered Software.  (Red Hat, 
Inc., 2014).
From Red Hat's perspective, then, this is the legal-juridical benefit of controlling what is 
included in the Fedora Project as well as centralizing control of the intellectual property 
rights within its corporate structure.  Red Hat relies on the FLOSS community to perform 
the cooperative labor of developing new features, fixing bugs, or otherwise improving the 
Fedora Project so that these features can be included in its commercial offerings.  In order 
to assure its customers that they will not be subject to intellectual property infringement 
claims from third parties, Red Hat requires contributors to assign licenses to their work 
17 The full text of the Open Source Assurance Agreement can be found at 
http://www.redhat.com/legal/open_source_assurance_agreement.html (last accessed July 7, 2014). 
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that will allow Red Hat to continue providing its services.  In effect, Red Hat is 
separating authorship from ownership, which is one of the primary critiques of 
intellectual property laws (see Bettig, 1992).  However, Red Hat does not use copyright 
to prevent authors or anyone else from making use of the code in other ways.  Basically, 
Red Hat is just trying to ensure that the code in Fedora can be legally defensible, while 
allowing the company to provide assurances to its customers.  Red Hat's method for 
protecting its core intellectual property does not come from copyright, but the company 
still prevents exact redistributions of its property through trademark law.  
Red Hat, Trademark, and CentOS
As stated earlier in this chapter, Red Hat does not own the intellectual property 
that makes up its core commodities.  Most of the code that makes up Red Hat's core 
commodities is covered by the GPL, which allows others to freely copy, modify, and 
redistribute the code.  Therefore, rather than relying on copyright to protect its core 
commodities, Red Hat relies on trademark law to protect its properties.  The details of 
this strategy can be found in Red Hat Trademark Guidelines18 document (Red Hat, Inc., 
2006).  In theory, anyone could make an exact copy of Red Hat's open source software 
and begin selling it, but they would be prevented from including any registered 
trademarks.  These trademarks include the logos and names of software, which means 
that exact copies of Red Hat's open source software would need to be given a different 
name.  Red Hat's trademarks also prevent products from having names that are 
sufficiently similar, like “Green Hat” or “Red Cap,” or “Redd Hatte.”  While these 
18 The Red Hat Trademark Guidelines are available at http://www.redhat.com/f/pdf/corp/RH-
3573_284204_TM_Gd.pdf (last accessed July 7, 2014).
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restrictions exist, CentOS provides an example of a project that served as an exact 
replacement for Red Hat Enterprise Linux.  
CentOS began in 2004, and served as a functionally compatible version of Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux.  Indeed, CentOS was based on the publicly available code for Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux.  Rather than competing with CentOS or trying to prevent them 
from using code included in Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Red Hat was largely ambivalent 
about CentOS.  This is, in part, due to the perception that customers who want to use 
CentOS will probably continue to use it, but also because those customers could switch to 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux at any time because the two operating systems were basically 
the same.  However, whatever tension may have existed between the two operating 
systems became a moot point in 2014, when Red Hat officially became a sponsor of the 
CentOS project.  The move was perceived as a way to meet users' demands across the 
three major versions of Red Hat's software – Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Fedora, and 
CentOS – by giving users access to features that may not be included across all versions 
of the operating system (Vaughn-Nichols, 2014).  As part of Red Hat's new sponsorship 
of the CentOS project, all CentOS trademarks were transferred to Red Hat.  
Red Hat's use of trademark law to protect its market position is used in 
conjunction with its ability to control the intellectual property included in its commercial 
offerings.  By sponsoring the CentOS project, Red Hat is able to increase its intellectual 
property holdings, while also eliminating a rival form of free software that was offering a 
functional equivalent of its commercial software.  In this sense, Red Hat's sponsorship of 
the CentOS project functions similarly to a corporate acquisition or an instance of 
horizontal integration.  
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Core Commodity Conclusions
What becomes clear from this discussion of Red Hat's core commodities and the 
services provided for those commodities is that Red Hat, as an institution, may be viewed 
in at least two different ways.  On the one hand, Red Hat can be viewed as a pragmatic 
way to centralize commons-based peer production in a capitalist system.  In effect, Red 
Hat serves as a gateway for access to commons-based peer production by being 
dialectically situated between capital and the commons.  In other words, Red Hat 
leverages the power of the commons by finding a way to centralize production into a few 
core commodities that can then be sold to other businesses as information technology 
solutions.  This offers another part of the explanation for why Red Hat maintains a good 
reputation with the FLOSS community.  Red Hat is clear about its intentions for being 
involved in FLOSS projects.  Indeed, Red Hat's entire business model is founded on 
finding a way to sell the power of FLOSS production to other businesses.  In return, Red 
Hat reinvests in the FLOSS community by supporting FLOSS projects, acquiring new 
businesses and releasing source code to the community.  The relationship between Red 
Hat and the FLOSS community is one of mutual benefit: Red Hat's financial success 
benefits the FLOSS community, more revenue for Red Hat means more investment in 
FLOSS projects, and more investment in FLOSS projects means higher quality products 
and services that Red Hat can offer to its customers.  
However, Red Hat can also be viewed as an institution that operates no differently 
than other corporations operating under a capitalist system.  Red Hat relies on 
centralizing production within its corporate structure, separating authorship from 
ownership through workers agreements, and protecting intellectual property through 
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trademark laws all for the purpose of making profit.  The difference in Red Hat's case is 
that it cannot prevent others from using its intellectual property through copyright laws.  
Moreover, Red Hat does not directly employ its entire labor force.  As such, the company 
does not compensate all of its laborers through wages, but must rely on other informal 
ways of compensating laborers.  Because the company relies on this labor force, it must 
maintain a good relationship with that community, or the community may move 
production elsewhere.  CHAPTER VI will describe some of the specific ways that the 
community maintains this ability to leverage its labor power.  The purpose of this chapter 
is to demonstrate the ways in which one company centralizes commons-based peer 
production into a commercial product.
From the Commons to Capital
Red Hat offers an example of how a distributed system of commons-based peer 
production can become centralized within a corporation and turned into a profitable 
business.  In part, Red Hat's success can be explained by its strategic partnerships with 
large information technology companies.  These partnerships can at least explain how 
Red Hat was able to survive the period immediately following its initial public offering.  
Interestingly, it became a publicly traded company at the same time that many dot-com 
companies were the targets of massive capital investment, a period referred to as the “dot-
com bubble.”  Red Hat was also one of the earliest companies to position itself as the 
leading company providing services for FLOSS.  As such, Red Hat sought to lend an 
element of professionalism to the emerging FLOSS phenomenon by establishing the 
formally recognized institution of a publicly traded corporation that could be legally 
liable for the services provided.  Consequently, Red Hat needed a way to hold the rights 
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to the commons-based peer production that made up its core commodities.  The company 
accomplished this through Individual Contributor License Agreement (ICLA) and later 
the Fedora Contributor License Agreement (FCLA) that granted the company rights to 
use the production that was performed by developers.
The CLA is a striking example of how authorship is separated from ownership.  
This separation is essential to Red Hat's business model because it grants exclusive rights 
to Red Hat so that the company becomes both legally liable for the products it is selling 
as well as legally able to defend those products in the event of a violation.  However, it is 
important to note that Red Hat is not alone in using these types of worker agreements.  
The issuing of contributor licensing agreements (CLAs) is common practice in FLOSS 
projects.  These CLAs represent the most striking example of how institutions, whether 
for-profit or non-profit corporations, or any other type of legally recognizable 
organization, centralize commons-based peer production by separating authorship from 
ownership.  
However, the peculiar thing about Red Hat is that it does not use contributor 
agreements to protect copyrights.  Most, if not all, of the code underlying its core 
commodities is protected by the GPL, which grants the right to copy, modify, or 
redistribute the work.  In addition, the GPL requires that modified versions of the 
intellectual property be protected by the same license.  By using code that is protected by 
this license as well as similar licenses, Red Hat cannot rely on copyright law to prevent 
others from making exact copies of the code it makes publicly available.  Rather, Red Hat 
relies on trademark laws that protect the names and logos for their products.
For all the rhetoric of revolutionary productive processes, massively decentralized 
and distributed systems, FLOSS as a process and product still exists within a capitalist 
100
system that requires commercial entities to be held liable for the products and services 
they provide.  Therefore, productive activity under capitalism still takes the form of 
centralization, control, and appropriation of surplus value.  Even in the case of so-called 
“non-market production,” the labor performed under these conditions can still be 
appropriated for corporate gain.  Even if the producers are not centralized within a 
particular institution, corporations require any claims to the knowledge commons be 
surrendered so that the commons may be exploited for corporate gain.  In the case of Red 
Hat, the company provides a legally recognized and formalized institution that makes use 
of trademark laws to effectively brand commons-based peer production.  This may be 
viewed as a mutually beneficial relationship that provides a pragmatic solution to the 
problem of how to organize commons-based peer production in a way that allows 
members of the community to earn a living.  However, this condition only benefits a 
portion of the community.
In the event that contributors to the knowledge commons are not employed by one 
of the institutions supporting a FLOSS project, their payment comes to them informally 
when they attend public events or trade shows where institutions like Red Hat provide 
sponsorship or other goods and services for the community.  This informal economy is 
only sustainable for as long as the institutions supporting FLOSS projects remain 
transparent about their intentions for the products of FLOSS developers' labor and 
continue to support the community through the provision of paid employment, 
sponsorship of additional FLOSS projects and events, and informally through gifts given 
to the community.  
This chapter has demonstrated how profitable Red Hat has become.  This is, 
undoubtedly, due in part to its relatively low labor costs in comparison to the size of its 
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workforce.  Red Hat offers an example of a way that commons-based peer production can 
be centralized within a corporate structure.  Red Hat has grown because of the 
relationships it has negotiated, the strategies it uses to control its intellectual properties, 
and its willingness to give back to the FLOSS community in a variety of ways.  The 
following chapter charts the very different history of the Microsoft Corporation's long 
and checkered relationship with the FLOSS community. 
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CHAPTER V
SHIFTING TOWARD THE COMMONS: MICROSOFT'S LONG AND WINDING 
HISTORY WITH FREE SOFTWARE
The Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft” hereafter) offers perhaps the most 
contentious relationship with the open source community.  Primarily, this is due to 
Microsoft's core business model, which relies on the sale of proprietary software.  
Through strategic partnerships, strong intellectual property protections, and a robust 
strategy for capturing the consumer market for personal computer (PC) sales, Microsoft 
grew to become one of the largest software companies in the world.  At its peak, 
Microsoft enjoyed a nearly 97% market share of all computing devices in the year 2000 
(Tu, 2012).  This was before the company was found to be in violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  However, the antitrust decision 
did little to curb Microsoft's economic growth at the turn of the 21st century.  Rather, the 
company's profits continued to grow, and Microsoft still ranks as one of the largest and 
most dominant software companies in the world.  What has changed, particularly after the 
antitrust ruling, is the company's relationship to the broader free and open source 
software community.  
As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, Microsoft's former Chief 
Executive Officer, Steve Ballmer, referred to Linux – the open source operating system – 
as “a cancer” in 2001.  Slightly more than eleven years later, the company opened an 
entire division of its company devoted to the promotion and development of open source 
software.  In this chapter, the history of Microsoft's checkered relationship with free and 
open source software (FLOSS) is charted, focusing on three specific moments that 
illustrate this relationship.  First, the company's initial growth and its rise as one of the 
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most dominant software companies in the world is described.  During this time, the 
company took an adversarial approach to open source software.  This includes Bill Gates' 
“Open Letter to Hobbyists” in which he decried the widespread culture of freely sharing 
software in the hobbyist community, as well as the leak of internal documents known as 
“The Halloween Documents” in 1998, which clearly outline the company's views on 
open source software.  The second section discusses the U.S. Department of Justice's 
investigation and, ultimately, its conviction of Microsoft for violating the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.  Findings from the investigation and the subsequent decrees issued to the 
company in the wake of the conviction are detailed.  The final section focuses on the 
most recent history of Microsoft, including its Shared Source program as well as its 
decision to create Microsoft Open Technologies, a wholly owned subsidiary dedicated 
solely to promoting and developing open source software, open standards, and open 
technologies.  
The Microsoft case study exemplifies the clash between two opposing systems of 
production.  On the one hand, Microsoft relies upon strong intellectual property 
protections to exclude others from making use of its products.  Those products have been 
produced in-house as part of Microsoft's core business model.  Microsoft uses these 
intellectual property rights not only to protect its own works, but to threaten FLOSS 
projects with infringement lawsuits.  It is within this context that we can view Microsoft's 
long history of railing against the lack of intellectual property within the FLOSS 
community, beginning with Bill Gates' “Open Letter to Hobbyists” in 1976, through 
Steve Ballmer's “Linux is a cancer” claim.  What changed after the DOJ antitrust ruling is 
that Microsoft shifted its position toward FLOSS projects in general by submitting its 
own licenses for approval by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).  The shift in Microsoft's 
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stance toward FLOSS after the antitrust ruling represents an important moment for 
Microsoft, specifically, but also for the software industry in general.  The shift can be 
read as a humble admission that the business model upon which Microsoft relied for most 
of its history had been mostly usurped by a more efficient and effective model of 
production.  But it can also be read within the broader context of the dot-com bubble 
burst that hit the economy at the end of the 20th century, which coincided with many 
Internet-related companies failures but also the emergence of the Web 2.0 phenomenon.  
It was during this time after the DOJ ruling that Microsoft not only readjusted its 
positioning with respect to FLOSS projects, but also attempted to become more directly 
involved in FLOSS projects.  The company's reasons for doing so were primarily to 
comport with the consent decrees that the company agreed to as part of the antitrust 
ruling, but also because the commons-based peer production of FLOSS had proven to be 
a viable and successful business model.  In short, Microsoft was basically forced to adopt 
a more open stance to the broader FLOSS community – first because of the consent 
decrees and, second, because of broader historical forces affecting the software industry.  
Ultimately, the goal of this chapter is twofold: first, to argue that the antitrust 
conviction in 2001 marks a critical moment in Microsoft's history that, when paired with 
the bursting of the dot-com bubble and the emergence of the so-called Web 2.0 
phenomenon, caused a shift in Microsoft's business strategy whereby the company tried 
to find ways of harnessing the power of commons-based peer production.  Second, it 
demonstrates how Microsoft's own history is contradictory to its stance against the open 
sharing of ideas.  In fact, many of Microsoft's most successful products have incorporated 
or licensed design features that were developed by others.  By making these two points, 
the chapter shows how Microsoft's relationship with the FLOSS community can be 
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understood as a strategic readjustment that was undertaken in response to Microsoft's 
declining market share at the same time that Linux-based systems were gaining market 
share.  Although not a complete transformation of its initial stance, Microsoft's shift in its 
relationship to the broader FLOSS community can be described as moving from capital 
toward the commons.
The Rise of Microsoft 1975-1990
Microsoft was founded in 1975 after Paul Allen and Bill Gates developed the 
Altair BASIC interpreter.  An interpreter is a computer program that directly performs 
functions written in a programming language.  In the case of Altair BASIC, the 
interpreter was designed to execute functions written in the BASIC (Beginner's All-
purpose Symbolic Instruction Code) programming language so that they could be 
performed on the Micro Instrumentation and Telemetry Systems (MITS) Altair 8800 
microcomputer.  Altair BASIC became Microsoft's first product, which was distributed 
by MITS under contract with the newly created company.  From its very beginnings, 
then, Microsoft focused on providing software solutions that could be included on 
hardware devices.  Microsoft's business model relied on establishing contracts with 
hardware providers, which would allow Microsoft products to be included on hardware.  
However, the company has consistently exhibited an antagonistic position with respect to 
alleged infringements on its intellectual property.  The first example of such behavior 
came from unauthorized copying of its original Altair BASIC interpreter.
The Altair 8800 microcomputer has been credited as the device that ushered in the 
microcomputer revolution (Garland, 1977).  The Altair 8800 became widely popular after 
being featured on the cover of the January 1975 edition of Popular Electronics.  From the 
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magazine, readers could order kits for the computer, which could then be assembled by 
hobbyists interested in experimenting with the device.  As part of the order, readers could 
purchase the Altair BASIC language for a fixed price.  Since the Altair BASIC language 
could be included with orders for the Altair 8800, Altair BASIC also became widely used. 
However, hobbyists often made copies for friends or others as a way to allow them to 
experiment with the device as well.  This made Altair BASIC subject to unauthorized 
copying, which prompted Bill Gates to publish an “Open Letter to Hobbyists” on 
February 3, 1976.19  
In the letter, Gates noted that “hundreds of people who are...using BASIC” have 
all provided positive feedback about the interpreter.  However, he claims that “most of 
these 'users' never bought BASIC,” as “less than 10% of all Altair owners have bought 
BASIC,” and the “amount of royalties [Gates and Allen] have received from sales to 
hobbyists makes the time spent of [sic] Altair BASIC worth less than $2 per hour” 
(Gates, 1976, 2).  Gates continued by decrying the fact that most hobbyists steal software, 
and asked whether this is a fair practice because it ultimately prevents good software 
from being written.  In effect, Gates was arguing that the time, labor, and resources spent 
on developing software ought to be returned to him in the form of fair payment for use of 
the software.  
Gates' open letter signaled what would become a recurring theme throughout 
Microsoft's history.  Specifically, Gates and Microsoft accused members of the hobbyist 
community of infringing on their intellectual property rights.  The hobbyist community, 
then, represented a threat to Microsoft's business model, which was one founded on the 
19 The “Open Letter to Hobbyists” is available via the Wikimedia Commons here: 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/14/Bill_Gates_Letter_to_Hobbyists.jpg (Last 
accessed July 3, 2014)
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need to protect its products by using strong intellectual property protections.  Indeed, 
some of the responses to Gates' open letter focused more on the business strategy, 
especially the shortcomings of Microsoft's contractual negotiations with the hardware 
vendor (Hayes, 1976).  In the years that followed the Altair BASIC beginnings, Microsoft 
pursued a course of action that sought to do exactly that.  By ingratiating itself with large 
hardware manufacturers, Microsoft rapidly gained market share and became one of the 
most dominant software companies in the world.  
MS-DOS
Microsoft's business strategy during its early years focused primarily on providing 
BASIC interpreters, but the company shifted its focus to operating systems in the early 
1980s.  From the 1980s until the mid 1990s, Microsoft primarily relied on its Microsoft 
Disk Operating System, or MS-DOS, as its core commodity.  MS-DOS originated in 
1981 after IBM put out a request for an operating system to use on its IBM-PC line of 
personal computers (PC).  Shortly after the initial request from IBM, Microsoft acquired 
the rights to the 86-DOS, an operating system from Seattle Computer Products, which it 
renamed MS-DOS.20  Microsoft customized the newly acquired operating system to the 
specifications required by IBM and licensed the operating system to IBM, which 
included it in its IBM-PCs under the name PC DOS.  
Microsoft's contract with IBM was not without controversy, however.  The rise of 
the PC was made possible by advances in integrated circuit, or microchip, technology.  
Microchips for the consumer market were first used commercially in calculators, which 
20 The original name for 86-DOS was actual QDOS, which stood for “Quick and Dirty Operating 
System,” but Seattle Computer Products changed the name to 86-DOS once it began marketing the 
product.
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were manufactured by companies like Hewlett-Packard and Texas Instruments.  As 
demand for higher performance calculators increased, Intel was commissioned by 
Busicom, a Japanese firm, to produce the first commercially available microprocessor 
that could receive digital data and process it according to its programmed functions.  The 
new microprocessor was called the Intel 4004 (Nairn, 2002).  However, these new chips 
still needed language capable of converting instructions into signals that the chip could 
process.  This operating system came from Gary Kildall, who had authored a language 
capable of performing such functions.  Eventually, Kildall's language was transformed 
into the first operating system for personal computers, known as CP/M.  The rights to 
CP/M were held by Kildall's company, Digital Research, Inc., or DRI.  
Throughout the late 1970s, CP/M became the industry leader in operating systems 
for personal computers.  When IBM announced its initial line of personal computers, the 
company chose Intel as the provider for microprocessors, but it also needed a supplier for 
the operating system.  Both Microsoft and DRI were consulted about providing an 
operating system.  The exact details about what transpired during the negotiations are a 
bit murky,21 but we know that Microsoft eventually won the contract, which resulted in 
the acquisition of 86-DOS that was subsequently rebranded as MS-DOS.  Kildall, 
however, would claim that MS-DOS infringed on his copyright for CP/M.  Kildall 
confronted both Gates at Microsoft and IBM about the alleged infringement but, on 
advice from lawyers, decided not to sue.  Instead, Kildall chose to license CP/M to IBM 
for inclusion on their personal computers.  When the IBM PCs were eventually released, 
21 There are many different accounts of what happened.  One of the most popular stories claims that 
Kildall snubbed the executives from IBM by choosing to go flying in his personal airplane at the time 
the meeting was scheduled.  Other accounts claim that Kildall's wife killed the deal by insisting on 
changes to the contract, and others claim that Kildall did not want to release the source code for CP/M 
to IBM.  These stories are recounted on the DRI Web site, which can be found at 
http://www.digitalresearch.biz/HISZMSD.HTM (last accessed May 14, 2014)
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IBM offered a choice of operating system: $240 for CP/M or $40 for DOS (Hamm & 
Greene, 2004).  In effect, Microsoft became the clear choice for consumers, and DRI was 
eventually purchased by Novell in 1991. 
Microsoft's contract with IBM was perhaps the biggest turning point on its path to 
becoming the largest software company in the world.  As part of Microsoft's contract, it 
reserved the right to sell its operating system to third-party vendors as well, which 
allowed the company to exploit sales of its operating system to any hardware 
manufacturer.  Employing this strategy, Microsoft grew tremendously from 1981-1995, 
with an increase in annual revenues from $16 million in 1981 to more than $6 billion in 
1995 (Campbell-Kelly, 2001).  Although exact figures are not publicly available, some 
estimates suggest that MS-DOS held nearly a 90% market share of the PC market 
(Gilbert, 1995).  Although MS-DOS would continue to be produced until September 14, 
2000, Microsoft began to focus its efforts on developing an operating system that would 
use a graphical user interface (GUI).  The product that it ultimately developed, Microsoft 
Windows, would continue Microsoft's dominance of the personal computer software 
industry.
Microsoft Windows
Operating systems featuring a GUI did not start with Microsoft.  Researchers 
working at Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) first developed the GUI, which 
was used on the Xerox Alto computer in 1973.  However, Xerox did not successfully 
exploit the GUI commercially.  Since the market for personal computers and operating 
systems was already dominated by IBM and Microsoft, Xerox found it difficult to focus 
its efforts on commercially exploiting the GUI.  Consequently, Xerox invited Steve Jobs 
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and other representatives from Apple to its PARC for access to its prototypes in exchange 
for a $1 million investment in Apple prior to its initial public offering (Ward, 2013).  
During this visit, Jobs viewed prototypes of a computer mouse used for navigation as 
well as the ability to move text around on the screen.  From this meeting, Jobs is said to 
have refocused efforts at Apple toward developing a GUI operating system.  However, 
others have argued that assigning too much causality to Jobs' single visit is an erroneous 
assumption, as other Apple engineers had ties to the PARC and Jobs himself made more 
than one visit (Pang & Marinaccio, 2000).  Whatever the inspiration, Apple worked on 
developing a GUI operating system for its Macintosh personal computers.  However, 
Apple still lagged behind IBM and Microsoft in developing applications for its operating 
system.  
Since Microsoft had established itself as a leader in the market for operating 
systems for PCs, and had previously worked with Apple by producing the SoftCard, a 
microprocessor designed to run programs designed for CP/M on the Apple II computer, 
Microsoft negotiated a licensing agreement for access to the Mac operating system in 
1985.  At this point, Microsoft had already been working on Microsoft Windows, its GUI 
operating system, which was announced in 1983.  The purpose of the license was to allow 
Microsoft access to certain visual elements of the Mac operating system so that Microsoft 
could develop applications for the Macintosh (The History of Computing Project, 2014).  
Indeed, Microsoft used its powerful position in the PC software market by threatening to 
“cease development work on important Mac applications unless such a license was 
granted” (Nairn, 2002, 375).  Windows version 1.0 was released the same year that the 
license was granted in 1985.  
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Both Microsoft and Apple then worked on GUI-based operating systems as a way 
to provide an easy-to-use solution for consumers.  Although neither the first Microsoft 
Windows release nor the Macintosh computer proved to be commercially successful, 
GUI-based operating systems soon allowed massive diffusion of PCs to the consumer 
market.  Microsoft held its IPO in 1986, which earned $61 million in cash, which the 
company used to invest heavily in developing its Microsoft Windows operating system.  
Microsoft emerged as the clear winner during this period, and the company's relationship 
with IBM ensured that its operating system would be installed on IBM-compatible 
computers.  Microsoft's growth during this period was immense, as reported earlier in this 
chapter when its market share rose to 90% by some estimates (Gilbert, 1995).  This 
growth in market share coincided with an increase in revenues, and the Windows 
operating system with its GUI elements was the key product that fueled the growth.  
However, Apple challenged Microsoft's claims to the GUI elements of Windows, 
claiming that Microsoft had infringed its intellectual property. 
Apple Computer vs. Microsoft Corporation 
In 1988, Apple began a copyright infringement lawsuit against Microsoft.  Apple 
claimed that Microsoft had infringed on 189 elements of its GUI, which, when taken 
together, constituted a “look and feel” of its Macintosh operating system that was 
protected by copyright.  Apple claimed that the infringements occurred in version 2.03 
and, later, 3.0 of Microsoft Windows.  The lawsuit stemmed from the initial licensing 
agreement that was negotiated between Apple and Microsoft when Apple granted 
Microsoft access to its GUI for developing applications for the Mac.  The resulting 
litigation lasted four years, but the case was interrupted by Xerox bringing a suit against 
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Apple, whereby Xerox claimed Apple had violated its copyrights by using some of the 
GUI elements originally featured in its PARC operations.  Xerox further claimed that 
Apple was guilty of unfair business practices because of its copyright claims on the GUI, 
which made it difficult for Xerox to license the technology to other customers.  The case 
against Apple grew out of the meetings held between Xerox and Apple when Steve Jobs 
and other Apple representatives visited the Xerox PARC to see prototypes of the GUI in 
exchange Xerox's ability to acquire stock prior to Apple's IPO.  
Xerox's claims against Apple were ultimately dismissed, as Apple claimed that, 
while it may have borrowed ideas from Xerox's PARC, those ideas were not able to be 
protected by copyright, and Xerox ought to settle any remaining dispute with the 
Copyright Office (Pollack, 1990).  Similarly, Apple's case against Microsoft was rejected. 
Of the 189 claims of copyright infringement, all but 10 were dismissed.  In the end, the 
district court ruled in favor of Microsoft, claiming that the remaining 10 claims were over 
ideas rather than expressions that could be protected by copyright.  Furthermore, the 
original licensing agreement signed between Microsoft and Apple that allowed Microsoft 
access to the GUI developed by Apple granted Microsoft the “right to transfer individual 
elements or design features using its 'Windows' program” (Apple Computer, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corporation, 1994).
While the 1994 case may not be directly related to corporate involvement in 
FLOSS, it does illustrate a couple things about software development, intellectual 
property, and Microsoft.  First, the case demonstrates that early software development, 
particularly of those features that we may take for granted today like the GUI, was not the 
result of rugged individuals developing the technology alone.  Rather, technological 
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development is a collective and collaborative process in which the ideas of others can 
influence the direction of development.  
Second, the case is instructive for the exploitation of  intellectual property, 
specifically because it illustrates how original authorship can be separated from 
ownership (Bettig, 1992).  While the idea and design for the GUI may have originated in 
Xerox's PARC, Xerox had not commercially exploited its designs in the same way that 
Apple and Microsoft sought to do.  Through a series of licensing agreements – first 
between Apple and Xerox, and later, between Apple and Microsoft – the rights to the 
individual elements of the GUI became diffused as they were shared among peers.  
Microsoft was already in a strong market position to be able to exploit the GUI through 
its Microsoft Windows operating system, whereas Apple relied on assistance from 
Microsoft for developing applications for its emerging Macintosh computer.  By doing 
so, however, Apple gave access to its GUI operating system to Microsoft.  In turn, 
Microsoft honored the stipulations of its original licensing agreement with Apple, but it 
would later continue development of its Windows operating system by making use of 
some of the same elements that Apple had been using.  Furthermore, because Microsoft 
maintained strategic alliances with major information technology manufacturers, the 
company was in a position to ensure that its operating system could be commercially 
exploited as its market share for personal computer operating systems rose to nearly 90% 
during the 1990s (Gilbert, 1995).  
Third, there is a great contradiction at the heart of this case when compared with 
the history of Microsoft.  Although the company benefited from sharing ideas to develop 
its Windows operating system, the company relied heavily on strong intellectual property 
protections to exclude others from its software as it ruthlessly defended its position atop 
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the software industry throughout the 1990s.  As we will see, however, this ruthlessness is 
ultimately what led to investigations for antitrust violations.
Microsoft in the 1990s
Microsoft's partnership with IBM was what ultimately allowed the company to 
solidify its strategic position atop the computer software industry.  Sales of the IBM PC 
and its clones reached nearly 16 million by 1990, which represented nearly 84% of the 
market share for personal computers (Reimer, 2005).  Originally, Microsoft had teamed 
with IBM to produce the OS/2 operating system, which IBM intended to be included on 
its PCs, but Microsoft was busy working on its Windows operating system.  By the time 
Windows 3.0 was released in 1990, the relationship between IBM and Microsoft had 
become strained to the point that the companies decided to terminate their Joint 
Development Agreement,22 which specified the partnership between the two firms for the 
purpose of working on OS/2 (TechInsider.org, 2013).  Because the Windows operating 
system was much more developed when the companies ended their relationship, 
Microsoft rapidly picked up market share as its operating system was included on sales of 
IBM-compatible PCs.  Indeed, the relationship between IBM and Microsoft was what 
initiallly drew attention from the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 
1990.
The investigation by the FTC was initiated because of a joint news release by 
IBM and Microsoft during the Comdex trade show in Las Vegas, NV, on November 13, 
1989 (Wallace & Erickson, 1992).  In the press release, the companies claimed that 
22 A digitized version of the Joint Development Agreement is available at http://tech-
insider.org/os2/research/acrobat/871126.pdf (last accessed July 3, 2014).
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“Microsoft would hold back features for Windows in order to help industry acceptance of 
the OS/2 operating system” (Wallace & Erickson, 1992, 373).  The FTC was concerned 
that the companies were colluding to control the market for operating systems.  
Ultimately, the FTC investigation ended in 1993 when the commissioners were split 2-2 
on whether to bring an administrative action against Microsoft.  In the same year, 
however, the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (DoJ) picked 
up the investigation, which would eventually lead to Microsoft's conviction for antitrust 
violations.  The main issues in that case, however, did not center around Microsoft's 
control of the operating system market but business practices associated primarily with its 
Internet browser, Internet Explorer.  Around the same time that Microsoft was seeking to 
solidify its position atop the computer software industry, however, at least three 
concurrent technological developments and their attendant cultural practices were 
emerging as challengers to the model used by Microsoft in its rise to power.  These 
developments were the emergence of the World Wide Web, the development of graphical 
web browsers, and the creation of Linux.  While the introduction to this dissertation 
discussed the rise of Linux in the early 1990s, the following section will focus more 
specifically on the so-called “browser wars” that followed the rise of the World Wide 
Web.
The Browser Wars
In November of 1990, Tim Berners-Lee and Robert Caillau authored a proposal 
for a hypertext project called the World Wide Web, which would provide “a way to link 
and access information of various kinds as a web of nodes in which the user can browse 
at will” (Berners-Lee & Caillau, 1990).  The creation of such a project relied on server-
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level applications to manage the nodes stored on the server and to facilitate the display 
and access of those nodes with a browser.  Browsers served as the application running on 
a user's machine that could request access to the nodes stored on the server and display 
those nodes to the user.  Finally, web pages would need to be created that could store 
textual, graphical, or other types of information that could be accessed by users.  By the 
end of the year in 1990, models of all these components had been created, and companies 
began developing browsers that would allow users to access the burgeoning technology 
of the World Wide Web. 
Mosaic and Netscape
In 1993, the Mosaic web browser was developed by a team of researchers at the 
National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign.  The browser had the ability to display graphical content on the web 
and, although it was not the first browser to do so, Mosaic would drastically increase the 
popularity of browsing the web.  Prior to its creation, most of the pages on the World 
Wide Web had been primarily text-based.  However, Mosaic's place in the history of web 
browsers is perhaps best illustrated by tracing the history of its ownership and, ultimately, 
its transformation into the open-source web browser, Mozilla Firefox.  
From its beginnings at the NCSA at the University of Illinois, the Mosaic browser 
spawned at least two primary companies that sought to commercially exploit the 
browser's technology.  One company was called Mosaic Communications, and the other 
was Spyglass.  The code base for the Mosaic browser was handled by Spyglass after an 
agreement was signed between the company and the University of Illinois, whereby 
Spyglass would retain the rights to commercially exploit the code.  The other company, 
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Mosaic Communications, created the Mosaic Netscape browser.  In fact, many of the 
employees at Mosaic Communications had worked previously on the Mosaic browser at 
the NCSA, although the Netscape browser was built entirely by the team at Mosaic 
Communications.  What was truly novel about the Netscape browser, however, was that it 
was made freely available to the general public for personal use, which was 
unprecedented up to that point.  Moody (2001) describes the significance of this strategy:
Along  with  a  beta-testing  program  on  a  scale  that  was 
unprecedented, the decision to allow anyone to download 
copies  of  Netscape  free  had  another  key  effect:  It 
introduced  the  idea  of  capturing  market  share  by  giving 
away  free  software,  and  then  generating  profits  in  other 
ways from the resulting installed base.  In other words, the 
Mosaic Netscape release signaled the first instance of the 
new Internet economics that have since come to dominate 
the software world and beyond. (187).
Indeed, the Netscape browser began to pick up market share, and the University of 
Illinois noticed.  To resolve any additional trademark disputes with the university, Mosaic 
Communications changed its name to Netscape Communications and reissued its browser 
under the name Netscape Navigator (Moody, 2001).
 Netscape Navigator quickly picked up market share from 1994-1996, reaching its 
peak at nearly 90% in April 1996, according to some sources (Cusumano & Yoffie, 
1998).  Riding this extraordinary wave of enthusiasm for Netscape, the company held its 
IPO in August 1995.  On the day of its IPO, shares of the company began selling at $28 
and reached $58.25 by the end of the day, valuing the company at nearly $3 billion after 
only 18 months of operation (Moody, 2001).  At that point, Netscape's IPO was the 
largest in history.  The success of Netscape was not lost on Microsoft, and the company 
began to focus its efforts on developing a browser to rival Netscape.  Thus began the first 
“browser wars.”
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Microsoft Responds
Since Microsoft had not devoted any significant amount of time and resources to 
developing a web browser of its own, the company decided not to build its browser from 
scratch.  Rather, Microsoft approached Spyglass, which held the rights to the code base of 
the original Mosaic browser.  Spyglass had been developing its own version of Mosaic, 
known as Spyglass Mosaic.  Microsoft negotiated a license to use the Spyglass Mosaic 
code base in exchange for royalty payments for each copy of the browser issued, with an 
annual cap of $5 million (Elstrom, 1997).23  The resulting browser was called Internet 
Explorer (IE), which was based on the same foundation as Netscape.  As evidence of how 
aggressively Microsoft pursued its new Internet strategy, Page and Lopatka (2007) note 
that the company only had five or six employees working in the browser department in 
1995 but, the company had more than 1,000 by 1999.  
In addition to assigning more employees to the browser division, Microsoft began 
packaging IE with distribution of its Windows operating system.  As Microsoft had nearly 
90% of the market for operating systems because of its contractual relationships with 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), the company was able to quickly make gains 
in the market for web browsers.  In effect, Microsoft was giving away copies of IE for 
free by bundling it with its Windows operating system.  To do so, the company began 
distributing versions of IE to OEMs by sending discs to the manufacturers, and 
eventually required the OEMs to install IE with Windows 95.  OEMs were prohibited 
from “modifying or deleting any part of Windows 95, including Internet Explorer, prior 
to shipment” because of a non-negotiable licensing restriction that Microsoft placed on 
23 This agreement would become a point of contention between Spyglass and Microsoft, as tracking the 
exact number of IE copies issued proved to be incredibly difficult.  Ultimately, the dispute was settled 
in 1997 after Microsoft agreed to issue a one-time payment of $7.5 million and an additional $500,000 
in “software and other considerations” to Spyglass (Elstrom, 1997).
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OEMs (United States, 1999, see Finding 158).  This restriction did not allow OEMs to 
ship new PCs without IE installed.  The effect on the market for web browsers was 
almost immediate.  Figure 6.1 shows the sharp rise in market share for the Netscape 
browser, and its eventual sharp decline.
Figure 5.1. Netscape Navigator Usage Data 1994-2006
Source: Image has been released to the public domain, and is available via Wikimedia Commons at 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Netscape-navigator-usage-data.svg 
Because of these tactics, Microsoft and its Internet Explorer won the first browser 
wars.  Microsoft was simply too big and had too much power to influence the market for 
Netscape to compete.  However, the novelty of distributing software freely for personal 
use was not lost on Microsoft.  Netscape's Navigator browser had rapidly picked up 
market share by using such a tactic, and Microsoft effectively gave away its IE browser 
by bundling it with its Windows operating system.  Just as Microsoft was reaching its 
most dominant market position and using tactics that eventually led to its conviction for 
antitrust violations, Linux and the open-source model of production was beginning to 
grow as a potential threat.  Indeed, after Netscape Navigator had lost significant market 
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share to Microsoft, Netscape released the source code to the broader community in 1998 
as a way to attract development for a new browser.  That new browser would eventually 
become Mozilla's Firefox, which was first released in 2002.  Microsoft took notice of this 
general trend toward open source as well and, in 1998, a series of leaked documents 
demonstrated exactly how Microsoft viewed this emerging threat.  The Halloween 
Documents24 were made publicly available and their authenticity was later confirmed by 
Microsoft (Harmon & Markoff, 1998).  They will be discussed later in this chapter.  
Before doing so, however, Microsoft's conviction for antitrust violations needs to be 
discussed.  In many ways, the antitrust conviction marks an important turning point, not 
just in Microsoft's history but in the broader history of the software industry.  
The United States vs. Microsoft Corporation
Microsoft's behavior during the Browser Wars was what ultimately led to its 
conviction for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act prohibits “every contract, combination..., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce...” (15 U.S.C. §1).  Section 2 states it is unlawful for any person or firm to 
“monopolize...any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations...” (15 U.S.C. §2).  The court ultimately found Microsoft to be in 
violation of both sections of the Act.  Microsoft violated Section 1 by unlawfully tying its 
web browser – Internet Explorer – to its operating system.  Furthermore, the company 
violated Section 2 by maintaining its monopoly power by anticompetitive means and 
attempting to monopolize the web browser market.  
24 The Halloween Documents can be found at http://www.catb.org/esr/halloween/ (last accessed July 3, 
2014).
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These convictions rested upon the fact that Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive 
behaviors in its contractual relationships with Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEMs).  In particular, Microsoft used “contractual and, later, technological shackles in 
order to ensure the prominent (and ultimately permanent) presence of Internet Explorer 
on every Windows user's PC system, and to increase the costs attendant to installing and 
using [Netscape] Navigator on any PCs running Windows” (United States, 2000, 11).  In 
addition, Microsoft restricted OEMs from reconfiguring Windows 95 and Windows 98 in 
ways that could lead to greater use of Netscape Navigator.  Finally, Microsoft “used 
incentives and threats to induce” certain OEMs from designing “distributional, 
promotional and technical efforts” that would favor Internet Explorer instead of 
Navigator (United States, 2000, 11).  
The final judgment in the antitrust case found that Microsoft had violated sections 
one and two of the Sherman Act, as well as more than 35 state law provisions in 19 states 
plus the District of Columbia.  In light of these violations, the U.S. District Court Judge, 
Thomas Penfield Jackson, ordered Microsoft to divest its operating systems business 
operations from its applications business operations.  Furthermore, all the intellectual 
property rights previously held by the two businesses were to be transferred to the 
Applications Division, which was required to grant a perpetual, royalty-free license to the 
operating systems business so that it could license, develop, and distribute modified or 
derivative versions of the intellectual property.  However, the Operating Systems 
Division was prohibited from doing this with the intellectual property related to the 
Internet browser (Internet Explorer).  Aside from divesting the operations of these two 
businesses, Microsoft was ordered to transfer all the assets from either one of the 
divisions into a newly formed company, for which the transfer of ownership was to be 
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accomplished by a distribution of stock to shareholders not connected with Microsoft.  
The intent of these decrees was to separate Microsoft's operating system business from 
the business operations that handled its web browser development.  These actions would 
prevent Microsoft from engaging in the same types of anticompetitive behavior that it 
had used during the Browser Wars.  
Effects of the Decision
In 2001, District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson recused himself from the case 
because of some public comments that he made, which gave the impression that he had a 
personal bias or prejudice against Microsoft (Wilcox, 2001).  In his place, U.S. District 
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly took over the case and, in late 2001, approved a settlement 
between the parties.  The approved settlement would no longer seek the break up of 
Microsoft's Operating Systems and Applications Divisions.  Instead, Microsoft agreed to 
a series of consent decrees in November, 2002, whereby the company would be 
prohibited from retaliating against any OEM that develops, distributes, promotes, uses, 
sells, or licenses any non-Microsoft products (United States, 2002).  In addition, 
Microsoft would need to establish a clearly documented schedule of all royalties that 
would be received from OEMs for its Windows Operating System.  
These provisions were aimed at prohibiting Microsoft from engaging in any 
anticompetitive behaviors, but most importantly for the purposes of this analysis, 
Microsoft would also be forced to promote interoperability for its products.  This would 
ensure that other companies could develop products that would operate smoothly with 
Microsoft's products.  As such, Microsoft was ordered to disclose its Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs), which would specify how software components should 
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interact with one another.  By releasing its APIs to independent hardware vendors (IHV), 
independent software vendors (ISV), OEMs, Internet Access Providers (IAPs), and 
Internet Content Providers (ICP), those parties could develop software that could operate 
on and interact with Microsoft's operating systems and other software.  Microsoft would 
also need to make any communications protocol available to third parties for the same 
purposes.  The consent decrees to which Microsoft agreed were supposed to last five 
years from the decision in 2002.  However, these decrees were renewed twice – once in 
2006 and again in 2009 – and finally expired May 12, 2011 (Chan, 2011).
In effect, the antitrust ruling against Microsoft did not seek a breakup of the 
company into distinct operating units, but focused more specifically on Microsoft's 
intellectual property practices.  The decrees forced Microsoft to disclose its APIs to third 
parties as a way to encourage and support interoperability with its products.  The logic 
was that doing so would curb the anticompetitive behavior Microsoft had displayed 
during the browser wars and in its contract bargaining with OEMs, while promoting 
competition within the software industry.  It is within this context that Microsoft's shift 
toward (but not completely to) open source can be viewed.  
Nevertheless, the consent decrees had little effect on the economic performance of 
the company.  Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate Microsoft's economic performance in the 
wake of the antitrust conviction and the consent decrees.  Figure 5.2 presents the 
company's annual revenues in billions of dollars.  Clearly, the company's annual revenues 
have continued to grow, and revenues were not affected by the dot-com crash that 
negatively affected the United States economy during 2001.  Indeed, the same could be 
said of the company's profits during the same time, which are shown in Figure 5.3.  The 
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company experienced a dip in profits in 2001, but still maintained nearly $7 billion in 
profits during this time with a substantial jump in the 2005-2006 fiscal year.  
Figure 5.2. Microsoft Annual Revenues 1999-2013
Figure 5.3. Microsoft Annual Net Profits 1999-2013
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In sum, the consent decrees did little to affect the overall economic performance 
of Microsoft.  However, along with broader shifts occurring in the software industry at 
the time, they did have the effect of changing some of Microsoft's practices associated 
with open source.  Indeed, the date of the consent decrees perfectly coincides with 
Microsoft's creation of the Shared Source program.  Furthermore, the end of the consent 
decrees in May, 2011, coincides with the creation of the Microsoft Open Technologies 
Division in 2012.  To understand more fully Microsoft's relationship with FLOSS, the 
remainder of the chapter charts the company's history with FLOSS, beginning with the 
Halloween Documents, then discusses the Shared Source program and Microsoft Open 
Technologies.  The previous discussion in this chapter, provides an important context 
within which Microsoft's shift toward FLOSS can be interpreted.
The Halloween Documents
In October 1998, Eric Raymond, who was a well-known member of the free and 
open source software community and author of The Cathedral and the Bazaar, received a 
series of internal documents from a confidential source that outlined Microsoft's strategy 
against Linux and open source software.  These documents were subsequently released to 
the public by Raymond and their authenticity was later verified by Microsoft.  These 
documents became known as the Halloween Documents because many were released 
near the end of October over different years.  The Halloween Documents focus on 
Microsoft's assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of open source software, 
including Linux, and how the company could combat the growing popularity of the 
movement.  What is clear from the documents is that Microsoft  viewed free software 
products as a genuine threat to its own products, especially because the free software 
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projects had “acquired the depth and complexity traditionally associated with commercial 
projects” (Raymond, 1998a).  As such, the Halloween Documents contain information 
about how Microsoft planned to combat open source software as a competitor.
In Halloween Document I  ,25 Vinod Valloppillil discusses open source software as 
a potential threat to Microsoft.  Rather than focusing on a particular open source project 
or organization, however, Valloppillil focuses on the process used in open source 
development.  Valloppillil writes, “to understand how to compete against OSS [open 
source software], we must target a process rather than a company” (Raymond, 1998a).  
The author goes on to assess possible strategies for combating open source software, and 
gives special attention to “FUD tactics,” which is an acronym for Fear, Uncertainty, 
Doubt.  FUD is a tactic used in sales, marketing, public relations, and propaganda, 
whereby one attempts to instill those feelings in consumers about the quality of a 
competitors' products.  For example, in an advertisement for Microsoft Server 2003, 
Microsoft claimed that research demonstrated “Linux was found to be over 10 times 
more expensive than Windows Server 2003” (BBC News, 2004).  Microsoft was asked to 
change the advertisement by the Advertising Standards Authority in the United Kingdom 
because the results of the study were deemed to be misleading to consumers.  In effect, 
the advertisement was viewed as a way to instill FUD in consumers about the total cost of 
ownership for Linux.
Halloween Document II26 largely contains a much more detailed technical analysis 
of Linux's functionality when compared to other products.  The author also describes his 
25 Halloween Document I, along with Eric Raymond's commentary, can be accessed at 
http://www.catb.org/esr/halloween/halloween1.html (last accessed July 3, 2014). 
26 Haloween Document II, along with Eric Raymond's commentary, can be accessed at 
http://www.catb.org/esr/halloween/halloween2.html (last accessed July 3, 2014).
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personal experience with installing the DHCP Client Daemon and ultimately claims that, 
even though he was a poorly skilled UNIX programmer, he was able to easily figure out 
how to extend the DHCP client code and “the feeling was exhilarating and addictive” 
(Raymond, 1998b).  Importantly, however, the conclusion of the document suggests 
possible strategies for competing against Linux.  While the author concedes that Linux 
was the greatest threat to Microsoft in the server market, he claims that a possible 
strategy for fighting Linux may have been patent and copyright litigation.
Halloween Document III27 is a document from Microsoft Netherlands in which 
Aurelia van den Berg, Press and Public Relations Manager, responds to the leak of the 
two internal documents in 1998.  Her response tends to downplay the significance of the 
leaked documents, claiming that all companies conduct assessments of their competitors, 
and that the leaked documents do not represent official Microsoft positions.  At the end of 
the document, however, van den Berg still manages to criticize FLOSS in general for its 
inability to be a long-term solution.  Alluding to the need for strong intellectual property 
protections, van den Berg claims, “unless Linux violates IP rights, it will fail to deliver 
innovation over the long run” (Raymond, 1998c).  
Documents VII, VIII, and X are the other documents that were directly leaked 
from Microsoft.  The remaining documents are commentaries, satires, and criticisms of 
Microsoft created by others in response to the leaked documents.  Halloween Document 
VII28 provides the results of an internal survey conducted by Microsoft in 2002 about 
attitudes and opinions of FLOSS in general, Linux in particular, and the general 
27 Halloween Document III, along with Eric Raymond's commentary, can be accessed at 
http://www.catb.org/esr/halloween/halloween3.html (last accessed July 3, 2014).
28 Halloween Document VII, along with Eric Raymond's commentary, can be accessed at 
http://www.catb.org/esr/halloween/halloween7.html (last accessed July 3, 2014).
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familiarity with Microsoft's newly created Shared Source program, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  The results of Microsoft's internal survey showed that 
FLOSS in general and Linux in particular were viewed favorably by those included in the 
survey, which mainly included policymakers, decision makers, and corporate executives 
selectively chosen by Microsoft.  The survey also showed that messaging designed to 
criticize or question the quality of FLOSS, Linux, or the GPL were not effective 
(Raymond, 2002a).  In light of these findings, the authors recommend that Microsoft 
could more effectively compete with FLOSS by focusing on the total cost of ownership 
(TCO) of Microsoft products when compared with Linux.  In addition, Microsoft should 
focus on the benefits of its newly created Shared Source program.  
Halloween Document VIII29 was an internal email sent by Orlando Ayala, Group 
Vice President of Microsoft's Worldwide Sales, Marketing, and Services Group, to the 
heads of Microsoft's subsidiaries in 2002.  The message was sent as a reaction to the fact 
that many governments and other large institutions had begun to transition to Linux.  As 
such, Ayala suggests that Microsoft and its subsidiaries needs to be better prepared to 
respond to those types of announcements by communicating these announcements 
internally so the company can try to respond to these cases directly.  In short, the 
document suggests that Microsoft's internal communication needed to be more fully 
integrated to respond to their declining market share, particularly among large 
institutions.  
29 Halloween Document VIII, along with Eric Raymond's commentary, can be accessed at 
http://www.catb.org/esr/halloween/halloween8.html (last accessed July 3, 2014).
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Finally, Halloween Document X30 was leaked in 2004 and features an internal 
email from the SCO Group in which the author discusses, albeit somewhat vaguely, the 
relationship between SCO Group and Microsoft.  The email appears to disclose the 
amount of money paid to SCO on behalf of Microsoft.  Although not discussed at length 
here, the SCO Group was a software company that became infamous for engaging in a 
number of legal battles over alleged intellectual property infringement in Linux related 
software.  The SCO Group went bankrupt in 2007, but between 2003 and 2011 the 
company alleged that various Linux vendors had infringed copyrights belonging to the 
SCO Group.  These vendors notably included IBM, Novell, and Red Hat, but also 
included claims against Daimler-Chrysler and AutoZone.  Particularly relevant for this 
discussion is that Document X suggests that Microsoft was contributing large amounts of 
money to the SCO Group as a way to fuel the intellectual property litigation against 
Linux and its vendors.  This would be consistent with some of the suggestions in the 
previous documents that possible strategies for combatting Linux would be copyright and 
patent litigation.
In sum, the Halloween Documents allowed direct access to Microsoft's 
assessment of FLOSS in general and Linux in particular.  What becomes clear from the 
documents is that Microsoft believed Linux was a legitimate threat to its own products.  
However, Microsoft correctly placed the true value of FLOSS projects within the process 
of production.  To compete against the perception that FLOSS projects provided at least 
the same level of quality as those of proprietary companies, Microsoft used FUD tactics 
to suggest that the open source model of production was inherently unstable or not 
30 Halloween Document X, along with Eric Raymond's commentary, can be accessed at 
http://www.catb.org/esr/halloween/halloween10.html (last accessed July 3, 2014).
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secure.  Ironically, Microsoft's own survey data suggested that these tactics were not 
effective, nor were any attempts to criticize the FLOSS development model.  Instead, 
Microsoft needed to shift their strategy to focus more on the quality of its own products, 
including its newly developed Shared Source program.  The Halloween Documents 
provide an illuminating perspective on the internal culture of Microsoft during the critical 
years from 1998-2004 when it underwent somewhat of a transformation.  The antitrust 
suit against the company began in 1998 and was ultimately decided in 2001, and the 
company developed its Shared Source program in 2001.  
Shifting Toward the Commons
Three concurrent factors ultimately led to Microsoft's change of position in regard 
to FLOSS.  First, the company was convicted of antitrust in 2001 and agreed to a series 
of consent decrees in 2002 that sought to curb the company's anticompetitive practices by 
requiring Microsoft to disclose its APIs to third parties.  Second, the dot-com bubble 
burst, which marked the end of the massive speculative investment in web-based 
companies.  Third, the rise of Linux and Linux-related businesses had demonstrated the 
commercial viability of FLOSS-based business models.  Microsoft responded to these 
factors by initiating a couple different projects that were claimed to be dedicated to 
FLOSS principles, although these initiatives were met with different levels of acceptance 
by the broader FLOSS community.  The next sections chart the rise of two such projects: 
the Shared Source Initiative and the Microsoft Open Technologies Division.  Because the 
Microsoft Open Technologies division is still relatively new, however, extensive 
information about its operations is limited.  Therefore, I attempt to position the opening 
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of the division within the broader historical trajectory of Microsoft's shift after the 
antitrust ruling. 
Microsoft Shared Source
The Shared Source Initiative (SSI) began at Microsoft in 2001 as a way to provide 
access to certain source code for debugging and reference purposes.  While Microsoft had 
been releasing portions of its Windows source code to academic institutions and OEMs as 
early as 1991, the SSI expanded the range of code that was made available in 2001.  The 
code made available under this program was protected by a number of different licenses, 
including the Research Source Licensing Program, Enterprise Source Licensing Program, 
ISV Source Licensing, OEM Source Licensing, Windows CE source code access, and 
others.  While a full description of the rights granted by these licenses and programs is 
well beyond the scope of this analysis, these licenses are mentioned here as a way to 
demonstrate that the sharing of source code by Microsoft was not entirely new to the 
period following the antitrust ruling.  However, these licenses were not considered free 
software or open source in its true sense because Microsoft still claimed copyright 
protection on the underlying source code.  Under most of these licenses, code was made 
available for academic and reference purposes, but the company prohibited redistribution 
of the code or limited distribution to those working on Microsoft software.  In effect, 
these licenses served as a way to allow others to view the source code, but it could not be 
modified unless it adhered to the limitations set forth in the licenses.  
What was novel about the SSI in 2001 was the expansion of its Shared Source 
program by the release of more types of source code as well as the creation of new 
licenses that were designed to grant different types of rights to users.  Most notably for 
132
the purpose of this project are the two licenses that were submitted to the Open Source 
Initiative (OSI) for official registration as open source licenses: the Microsoft Public 
License and the Microsoft Reciprocal License.  Both were approved by the OSI in 
October of 2007 (Open Source Initiative, 2007).  This marked the first time that 
Microsoft officially had a license approved by the open source community, even though 
these licenses were still not fully compatible with the GPL.  
Indeed, some within the broader community viewed Microsoft's Shared Source 
Initiative and its new licenses as simply a marketing ploy.  Even Michael Tiemann, the 
president of OSI, the organization that approved the licenses, claimed:  
Shared source is a marketing term created and controlled by 
Microsoft.   Shared source is  not  open source by another 
name.  Shared source is an insurgent term that distracts and 
dilutes the Open Source message by using similar-sounding 
terms and offering similar-sounding promises.  And to date, 
“share source” has been a marketing dud as far as Open 
Source is concerned (Tiemann, 2007).
Of course, Microsoft's views differed from Tiemann's claim.  In a speech in 2001, 
Microsoft Senior Vice President, Scott Mundie, noted that Microsoft's expansion of its 
Share Source Initiative may be viewed by some as a failed attempt at becoming an open 
source company.  Mundie claimed this assertion would be false because, “Shared Source 
is Open Source” (Mundie, 2001).  Mundie continued by saying Microsoft would be 
incorporating many of the positive aspects of the FLOSS development, while continuing 
to preserve the company's strong intellectual property protections.  Mundie went on to 
claim that FLOSS production was unstable as a business model in the long run because it 
was not secure and subject to “unhealthy 'forking'” (Mundie, 2001).  
These vastly different assessments of the SSI are indicative of the contentious 
relationship that exists between Microsoft and the FLOSS community.  Although 
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Microsoft had shifted its position toward FLOSS, the community still maintained a 
healthy skepticism about Microsoft's involvement in FLOSS projects.  After all, 
Microsoft had a history of threatening intellectual property infringement suits against 
firms using Linux, even though this stance began to thaw around the same time that 
Microsoft's Shared Source licenses were approved by the OSI.  In 2006, Microsoft agreed 
not to sue Novell's Linux users in exchange for a share of Novell's open source revenue, 
as Microsoft claimed that Novell was infringing its intellectual property.  As a result of 
the agreement, Novell claimed that its Linux business had increased 243% through the 
first three quarters of the 2007 fiscal year (Lai, 2007).  This agreement, as well as other 
similar agreements between companies using Linux and Microsoft, caused somewhat of a 
split within the FLOSS community as to whether companies should be signing such 
agreements.  While the split existed in 2007, the lines of this split have blurred 
significantly in the years since these types of agreements began.  Indeed, Microsoft has 
now opened an entire division of its company dedicated to open source, which will be 
discussed in the next section.
Microsoft Open Technologies
Microsoft Open Technologies opened in 2012 as a wholly owned subsidiary to 
build “bridges between Microsoft and non-Microsoft technologies” (Microsoft Open 
Technologies, 2014a).  To do so, the subsidiary claimed to promote interoperability 
through open standards and open source.  One of the primary ways this is accomplished 
is the building of open source code, which is hosted on the popular web-based 
development platform GitHub, as well as Microsoft's own CodePlex platform.  As of 
2014, the company claimed to have 25 projects available on GitHub and CodePlex 
134
(Microsoft Open Technologies, 2014b).  These projects appeared to serve a variety of 
purposes that were grouped into six thematic areas: cloud-based services, data and 
business intelligence, device applications, open web, virtual machines, and devops.31  
At the time of writing, it was still too early to tell whether the specific projects 
hosted by Microsoft Open Technologies would be successful.  More generally, however, 
the creation of an entire subsidiary dedicated to open source at least signals a shift in 
Microsoft's relationship to the broader open source community.  Throughout Microsoft's 
history, isolated individuals or smaller working groups may have advocated for greater 
involvement in open source projects, but the creation of an entirely new subsidiary 
marked the first concerted institutional effort at direct involvement.  Notably, the creation 
of the new subsidiary coincided with two major events at Microsoft.  The first was the 
expiration of the consent decrees in 2011, and the second was the resignation of Steve 
Ballmer as Chief Executive Officer.  
The consent decrees required Microsoft to make its APIs more openly available so 
that developers could create technologies that could easily interact with Microsoft's 
technologies.  In other words, the consent decrees provided an impetus for forcing the 
promotion of greater interoperability between Microsoft and non-Microsoft technologies.  
In addition, Microsoft expanded its Shared Source initiative as a way to make its code 
more openly available to the broader community.  However, this move was met with 
some skepticism by the FLOSS community, particularly because most of the licenses that 
protected the code did not comply with open source standards.  This changed in 2007 
when the OSI approved two Microsoft licenses as open source.  
31 “devops” is a portmanteau combining the terms “development” and “operations,” which is used to 
describe a software development method. 
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In addition to the changes brought about by the consent decrees, Microsoft 
experienced a change in leadership shortly after Microsoft Open Technologies opened.  
CEO Steve Ballmer, who is credited with the “Linux is a cancer” indictment, announced 
his resignation on August 23, 2013. He ultimately resigned in 2014, and Bill Gates 
stepped down as Chairman of the company.  However, Gates was invited to serve as 
technology adviser to the newly appointed CEO, Satya Nadella.  The shift in leadership 
could similarly signal a new direction for Microsoft, although it is still far too early to 
tell.  What is clear, however, is the notable shift in Microsoft's stance toward open source.
Why Open Source? Why Now?
Microsoft's transformation in regards to open source can be interpreted within 
broader historical shifts in web technology.  On the one hand, the company's initial 
strategy of relying on strong intellectual property rights and enforcing them ruthlessly 
while simultaneously framing open source as an adversary ultimately led to an antitrust 
conviction shortly after the turn of the 21st century.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
Microsoft's closed-source strategy led to tremendous growth within the software market.  
The findings of the antitrust case, however, revealed the darker side of this growth.  
Mainly, that the company engaged in monopolistic practices by using its dominance in 
the market for personal computer operating systems to distribute copies of its Internet 
Explorer web browser.  This marked an historical turning point not just for Microsoft, but 
of a more general trend that saw the end of the dot-com bubble and Web 1.0.  
Microsoft was, and still remains, the largest software company in the world, and 
the company managed to survive the burst of the dot-com bubble.  Indeed, as 
demonstrated in this chapter, the company was able to thrive in its wake.  But in the years 
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shortly after the dot-com bubble burst in 2001, a host of new web-based companies arose 
that promised interactivity and a focus on the consumer.  This era, which marks the rise 
of so-called “Web 2.0” companies, was characterized by companies providing services 
rather than packaged software, controlling robust data sets that expanded as more people 
use them, trusting users as co-developers of companies' products and services, harnessing 
collective intelligence, relying on customer self-service, providing software across 
multiple devices, and featuring lightweight user interfaces, development models and 
business models (O'Reilly, 2005).  These technological features functioned ideologically 
insofar as they gave the illusion of participation, collaboration, and egalitarianism when, 
in fact, they merely justified the provision of personal data to corporate Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs), who, in turn, harvested and sold that data to advertisers (see Fuchs, 
2011b).  
This suggests that the antitrust ruling cannot be viewed as the sole factor that 
affected Microsoft's business model.  Rather, the antitrust decision combined with the 
other emerging historical forces within the technology field – Web 2.0, the commercial 
viability of Linux, and the ideology of romantic individualism within start-up culture – to 
effect a change in Microsoft's business strategy.  In 2002, only a year after the antitrust 
ruling, Microsoft launched its “shared source” program, which provided greater access to 
some of its source code, but still placed restrictions on its modification and redistribution. 
Consequently, the program was widely viewed  as somewhat of a marketing ploy and a 
strategy to gain a better reputation with the open source community.
When viewed in this way, Microsoft needed to embrace open source – not only 
because the consent decrees required a more open approach, but because the industry in 
general was trending toward collaboration and Linux was proving to be commercially 
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viable.  In part, Microsoft has an interest in promoting interoperability and open 
standards, which enables it to keep up with the always-changing technological landscape. 
But the company's turn to open source may also be viewed as a humble recognition that 
the commons-based peer production taking place within the FLOSS community was an 
efficient and effective model of production that could supplement its own business 
practices.  
In sum, Microsoft represents an example of how a corporation that was widely 
viewed as the antithesis to the FLOSS ethos transitioned toward a more open stance 
toward it.  In effect, Microsoft is now seeking to incorporate elements of FLOSS 
production within its broader corporate structure.  While not fully transforming to an 
open source business, Microsoft has shifted its position even while it maintains strong 
intellectual property protections over some of its core software.  Consequently, Microsoft 
does not seem poised to fully embrace FLOSS, but it also does not seem to be fully 
competitive.  The decision to collaborate or compete with the broader FLOSS community 
will most likely be based on the company's assessment as to its relative strengths and 
weaknesses in certain areas of software.  
In the meantime, Microsoft will need to attract FLOSS developers to work on its 
open source projects.  However, this is not without potential pitfalls.  The following 
chapter presents a case in which a company that supported FLOSS projects was acquired 
by another company that had other intentions for those projects.  In response to this 
undue corporate encroachment into their FLOSS projects, the community took certain 
measures to resist such involvement, ultimately abandoning production on those projects. 
More specifically, the following chapter discusses Oracle's acquisition of Sun 
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Microsystems and the effect this acquisition had on three software projects: OpenSolaris, 
MySQL, and OpenOffice. 
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CHAPTER VI
CONFLICT IN THE COMMONS: ORACLE CORPORATION AND ITS 
ACQUISITION OF SUN MICROSYSTEMS
The previous two chapters focused on case studies of Red Hat and Microsoft, 
respectively.  Red Hat demonstrates how free software can be turned into a profitable 
business, and the company still maintains a good relationship with the broader open 
source community today.  Microsoft demonstrates how a company that depends on strong 
intellectual property to protect its proprietary software eventually shifted to embrace open 
source, albeit in limited and only certain ways.  This chapter will look at how another one 
of the largest software companies in the world, the Oracle Corporate (simply “Oracle” 
hereafter), has tried to incorporate open source projects into its corporate structure.  
Oracle did this by acquiring Sun Microsystems, which supported open source software 
projects.  Whereas Sun Microsystems (simply “Sun” hereafter) maintained a good 
relationship with the open source community, these relations became strained after Oracle 
acquired the company in 2010.  After the acquisition, Oracle used a differnet strategy 
with regards to Sun's open source projects.  In certain cases, Oracle ended open source 
activities, in others it tried to influence open source development to meet its own goals, 
and in other it altered the way that the project was governed.  In response, the community 
employed different strategies to protect their commons-based resources.
In this chapter, I focus on the histories of three such projects: the OpenSolaris 
operating system, the MySQL relational database management system, and the 
OpenOffice productivity software that was designed as an alternative to Microsoft Office. 
Throughout the chapter, I focus on the ways that the FLOSS community maintains a 
unique ability to leverage its collective labor power against corporate encroachment into 
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its projects by using technical, legal, and governance strategies that allow them to 
abandon a project without losing the products of their labor.  This has a similar effect to a 
factory walk out, whereby workers halt the productive process by abandoning the site of 
production.  When dealing with software, however, production is not reliant on a 
particular space.  Rather, productive activity can simply be moved to a new location.  
And, because of the unique legal institutions and technical features of open source 
software, a project can be “forked,” whereby project can be copied and moved to a new 
location under a new name without violating the intellectual property protections of the 
original project.  As we will see, this is one of the primary ways that the FLOSS 
community leverages its collective labor power against undue corporate influence.  
To this end, I have structured the argument in the following ways.  First, I provide 
some background about Oracle and Sun.  Next, I discuss the histories of each of the three 
projects – OpenSolaris, MySQL, and OpenOffice – by focusing on their initial 
development, their acquisition by Sun, and their fates after Oracle acquired Sun in 2010.  
Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about why it will be important for the FLOSS 
community to maintain its ability to leverage its collective power.
The Oracle Corporation and Sun Microsystems
The Oracle Corporation (hereafter simply Oracle) is one of the largest software 
companies in the world.  The company has three main operating segments: software 
business, hardware business, and services.32  In turn, these three segments are divided into 
seven smaller operating divisions: 1) new software licenses and cloud software 
32 Unless otherwise noted, all of this information was derived from Oracle's annual filings (Form 10-K) 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the United States, which is available 
here:http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/investor-relations/financials/fy2013-form-10k-1966521.pdf 
(last accessed March 4, 2014)
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subscription service; 2) software license updates and product support; 3) hardware 
systems products; 4) hardware systems support; 5) consulting services; 6) managed cloud 
services; and 7) education services.  However, of the three main operating segments, 
Oracle earns nearly 75% of its total income from the software business segment.  In 2013 
alone, the company earned more than $37 billion in total revenues and employed 
approximately 120,000 people.  Figure 6.1 provides an illustration of Oracle's total 
revenues from 1998-2013.  If calculated by total revenues, Oracle is the third largest 
company in the global software market behind only IBM and Microsoft.  Oracle has 
remained competitive within the global software market, in part, because of its strategic 
acquisitions.  One of the company's largest acquisitions took place when it acquired Sun 
Microsystems in 2010. 
Figure 6.1. Oracle Corporation's Annual Revenues 1998-2013
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Figure 6.2 shows the rise in Oracle's net profits in the wake of its acquisition of 
Sun Microsystem.  The company's net profits dipped in 2001 after the dot-com bubble 
burst, which had an effect on the entire economy in the U.S. at the time.  However, 
Oracle has enjoyed a steady rise in profits since that time, with a noticeable spike in 
profits between 2010 and 2013.  The company's profitablity can be directly tied to its 
acquisition of Sun Microsystems.
Figure 6.2. Oracle Corporation's Annual Net Profits 1998-2013
Prior to its acquisition by Oracle in 2010, Sun Microsystems provided network 
computing infrastructure solutions, which included software, systems, storage, and 
microelectronics.  In 2009, the final year of its independent operation, Sun reported 
approximately $11.45 billion in revenues and employed approximately 29,000 employees 
in more than 100 different countries.  The majority of the company's revenues (42%) 
came from its Systems operating segment, which includes the sale of servers that provide 
computing and storage power to customers as a key part of Internet infrastructure.  The 
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other core brands owned by Sun Microsystems were the Java technology platform, the 
Solaris Operating System, MySQL database management software, Sun StorageTek 
storage solutions and the UltraSPARC processor.  Because the company relied on the 
provision of infrastructure-based services and products, the company was a large 
supporter of interoperability.  Interoperability, here, is simply defined as the ability for 
different programs to exchange data with one another by using common formats.  To 
facilitate innovation and interoperability, Sun made its key intellectual properties freely 
available as a way strategy to support open standards, open interfaces, and open source 
software.  By making a commitment to open source, Sun was viewed favorably by the 
open source community and maintained a relatively good relationship with the 
community because it was transparent about its corporate goals.  To better understand the 
reasons for Sun open-sourcing some of their key intellectual properties, we need to 
consider some of the historical development for corporate involvement in FLOSS 
projects.
A Brief History of the Market for Operating Systems
Throughout the 1980s, the market for operating systems was dominated by 
proprietary versions of Unix-based operating systems.  For example, Hewlett Packard 
offered HPUX, IBM offered AIX, and Sun Microsystems offered SunOS.  These 
operating systems dominated high computing, or infrastructural level computing, while 
the consumer market was dominated by Microsoft DOS, which was not based on Unix 
but developed entirely by Microsoft.  Importantly, the proprietary Unix-based systems 
were source-incompatible.  In effect, although these systems were all based on Unix, the 
development of separate proprietary versions had caused the code to diverge in such a 
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way that programmers could no longer assume interoperability between the systems.  As 
a result, programmers had to maintain separate code bases for each system, and 
companies could sell entire stacks of software to their customers who had to accept the 
entire stack.  This resulted in an inefficient system that was dominated by proprietary 
software vendors, while simultaneously increasing the workload for programmers.  
During the mid-1980s, however, the Free Software Foundation began as a response to the 
overly protective intellectual property restrictions placed on software.  This, in turn, led 
to the development of free and open source software, which was collaboratively 
developed as a commons-based resource for others to study, use, adapt, or modify in any 
way.
Because this model of development was so successful, by the mid-1990s Linux, 
an open-source operating system, had become the dominant Unix-like operating system.  
Linux undercut the competition by offering a comparable product at a significantly lower 
cost.  Furthermore, because Linux is licensed under the GNU General Public License 
(GPL), an alternative form of intellectual property (“copyleft”), improvements to Linux 
could be shared by everyone, which improved the quality and stability of Linux.  The 
proprietary companies could not compete with Linux because the commons-based peer 
production driving Linux constituted a larger labor force than any of the individual 
companies could employ.  Rather than competing directly with Linux, certain proprietary 
companies began to open source their products as a way of joining forces with the free 
and open source software community.  Sun Microsystems was one of those companies.
Although Sun supported many different open source projects, I will focus on just 
three here.  Sun open-sourced their Solaris operating system, which became OpenSolaris. 
They also open-sourced the MySQL database management software, as well as 
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StarOffice, which became OpenOffice.  As I mentioned earlier, Sun maintained a good 
relationship with the broader FLOSS community because of their commitment to and 
support for FLOSS projects.  After the company was acquired by Oracle, this relationship 
was strained in certain ways.  In what follows, I will discuss how the developers working 
on the three projects mentioned above – OpenSolaris, MySQL, and OpenOffice – 
strategically resisted the corporate acquisition.  
OpenSolaris
In 1987, Sun Microsystems and AT&T announced that they were going to merge 
some of the most popular Unix-based operating systems into a single project.  This 
project eventually became Solaris, which was a proprietary operating system held by Sun 
that contained both open-source and closed-source components.  To attract interest in the 
project and build a community of users and developers around the project, Sun 
Microsystems created OpenSolaris.  OpenSolaris was an open-source version of the 
Solaris operating system, although OpenSolaris did contain some elements in the code 
that were not open source.  After attracting a larger community of interest in the project, a 
Community Advisory Board (CAB) was created to direct the project.  The CAB was 
comprised of two Sun employees, two members who were elected by the broader 
community, and one member who was appointed by Sun from the broader free software 
community.  In effect, most of the CAB members were connected with or appointed by 
Sun, and Sun made clear what its intentions were for the OpenSolaris project.
Sun's strategy for the OpenSolaris project was to incorporate some of the 
developments from OpenSolaris into their proprietary Solaris operating system.  In turn, 
Sun could sell the proprietary version of Solaris to other enterprises.  The money earned 
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from sales of the Solaris project could then be used to support the developers and 
community involved in the OpenSolaris project.  To facilitate this type of strategy, Sun 
protected OpenSolaris under a free software license created by the company called the 
Common Development and Distribution License (CDDL).  This license enabled Sun to 
include proprietary, free software, or software protected under any other license in their 
Solaris and OpenSolaris operating systems.  Consequently, Sun could use the 
OpenSolaris community as a way to drive development, quality control, or innovation 
that could be included in their proprietary Solaris offering.  Importantly, however, Sun 
made this strategy very clear to the OpenSolaris community, and Sun was supportive of 
the broader FLOSS community, which gave it a good reputation within the community.  
Once they acquired Sun, Oracle took a very different approach to this strategy.
After Oracle acquired Sun, they announced plans to discontinue the regular 
distribution and development model of OpenSolaris (Laishram, 2010).  Instead, Oracle 
would focus its development strategy on a new proprietary version of Solaris called 
Solaris Express.  In effect, the new strategy from Oracle would not allow the community 
of developers that supported OpenSolaris to continue their work.  In response, the 
Community Advisory Board directing the OpenSolaris project decided to fork the project. 
When a project is forked, developers take a copy of the source code for a particular 
project and begin to develop it as a distinct form of software.  The resulting fork of the 
OpenSolaris project is called OpenIndiana, which was created to continue the 
development and distribution of the OpenSolaris project.  Currently, Oracle still 
continues development on the proprietary Solaris Express operating system, while the 
community of developers supporting OpenSolaris have left Oracle to work on the forked 
version of OpenSolaris called OpenIndiana.  
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In the case of the OpenSolaris operating system, Oracle's strategy was simply to 
discontinue the open source project and focus development on a proprietary version of 
Solaris under the new name Solaris Express.  This represents the most direct strategy for 
ending open development.  Oracle announced that the open source project would be 
discontinued and, in response, the community had to fork the project to continue 
development under a new name.  This is a similar fate to that of MySQL and OpenOffice, 
but Oracle's strategy for ending development took different forms in each case.
MySQL
In 2008, Sun Microsystems acquired MySQL AB for approximately $1 billion 
(MySQL, 2008).  At the time, MySQL was growing in the market for relational database 
management software (RDBMS), and Sun's acquisition of MySQL would allow the 
company to compete directly with Oracle in that particular market.  Only one year later, 
however, Oracle acquired Sun, and the MySQL property was one of the key properties 
that drew Oracle's interest.  Indeed, the Sun-Oracle merger was originally approved by 
regulators in the United States, but the European Union (EU) did not immediately 
approve the deal specifically because of concerns that Oracle's acquisition of the MySQL 
property would lead to an anticompetitive market for RDBMS in Europe (Chapman & 
Newman, 2009).  Consequently, the EU pressured Oracle to divest the MySQL property 
as a condition for approval of the merger.  As leaked documents provided to the whistle-
blowing site WikiLeaks have since shown, the United States Department of Justice 
communicated directly with the European Commission's Directorate General for 
Competition in support of the merger in October of 2009 (United States Mission to 
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European Union, 2009).  Less than three months later, in December of 2009, the merger 
was approved without the divestiture conditions sought by the EU.  
MySQL relied on a dual licensing approach that was similar to the licensing of 
OpenSolaris.  The dual license model for MySQL would allow the code base for MySQL 
to be protected by the GNU GPL copyleft license, but proprietary versions could be 
created for enterprises that wanted customized installations.  When the Sun-Oracle 
merger was approved, employees working for MySQL had reservations about Oracle's 
intentions for the GPL-protected code base of MySQL.  Most notably among them was 
Michael “Monty” Widenius who authored the original version of MySQL and co-founded 
MySQL AB, which was the original owner of MySQL.  Widenius later sold MySQL AB 
to Sun before Sun was acquired by Oracle.  Widenius along with other MySQL 
developers were concerned that Oracle would try to discontinue MySQL or make it a 
closed-source program by using the same strategy it had with OpenSolaris.  In response, 
Widenius urged MySQL users to “Help MySQL” by starting an online petition.  Leading 
up to the acquisition of Sun, however, Oracle pledged to keep the same licensing 
strategies in place that had been negotiated with current customers for an additional five 
years (Whitney, 2009).  That commitment is set to officially expire in December of 2014.  
Fueled by the concerns about Oracle's intentions for MySQL, the developers 
forked the project to create MariaDB.33  The code base for MariaDB is protected by the 
GNU GPL, and is designed to be a drop-in replacement for MySQL.  As a forked project 
of MySQL, MariaDB allows its community of developers and users to ensure that the 
code will continue to be protected by the GNU GPL regardless of what Oracle decides to 
do with MySQL.  Furthermore, although MySQL remains dominant in the RDBMS 
33 MariaDB is just one fork of the MySQL project.  Others include Drizzle and Percona Server. 
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market with an approximately 58% market share, MariaDB has now grown to claim 
approximately 18% of the market (Fydorenchyk, 2014).  MariaDB has experienced 
increased growth in the database market in part because of some notable companies 
switching from MySQL to MariaDB, including Google and the Wikimedia Foundation.  
MariaDB once again illustrates how the community of developers and users of an 
open source software can protected their projects from unwanted corporate 
encroachment.  In the case of MariaDB, the project has gained additional attention from 
some of Oracle's competitors who have invested directly in the project.  Most notably, 
SkySQL recently invested nearly $20 million to support the growth of MariaDB.  Backed 
by capital from Intel and other venture capital firms, SkySQL is directed by some of the 
founding members of MySQL as well as former executives who left the company after 
Oracle acquired the project.  SkySQL recently announced a merger with The Monty 
Program AB, which is led by Monty Widenius, the original author of MySQL.  The 
merger reunites the original members of MySQL and transfers ownership of the MariaDB 
trademark to SkySQL.  The resulting partnership will focus on developing MariaDB to 
compete with MySQL.
Furthermore, both the Monty Program AB and SkySQL belong to the MariaDB 
Foundation.  The MariaDB Foundation is a non-stock, non-profit corporation, which was 
established to provide legal and technical support for the MariaDB project and provide a 
platform for supporters to contribute money to the project.  For example, the MariaDB 
Foundation sells corporate memberships beginning at $50,000 and corporate 
sponsorships beginning at $5,000.  According to the Foundation's web site, corporate 
memberships allow “engagement with the governance of the Foundation,” although no 
further details are provided about exactly what that entails (MariaDB Foundation, 2014).
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In sum, MariaDB represents another example of how communities of FLOSS 
projects maintain the ability to protect their commons-based resource against unwanted 
corporate influence.  In this case, however, Oracle's strategy was not to discontinue the 
open source project, per se.  Rather, Oracle's acquisition of Sun would allow the company 
to gain a greater market share of the RDBMS market, and Sun's ownership of MySQL 
was one of the primary properties that attracted Oracle to acquire Sun.  Although 
development of MySQL still continues under Oracle, many of the community members 
resigned from Sun, and Oracle's commitment to maintain the same licensing agreements 
for MySQL are set to expire at the end of 2014.  To resist what could ultimately be a 
similar fate to that of OpenSolaris, the MySQL community forked the project to develop 
MariaDB.  Furthermore, MariaDB has the additional benefit of having received 
investment capital from some of Oracle's competitors, which ensures the survival of the 
project for at least the foreseeable future.  By establishing the MariaDB Foundation, the 
community has a legally recognizable organization to provide technical and legal support 
for the project, while also collecting additional donations to the project.  In the third and 
final example provided in this paper, I focus on a series of office productivity software 
that eventually led to another forked project.
StarOffice, OpenOffice, LibreOffice
During the dot-com bubble in the mid- to late-1990s, Sun Microsystems 
experienced dramatic growth that allowed the company made some key acquisitions.  In 
1999, Sun acquired the German company, StarDivision, which developed StarOffice.  
StarOffice was designed as a proprietary office software featuring a word processing, 
spreadsheet, presentation, drawing, database, and formula programs.  When Sun acquired 
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StarDivision, the company continued to develop StarOffice as a proprietary software.  
However, Sun forked the project and relicensed the software so that the source code 
could be made open source under a free and open source license.  Once again, Sun's 
strategy was to use the newly open-sourced software, known as OpenOffice, to develop 
new features and fix bugs in the software.  Then, the changes made to OpenOffice could 
be integrated into StarOffice, which contained certain proprietary elements.  OpenOffice 
could continue to remain free to consumers, while Sun would try to monetize StarOffice 
by selling the software and services to customers who wanted the additional features.  
The upshot for Sun was the maintenance and support for essentially two different 
versions of the same software: OpenOffice 1.0 was a forked version of StarOffice 6.0, 
and Sun maintained the legal rights to both properties, although they were protected by 
different licenses. 
The early versions of OpenOffice were protected by the Sun Industry Standards 
Source License (SISSL) and the GNU Lesser General Public License (GNU LGPL).  
Later versions were protected by an updated version of the LGPL after Sun discontinued 
the SISSL.  The LGPL was chosen because it had less restrictive requirements for 
integrating free and open source software components into proprietary versions of the 
software.  Although a full discussion of the distinctions between free and open source 
software licenses is beyond the scope of this essay, the basic differences between the 
GNU General Public License (GPL) and the GNU LGPL can be summarized quickly.  
The GPL requires that any modified or derivative software produced using a GPL-
protected software as its base must be redistributed under the same licensing 
requirements.  This ensures that free software remains free software rather than being 
exploited by commercial companies.  The LGPL is a more permissive license that allows 
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free software elements to be incorporated into proprietary software.  The only restriction 
on using LGPL-protected software is that the end-user must have the ability to modify the 
source code.  By protecting OpenOffice in this way, Sun could ensure that developments 
in OpenOffice could be used in their proprietary StarOffice.
Thus, the symbiotic relationship between StarOffice and OpenOffice continued 
under Sun because Sun was transparent about what its intentions were for the two 
properties.  Importantly, however, OpenOffice was governed by a Community Council 
comprised primarily of members from the broader OpenOffice community but also 
including a Sun employee as well.  The Sun member on the Community Council was 
responsible for communicating Sun's intentions to the community.  Once again, however, 
this relationship was strained when Oracle acquired Sun in 2010.  
Since Oracle had discontinued the OpenSolaris operating system, members of the 
OpenOffice Community Council decided to create The Document Foundation and fork 
the OpenOffice project under the name LibreOffice until Oracle made its intentions clear 
for the OpenOffice project.  Both The Document Foundation and LibreOffice were 
established with the intention of being temporary projects until Oracle made its intentions 
clear.  In the event that Oracle ultimately decided to discontinue OpenOffice, however, 
the Community Council would be able to move development to the newly created 
LibreOffice.  Furthermore, The Document Foundation was established as a non-profit 
organization to manage the LibreOffice project and promote the use of open-source 
document software more broadly.  The initial governance of The Document Foundation 
was directed by a temporary steering council featuring some of the same members of the 
OpenOffice Community Council.  Oracle viewed the Community Council members' 
positions on two governing boards as a conflict of interest and asked members on the 
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Community Council to step down from their positions (OpenOffice Community Council, 
2010).  This move effectively ended community support for OpenOffice and the project 
was renamed Oracle OpenOffice.  Oracle OpenOffice became the proprietary software 
offering from Oracle that was meant to replace Sun's StarOffice.  
While the official position of Oracle was to cite a conflict of interest, members of 
the broader open source community viewed Oracle's broader strategy as simply wanting 
to discontinue open source projects that existed under Sun because they did not provide 
any real value to the company.  In response to this, however, The Document Foundation 
continued its development of LibreOffice.  Since LibreOffice had strong community 
support, LibreOffice essentially surpassed OpenOffice within one release.  In effect, all of 
the collective labor behind the development of OpenOffice abandoned the project but 
continued to work on LibreOffice.  Because OpenOffice had been abandoned, Oracle 
announced that it would end development on the project entirely and fire the majority of 
OpenOffice developers.  Ultimately, Oracle donated the code base for OpenOffice to The 
Apache Software Foundation, which has resumed development on the project under the 
name Apache OpenOffice.
To summarize this somewhat confusing history of a software that has been forked 
numerous times, Figure 1 illustrates the development history of StarOffice, its transition 
to OpenOffice (OOo) under Sun, the dual development of StarOffice (SO) alongside 
OpenOffice, the forks into LibreOffice (LO) and Oracle OpenOffice after Oracle acquired 
Sun in 2010, and the donation of OpenOffice back to The Apache Software Foundation to 
be developed as Apache OpenOffice (AOO).  Figure 1 also includes additional forked 
projects that have not been discussed in this paper, which includes IBM Lotus Symphony 
(Symphony) and Go Open Office (Go-oo).  As illustrated in the figure, the developments 
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examples of how the FLOSS community uses legal, technical, and governance strategies 
to protect their commons-based resources.
Protecting the Commons
Throughout this chapter, I have demonstrated how the FLOSS community 
maintains the ability to leverage its collective labor power against undue corporate 
influence by employing technical, legal, and governance strategies to protect its 
commons-based resources.  On the one hand, FLOSS has unique technical characteristics 
that allow it to be reproduced and distributed widely without any significant cost.  This 
allows FLOSS projects to be forked so that development can occur collaboratively, 
simultaneously, and continuously throughout the life of the project.  Although dispersed 
development occurs, however, the community employs certain governance strategies for 
effectively coordinating development and protection of the project.  These governance 
strategies include the establishment of non-profit organizations, which hold the 
intellectual properties for projects.  These organizations provide a legally recognizable 
entity that can more effectively defend the intellectual property and licensing 
requirements of the project.  Furthermore, more direct governance of the development 
project can occur through governing councils that are democratically elected or appointed 
by the community.
The legal strategies for defending FLOSS projects relies on alternative intellectual 
property protections like copyleft or other free and open source software licenses.  These 
licenses free the software from overly protective copyright and allows the community to 
fork the project in the event of undue corporate influence.  On the other hand, 
corporations can also use licensing strategies to their benefit as well.  In the case of Sun, 
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the company used licensing that allowed for free and open source software development 
but that were less restrictive to the corporation.  These licenses allowed the company to 
incorporate some of the commons-based peer production of FLOSS projects into their 
proprietary offerings.  This strategy was understood and accepted by the FLOSS 
community because Sun was clear about its strategies but also because Sun supported 
FLOSS development projects.  In a sense, then, licensing a project becomes a site of 
struggle, especially because a single project may contain code that is protected by 
different licenses.  These licenses may have competing or conflicting terms that need to 
be resolved or the project becomes susceptible to intellectual property litigation.  As was 
the case during Oracle's acquisition of Sun, the licenses can be changed as a way to direct 
development toward different ends.  Sun was transparent about its licensing strategies as 
a part of its broader commercial strategies, while Oracle made either temporary 
commitments to use existing licensing strategies (i.e., MySQL) or sought to change those 
licensing requirements altogether (i.e., OpenSolaris).
However, the dynamics that exist between FLOSS communities and corporations 
are comprised of a combination of technical, legal, and governance strategies.  The 
particular forms that these strategies take will vary depending on the individual project, 
but the FLOSS community's ability to defend its commons-based resources depends, in 
part, on a shared consciousness of what is permissible within the community.  In a sense, 
this shared consciousness constitutes a sort of moral economy (Thompson, 1971).  The 
FLOSS community leverages its collective labor power against corporate power by 
protecting its commons-based resources.  When a corporation infringes on the moral 
economy of the community, the community rebels by forking the project and abandoning 
the project that has been overly influenced by the corporation.  This moral economy has 
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foundations in the shared ideals of peer-to-peer relationship building, collaborative 
development, transparency, and community.
Even though the FLOSS community maintains the ability to leverage its power 
against undue corporate influence, community members are still in a somewhat 
precarious position as digital laborers.  One definition of success in open source projects 
is to receive backing from a company, which at least ensures the project's survival if not 
its overall attractiveness.  However, the FLOSS community depends on keeping projects 
protected under free software licenses, albeit of many different types, so that the 
community maintains the ability to keep the code for the program open.  This is 
particularly true in cases where hybrid models of proprietary and free software are used 
in FLOSS projects.  Throughout this paper, I have demonstrated how such struggles can 
occur, particularly after corporate mergers, acquisitions, or take overs.
In the face of growing corporate involvement in FLOSS projects, the broader 
FLOSS community must maintain its ability to protect its commons-based resources.  At 
the same time, however, the protection of these resources depends, at least in part, on a 
shared collective understanding of how the community can leverage its collective labor 
power against increasing corporate involvement.  The lessons to be learned from Oracle's 
acquisition of Sun Microsystems need to remain salient if similar strategies are to be 
effective.  Most important, however, is the recognition that the struggles taking place 
within the FLOSS community are just one part of a broader social struggle.  As Christian 
Fuchs (2008) has observed, commons-based production is not truly possible until we 
have a commons-based society.  Until that time, commons-based movements like FLOSS 
will be subjected to increasing corporate encroachment that threatens to abate, assimilate, 
or altogether annihilate progress toward alternative economic configurations.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Throughout this study, I have demonstrated the different ways that FLOSS 
projects have been incorporated into the corporate structures of various firms.  
CHAPTER II emphasized how a critical political economic perspective can be used to 
counteract some of the sweeping and, at times, overly celebratory treatments given to 
FLOSS communities in the theoretical literature.  If we accept the claim that FLOSS as a 
process of production constitutes a form of commons-based peer production or non-
market production that makes use of the knowledge commons (Benkler, 2006; Ostrom, 
1990), then a critical political economic approach can both temper and complicate our 
understanding of these claims by emphasizing how these forms of production have been 
incorporated into larger corporate strategies.  Each of the case studies discussed in this 
project have different implications for our understanding of commons-based peer 
production as a process, the knowledge commons as a resource, and FLOSS processes 
and products within the broader capitalist order.  
In what follows, then, I discuss the major findings from each case study.  Next, I 
explain how these novel findings can enrich our understanding of FLOSS products as 
commons-based resources and FLOSS processes as commons-based peer production.  
After establishing the major findings and their implications for our understanding of 
FLOSS products and processes, I discuss the limitations of the present study as well as 
areas that will be germane for future study.  Finally, the chapter concludes with some 
final thoughts about the nature of the commons and commons-based peer production 
under capitalism. 
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Major Findings
The current study posed three primary research questions, which each sought to 
address certain characteristics of the dynamics existing between FLOSS communities and 
the corporations that are involved in FLOSS projects.  Each of the questions was specific 
enough to address a core concern of the research project, while simultaneously broad 
enough to allow for careful attention to the complexity and diversity of different cases.  
The following section demonstrates how the case studies addressed these research 
questions.
Research Question #1
Research question #1 asked what is the relationship between proprietary, for-profit 
corporations and free and open source software communities, and how has this 
relationship changed over time?
The case studies demonstrated three different ways that corporations are involved 
in FLOSS projects.  Consequently, the answer to this research question cannot be 
addressed without considering the contributions of each case study.  The relationships 
between proprietary, for-profit corporations and FLOSS communities are diverse and do 
not always follow specific patterns.  However, the cases of Red Hat and Microsoft most 
directly address this research question.
Red Hat, Inc.
In the case of Red Hat, which still maintains a relatively good relationship with 
the FLOSS community, the company was able to harness (which is to say, centralize) the 
collective labor power of the FLOSS community and transform it into a profitable 
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business strategy.  Red Hat was created with the intention of providing a formalized 
institution that could bring the power of free software to the market.  However, since the 
underlying source code for free software was protected by the Gnu General Public 
License (GPL), Red Hat was unable to rely on using copyright protection to exclude 
others from providing similar software and services.  As a result, the company began 
offering customized versions of free software that could be packaged and protected under 
the Red Hat corporate logo.  As such, the company's products could be protected by 
trademark.  The software that the company provides, then, is protected by the Red Hat 
trademark, and the company sells customized subscriptions for its software and services.  
However, Red Hat still needed a way to protect its customers against potential intellectual 
property infringement claims.  Consequently, the company needed a way to control the 
types of licenses allowed in its software offerings.  To accomplish this, Red Hat first 
required all contributors to its software to sign a Individual Contributor License 
Agreement (ICLA), which would assign the rights to protect the code to the company.  
The ICLA later changed to the Fedora Project Contributor Agreement (FPCA), which 
served as a mechanism to control the range of possible licenses that could be included in 
contributions to its Fedora project.  Nonetheless, the consequence of controlling the 
commons was the same.
From a particular point of view, then, Red Hat can be seen as a pragmatic solution 
to the problem of organizing commons-based peer production under capitalism.  In effect, 
Red Hat has been able to establish itself as a trusted company that can accept liability for 
the products and services it provides.  In effect, the problem of organizing commons-
based peer production under capitalism was solved by establishing a legally recognizable 
and formal institution that serves as a mediator between corporations and the commons.  
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In doing so, however, Red Hat needed to find a way to control what types of code – or at 
least the types of intellectual property licenses – were included in its software so that it 
could protect itself and its clients against intellectual property infringement claims.  In 
this sense, Red Hat functions as a curator of the commons.  Just as a curator is 
responsible for collecting, organizing, and interpreting artifacts for the purpose of public 
display, Red Hat performs a similar function for its subscribers.  In each case, the curator 
charges a fee to the public for entrance to a purposefully organized and constructed 
display of artifacts that has been interpreted in a particular way.  The key difference, 
however, is that Red Hat does not rely on the collection of artifacts exactly as they 
existed previously.  Rather, Red Hat relies on commons-based peer production from its 
FLOSS project, Fedora, for inclusion into its customized distributions of Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux.  Moreover, the contributions to Fedora are controlled by worker 
agreements that all contributors to the Fedora project must sign.  Importantly, however, 
because Red Hat is transparent about its intentions, the company has been able to enjoy a 
relatively good relationship with the broader FLOSS community throughout its history.  
This, of course, differs from the case of Microsoft.
Microsoft Corporation
Microsoft has a long history of opposition to FLOSS.  This stance began as early 
as 1976 when Bill Gates authored the “Open Letter to Hobbyists,” in which he railed 
against the culture of sharing software within the community.  He argued that this 
practice harmed the ability of others to produce software and be compensated for their 
work.  However, this stance contradicts some of Microsoft's own history, as it relied on 
others' designs to produce some of its most successful software.  This was particularly the 
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case for the MS-DOS operating system and the graphical user interface of Windows, 
which were built on top of previously existing technologies developed in Gary Kildall's 
CP/M operating system and Apple's graphical user interface.  Both of these technologies 
were instrumental to Microsoft's success throughout the 1980s and 1990s, especially 
when paired with its strategic partnerships with IBM and other OEMs, which allowed the 
company to gain widespread adoption of its software.  The same can be said of its 
Internet Explorer web browser, which the company packaged with distribution of its 
Windows operating system.  This practice ensured that the company's web browser would 
win the first of the browser wars, but it also was one of the primary business practices 
that led to its conviction for antitrust violations by the Department of Justice.
Microsoft's ascent to the top of the personal computer software market culminated 
around the same time that it was being investigated for antitrust violations.  When the 
DoJ issued its decree in 2001, Microsoft was forced to divest its operating system and 
applications operations.  However, after the original District Court judge recused himself 
from the case after making some public comments that gave the impression of bias 
against Microsoft, the subsequent judge no longer sought divestment.  Rather, Microsoft 
would need to agree to a series of consent decrees that were designed to prevent the type 
of predatory and uncompetitive behaviors that led to its conviction.  The consent decrees 
were intended to last for five years, but they were renewed twice and finally came to an 
end in 2011.  However, the decrees did little to affect Microsoft's economic performance, 
as the company's annual revenues and profits continued to climb in the wake of the DoJ's 
decision.  Nevertheless, as argued in CHAPTER V, the antitrust suit marks a major 
historical moment both for Microsoft and the larger software industry.  Most notably, the 
antitrust suit forced Microsoft to make its APIs more openly available to other developers 
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so they could design software that could interact with Microsoft's technologies.  More 
generally, however, the antitrust decision coincides with the bursting of the dot-com 
bubble in 2001, the emergence of Linux as a commercially viable business model, and 
the emergence of the so-called Web 2.0 era, which shifted the business focus of many 
high-tech companies during that era.
If Microsoft needed any additional convincing that it could no longer rely on its 
old business model, the antitrust conviction signaled to Microsoft that the company 
needed to find new ways of doing business.  Because Linux was becoming more 
widespread, Microsoft could no longer take an antagonistic stance toward open source.  
Instead, it needed to find ways to ensure that its products could function on devices that 
use Linux.  To facilitate greater interoperability between Microsoft and non-Microsoft 
technologies, Microsoft expanded its Shared Source program and, in 2012, opened an 
entire division of the company dedicated to promoting and supporting open source, open 
standards, and open platforms.  This shift is indicative of the fact that FLOSS, by many 
measures, has proven to be an effective and commercially viable production model.  The 
shift in supporting open source projects suggests that Microsoft is trying to accomplish 
two primary goals: harnessing the power of commons-based peer production to 
supplement its own commercial goals as well as promoting interoperability between its 
technologies and other systems.  
The Microsoft case study is indicative of a company undergoing a transformation 
in its stance to FLOSS.  In part, this shift was driven by the antitrust conviction in 2001, 
but the leaked Halloween Documents suggest that the company was already concerned 
with the FLOSS phenomenon and how to combat it in 1998.  Perhaps not coincidentally, 
164
this is the same year that the antitrust investigation began.  In this sense, Microsoft 
represents a strategy of incorporating the commons, or at least attempting to do so.
Research Question #1A
As a supplement to the first question, research question 1A asked about the power 
dynamics between corporations and the FLOSS community?  In other words, which party 
holds the ability to exert influence on the other, if at all?
Oracle's Acquisition of Sun Microsystems
The third case study, Oracle's acquisition of Sun Microsystems, most directly 
addressed this question.  That chapter illustrated how the FLOSS community has coped 
with undue corporate influence into its projects by focusing on three different FLOSS 
projects that were supported by Sun Microsystems prior to its acquisition by Oracle: the 
OpenSolaris operating system, the MySQL relational database management system, and 
the OpenOffice office productivity suite of software.  What becomes clear from the case 
study is that FLOSS projects may not be able to avoid corporate influence altogether, 
especially when those projects are sponsored or supported by a particular company.  
However, given the nature of FLOSS code, the community maintains the ability to 
effectively abandon production on a particular FLOSS project by forking the project and 
continuing development under a new name.  This is precisely what happened in each of 
the three cases discussed in Chapter VI. 
Furthermore, the case study also provides evidence that FLOSS projects are not 
immune from the corporate maneuvering – acquisitions, integration, takeovers, buyouts, 
etc. – that is commonplace in a capitalist system.  That is, although the projects may find 
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a corporation willing to provide support through sponsorship, financing, or partnerships, 
those relations can become strained in the wake of an acquisition in which the acquiring 
company is unwilling to provide the same level of support as the previous company.  If 
this is the case, the community of developers who contribute to the FLOSS project have 
technical, legal, and governance strategies at their disposal to resist undue corporate 
influence in the project.  Technically, code can be reproduced ad infinitum without any 
substantial reinvestment costs.  Legally, most code that is used in FLOSS projects is 
protected by permissive licenses that allow the community to fork their project and begin 
development under a new name.  Coinciding with the process of forking the project is the 
transitioning of the governing board members to oversee the new project.
The Oracle Corporation's acquisition of Sun Microsystems illustrates how the 
power dynamics existing between FLOSS communities and the corporations that rely on 
their projects are complex and varied.  While the community still retains the power to 
abandon production on a project in the face of undue corporate influence, this still places 
the community in a precarious position with respect to the long-term survivability of their 
projects.  The community retains the ability to fork the project and begin new 
development, but it cannot rely on the same level of support it received from its corporate 
sponsor unless it can find new investors.  For instance, the OpenIndiana, MariaDB, and 
LibreOffice projects were able to find additional investment capital, although to varying 
degrees.  In other words, the ability to fork a project is just one step in assuring 
productive autonomy.  However, the productive autonomy of those who contribute to 
projects that are sponsored by other organizations may always be at risk of undue 
influence.  In those situations, the community can take steps to try to reduce such 
influence. 
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Research Question #2
The second research question asked about value for each of these stakeholders.  
What value do corporations provide for the FLOSS community, and what value does the 
FLOSS community provide for corporations?  Finally, do any external factors or 
stakeholders exist that may profit from this relationship?
In the case studies presented in this project, the value derived from FLOSS 
projects becomes quite clear.  The value of all FLOSS projects comes from the software 
developers, programmers, and others who contribute time and labor to the project.  
Whether the developers perform the labor out of love for the project or work for a 
corporation that wants to support the project, the sheer number of contributors who focus 
on a particular project tends to be much larger than any single corporation could directly 
employ to work on developing a project.  As such, the FLOSS community represents a 
large pool of collective laborers whose labor power is derived from the scale of their 
collective productive capacity.  Because the FLOSS community features a potentially 
large pool of labor, the contributions of each individual, no matter how small, can be 
incorporated into FLOSS projects.  These small, incremental changes can lead to the 
rapid completion of complex tasks when spread throughout an entire community of 
developers.  Consequently, FLOSS projects tend to innovate more quickly, tend to be 
more secure, and tend to be competitive with their commercial counterparts.  The 
literature discussed in CHAPTER II tends to focus on exactly these qualities of FLOSS 
projects and processes, but very few go as far as assigning the true value to the labor that 
makes such qualities possible.
The value that corporations hold for the FLOSS community is derived from their 
ability to provide support for FLOSS projects by funneling money or other resources into 
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a project, which is to say, a community.  As mentioned previously, not all FLOSS projects 
require a direct corporate sponsor.  However, some of the larger projects that do not have 
a direct corporate sponsor may still be governed by a non-profit entity that indirectly 
receives support from other firms or individual contributors.  Direct sponsorship by a 
corporation may be another way to attract contributions to a project, as this ensures that it 
is likely to survive for awhile.  Furthermore, this offers an avenue for contributors to 
signal their abilities to members within the project who may be working for a company 
that could provide employment to others who are looking for work.
Finally, the external stakeholders who exist in the relationships between FLOSS 
projects and the corporations who become involved in their projects are those who make 
use of the technology developed within the FLOSS community.  Many of these 
technologies are used without much public awareness, like the Linux kernel, but others 
are used extensively and are highly recognizable, like the Mozilla Firefox web browser.
Contributions of the Study
This study makes a number of contributions to the existing scholarship in digital 
media studies and the political economy of communication, as well as our understanding 
of the commons and commons-based peer production under capitalism.  As suggested in 
CHAPTER II, the internal dynamics of FLOSS communities and their models of 
production have been studied somewhat extensively.  The individual motivations of 
contributors to FLOSS projects is diverse and varied (Deek & McHugh, 2008), but the 
FLOSS community as a whole generally believes in protecting the right to productive 
freedom (Coleman, 2013).  The broader implications of the FLOSS community's 
practices have received their most notable theorizations in the work of Yochai Benkler 
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(2006), who used the term commons-based peer production to refer to the “radically 
decentralized, collaborative, and nonproprietary” forms of production that are based on 
“sharing resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely connected individuals 
who cooperate with each other without relying on either market signals or managerial 
commands” (60).  Benkler continues by arguing that this new modality of organizing 
production engenders greater degrees of freedom and democracy.
Benkler's assessment of commons-based peer production is largely celebratory in 
that he focuses on the institutional novelty of the arrangements and the capability of such 
production to facilitate high degree of innovation and entrepreneurship.  However, this 
form of production still exists within a broader capitalist system.  As such, capitalist firms 
have found a way to harness the entrepreneurship and innovation of some FLOSS 
communities and incorporate them into their broader corporate structures.
This study complicates and extends theorizations of commons-based peer 
production by investigating sites where the idealism of FLOSS production meets with the 
material realities of capitalism.  These contested sites make up the case studies in this 
research project, for they are where commons-based peer production has been 
incorporated into the corporate structures of capitalist firms.  By employing a critical 
political economic approach, this study focused on the power relations that exist between 
corporations that rely on capitalist, market-driven production, and the broader FLOSS 
communities that rely on non-market, commons-based peer production.  An important 
part of this focus was to shift the discussion of the FLOSS community's innovativeness 
away from its instrumentality to business and couch its contributions in terms of 
collective labor and the collective labor power of the broader community.  By focusing 
on the community's labor power, CHAPTER VI in particular was able to identify some of 
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the technical, legal, and governance strategies used within FLOSS communities to resist 
undue corporate influence. 
Furthermore, the case studies provided the opportunity to investigate the unique 
ways that different corporations have incorporated the commons-based peer production 
of FLOSS communities.  In previous literature, major projects like the Linux kernel or 
Wikipedia have been lauded as examples of effective and productive commons-based 
peer production can be (Benkler, 2006; Lessig, 2006; Weber, 2004).  Significantly less 
studied, however, is how capitalist firms can use commons-based peer production to 
supplement their commercial offerings.  The case studies for this project, particularly the 
discussion of Red Hat and Sun Microsystems, provided an in-depth look at how capitalist 
firms rely on the innovations and bug fixes from within the FLOSS community for 
implementation in their commercial products.  That said, however, these case studies 
should not necessarily be viewed as generalizable across all FLOSS projects.  The 
broader ecosystem of FLOSS projects features certain projects that are completely 
supported by its community of developers and do not rely on investment or sponsorship 
from corporate firms.  Additional studies could continue to investigate the extent to which 
FLOSS projects rely upon or seek corporate sponsorship.  Moreover, additional studies 
could investigate the extent to which sponsorship or capital investment is linked with the 
long-term survivability of a FLOSS project.
By selecting cases in which capitalist firms are incorporating commons-based 
peer production, this study was able to yield a novel insight into how intellectual property 
is used both within the FLOSS community and corporations.  Specifically, the case of 
Red Hat demonstrated how a firm is able to profit off of intellectual property that is 
covered by the GPL and, therefore, not amenable to enclosure by traditional copyright.  
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Because Red Hat cannot exclude others from using its source code by relying on 
copyright, the company uses its trademarks to prohibit competitors from making a direct 
use of its products.  However, Red Hat's trademarks cannot prevent someone from using 
the underlying source code, which is protected by copyleft.  Indeed, this was the case of 
CentOS, which was designed as a functionally equivalent operating system to that offered 
by Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Red Hat's core commercial product.  Similarly, Red Hat 
controls the types of licenses that can be included in its Fedora project, which is the 
FLOSS project that generates the code included in its commercial offerings.  The ways in 
which Red Hat controls the intellectual property included in its commercial offerings 
complicates the claims made about the productive autonomy within FLOSS communities. 
In the vast majority of work on FLOSS, one of the defining features of its novelty 
is often traced back to its protection under more permissive copyright licenses, or 
copyleft licenses ( Benkler, 2006; Stallman, 2002; Lessig, 2001).  In addition, the 
software industry has been broadly plagued by a surge in patent infringement claims.  
However, the issue of trademark is an often overlooked feature of software development, 
most likely because it has not been used as a traditional method for enforcing intellectual 
property protections.  Red Hat uses trademark protections to circumvent the permissive 
nature of the GPL and the other licenses that do not allow it to claim exclusive ownership 
of the code used in its core products.  To my knowledge, the extent to which other firms 
are using this strategy has yet to be investigated, particularly within the FLOSS 
community.  Although Red Hat is just one example and, perhaps, an exceptional one, the 
case serves as a counter-factual example to the overarching claims made about the 
degrees of freedom, democracy, and autonomy within FLOSS production.
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Further complicating these claims are the often-overlooked Contributor Licensing 
Agreements within FLOSS production, particularly when a project has a corporate or 
other institutional sponsor.  While these agreements are not uniform across all FLOSS 
projects, the organizations that issue them rely on these agreements to maintain control 
over their projects.  However, control is achieved in at least a couple different ways.  The 
CLAs may ask contributors to surrender the rights to their submissions so that the 
organization can defend itself from intellectual property claims.  Similarly, the CLAs may 
be used to control the types of licenses that are allowed into the code base.  This was seen 
in the Red Hat case study, whereby Red Hat wanted guarantee its customers that they 
would not be in danger of intellectual property infringement suits.  A common theme 
running throughout the Red Hat chapter was the extent to which copyright separates 
authorship from ownership.  In this sense, the current project contributes to this critical 
understanding of copyright by demonstrating how FLOSS laborers are forced to abandon 
claims to ownership of their work in order to contribute directly to certain FLOSS 
projects.  Further studies could investigate the differences between these agreements, 
which organizations are using them, and whether or not these agreements deter some 
contributors from becoming involved in projects.
Limitations of the Study
Despite these contributions, the present study was limited in certain ways.  This is 
particularly the case with respect to the case study selections as well as the 
methodological choices.  By choosing to operate from a critical political economic 
perspective, the study focused primarily on the power dynamics that exist between the 
FLOSS community and the corporations that rely on their labor.  This directed attention 
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more toward corporate structures and strategies, as well as how these operations affected 
the FLOSS community, particularly how and why corporations were involved in FLOSS 
projects.  In addition, the third case study, in particular, focused on the FLOSS 
community's response to such involvement.
The cases chosen were purposively selected because of their prominence within 
both corporate and FLOSS communities.  Red Hat, Microsoft, and Oracle represent some 
of the largest and most publicly visible software companies in the world.  This is 
primarily the reason for selecting these companies, but also means that the findings from 
each case study may not be applicable to a broader range of corporations or FLOSS 
projects.  In this sense, the study can only provide a snapshot of some of the dynamics 
occurring at the intersection of corporations and the commons.
Furthermore, the study tended to concentrate more on the institutional 
arrangements between corporations and FLOSS communities.  This was driven mainly by 
the theories drawn upon for the study.  The intent was to demonstrate what happens if we 
accept the claims made by Benkler (2006) about commons-based peer production and 
non-market production and, in turn, contrast those claims with the dynamics existing at 
the intersection of corporations and communities of commons-based peer production.  By 
taking this position, the study did not delve into the internal dynamics of different FLOSS 
communities.  Indeed, one of the shortcomings was the constant reference to FLOSS 
communities, writ large, while each community has unique governance structures, unique 
relationships to its sponsoring organization (if it has one at all), and a unique culture.  
This is indicated by the point made about contributors to FLOSS projects and their 
support for FLOSS projects in general often being masked by their very particular 
preferences for certain software projects over others.  For example, a contributor's 
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support for a particular project may be driven by the culture of the community developing 
the software or the proclaimed ideology of the project.  On a related note, the FLOSS 
projects covered in this study all have (or had) corporate sponsors.  However, this is not 
the case for all FLOSS projects.  Consequently, future studies could do more to account 
for the diversity of FLOSS projects' goals, as well as the development community's 
internal dynamics.  One notable example of this type of work is Gabriella Coleman's 
work on the Debian community (Coleman, 2013).
One final factor to consider in relation to the selection criteria for this study is the 
relatively recent opening of the Microsoft Open Technologies division.  Because the 
subsidiary is still growing, the analysis was not able to offer a clear picture as to where 
the company is ultimately headed in its involvement in FLOSS projects.  Throughout the 
course of the research, the publicly available information about the subsidiary changed 
extensively.  The web page, for example, was continuously adding new information and 
organizing that information in new ways.  Consequently, official press releases and 
secondary sources were used for the limited amount of information included about the 
newly formed subsidiary.  As the MS Open Tech subsidiary grows and begins to develop 
more projects, we may be able to get a better sense of the exact types of projects that the 
company will be supporting.
Concluding Thoughts: Capital and the Commons
Commons-based peer production offers the potential to provide a truly novel form 
of organizing collective and collaborative production.  However, the emergent or novel 
forms of organizing still exist within a broader capitalist order.  Therefore, commons-
based peer production should not be viewed as a comprehensive solution to the unequal 
174
social relations of a capitalist system.  Rather, commons-based peer production may be 
viewed as one part of a broader social struggle against global capital.  More specifically, 
commons-based peer production can be viewed within the context of a broader resistance 
movement that seeks to reclaim commons of all types, whether they be tangible goods 
like land, water, and air, or the intangible goods of data, information, or knowledge that 
provide the infrastructure for social relations.
When Karl Polanyi authored The Great Transformation, he critiqued the then-
emerging market fundamentalism of the Austrian School of economics, exemplified by 
Friedrich Hayek and inspired by the work of Ludwig von Mises, for its disembedding of 
market relations from social relations.  For Polanyi, the market and market relations had 
historically been embedded within social relations, such that the social bonds connecting 
communities of people together were not subjected to a market logic.  Rather, the market 
existed within and as a part of social relations.  This, however, transformed after the 
market became elevated to a degree whereby all other relations became molded according 
to its logic.  This disembedding of the market from social relations has the normative 
effect of creating certain “fictitious commodities,” like land, labor, and money that had all 
previously been important infrastructural elements of social life.  In other words, when 
land becomes a commodity, concerns about its long-term sustainability become 
subsumed under a market logic that seeks profit from its exploitation.  The same applies 
to labor, which is to say, human beings, who become exploited and valued according to a 
market logic.  Finally, money becomes something to be hoarded for its intrinsic or future 
value rather than its function as a universal equivalent for exchanging different goods.
Polanyi's critique could, perhaps, be expanded to include information as a 
fictitious commodity.  This would offer a framework for situating information 
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dialectically between the market and social relations, as well as the increasing tendency 
to extract information out of its social function and treat it as a commodity.  Indeed, 
Schiller (2007) draws this distinction between information as a commodity and 
information as a resource.  When treated as a commodity and enclosed by intellectual 
property protections, information becomes highly valued as a privileged resource that can 
only be accessed by those who are willing to pay for access.  When treated as a resource 
and made freely available for all, information can be studied, modified, adapted, and 
redistributed to others who can also benefit from access to it.  Thus, we arrive at two 
conceptualizations of information: as a privately owned resource transformed into a 
commodity, and as a commonly held resource available for all.  
Corporations, like Microsoft, have sought to transform information into a 
privately owned resource that can be protected by copyright.  The FLOSS community has 
sought ways to preserve information as a commonly held resource for all to use, most 
notably through copyleft licenses like the GPL.  By doing so, the community has been 
able to establish a knowledge commons that resists enclosure.  However, the knowledge 
commons under capitalism may be facing a similar fate to the commons of the past, 
although with certain careful distinctions.  This project has demonstrated that how capital 
has readjusted its relatively inflexible position in relation to commons-based production.  
It needed to reorient its strategies to incorporate without enclosing the commons.  By 
doing so, capitalist firms pursue profits while finding a variety of ways to give back to 
the community, whether by making code freely available under free software or open 
source licensing, or by supporting the informal institutions that govern various open 
source projects.  While this may provide ad hoc support for commons-based production, 
it may not provide a long-term solution to commons-based labor.  Instead, commons-
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based peer labor may be placed in an ever-more-precarious position of depressed or non-
existent wages while corporations make commercial use of their contributions.  What will 
be needed as this type of involvement continues is a sustainable way to protect the 
commons, but also a way to ensure investment in commons-based peer labor.  In other 
words, not just investment in institutions, organizations, technologies, or innovations, but 
long-term and sustainable investment in the true source of their value, which is to say, 
people. 
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APPENDIX A
RECRUITMENT LETTER OR EMAIL
Dear [insert name], 
My name is Ben Birkinbine, and I am a Ph.D Candidate from the School of Journalism 
and Communication at the University of Oregon. I am writing to invite you to participate 
in my research study about corporate involvement in open source projects. You're eligible 
to be in this study because of your involvement in such projects. 
If you decide to participate in this study, you agree to be interviewed about your 
experiences, attitudes, beliefs, or opinions about corporate involvement in open source 
projects. 
I would like to record audio of our interview.  I plan to use this recording as a way to 
accurately represent your perspective on the research topic.  However, you will have the 
option to not be recorded.  You can indicate your preference on the Interview Consent 
Form. 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You can choose to be in the study 
or not. If you'd like to participate or have any questions about the study, please email or 
contact me at bjb@uoregon.edu or XXX-XXX-XXXX.
Thank you very much. 
Sincerely, 
Benjamin J. Birkinbine 
Ph.d Candidate, Media Studies
School of Journalism & Communication
University of Oregon
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APPENDIX B
INFORMED CONSENT LETTER
University of Oregon, School of Journalism & Communication
Informed Consent for Participation as a Subject in “Free Software and Capital”
Investigator: Benjamin J. Birkinbine
Type of consent Adult Consent Form 
Introduction
You are being asked to be in a research study that investigates corporate participation in 
open source software projects.  You were selected as a possible participant because of 
your involvement in open source software projects.  Please read this form and ask any 
questions that you may have before agreeing to be in the study. 
Purpose of Study:
The purpose of this study is to solicit participants' perceptions, opinions, beliefs, or other 
disclosures about practices associated with involvement in open source software.  
Participants in this study are either representatives from corporations involved in open 
source software projects or representatives from the broader open source community, 
whether they be programmers, advocates, members of non-profit groups, community 
organizations, or any other group involved in open source software development.  
Description of the Study Procedures:
If you agree to be in this study, I will ask you to do the following: agree to a semi-
structured interview in which I will be asking you for disclosures about your experiences, 
attitudes, opinions, beliefs, or other feelings associated with free and open source 
software.  Most interviews will last anywhere from 30-60 minutes, but certain interviews 
may last for a longer or shorter duration.
Risks/Discomforts of Being in the Study:
There are no reasonable foreseeable (or expected) risks.  This study may include risks 
that are unknown at this time.
Benefits of Being in the Study:
The purpose of the study is to gain a better understanding of the relationship between for-
profit corporations and the broader free and open source software community.  By 
participating in this study, you are contributing to this understanding and have a chance 
for your voice to be heard.
Payments and Costs:
You will not be receiving any payment for participating in this study.  There are no costs 
to you for participating in this research study. 
Confidentiality:
The records of this study will be kept private.  In the final published report, I would like 
to be able to identify you as well as your affiliations unless you request to remain 
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anonymous.  You will have the opportunity to indicate your preference at the end of this 
form.  If you choose to remain anonymous, I will not include any information that will 
make it possible to identify you.  Research records will be kept in a locked file.  
I would also like to keep an audio recording of our interview. If you consent to being 
recorded, the digital audio files will be kept on a password protected personal computer 
and destroyed after the final written report is published.  You will have the opportunity to 
indicate your preference for being recorded at the end of this form.
Access to the records will be limited to the researchers; however, please note that the 
Institutional Review Board and internal University of Oregon auditors may review the 
research records.  
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal:
Your participation is voluntary.  If you choose not to participate, it will not affect your 
current or future relations with the University.  You are free to withdraw at any time, for 
whatever reason. 
There is no penalty or loss of benefits for not taking part or for stopping your 
participation.
Contacts and Questions:
The researcher conducting this study is Benjamin J. Birkinbine.  For questions or more 
information concerning this research you may contact him at XXX-XXX-XXXX or 
bjb@uoregon.edu
If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact: 
Research Compliance Services, University of Oregon at (541) 346-2510 or 
ResearchCompliance@uoregon.edu
Copy of Consent Form:
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records and future reference.
Statement of Consent:
I have read (or have had read to me) the contents of this consent form and have been 
encouraged to ask questions.  I have received answers to my questions.  I give my 
consent to participate in this study.  I have received (or will receive) a copy of this form.
Participant Preferences (please mark one for each preference):
□ I agree to have audio from the interview recorded, OR □ I DO NOT agree to be 
recorded.
□ I agree to be identified by name and affiliation, OR □ I would like to remain 
anonymous.
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Signatures/Dates 
_____________________________________________________________
Study Participant (Print Name)
_____________________________________________________________
Signature Date
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APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW GUIDE
Interviews will be semi-structured.  Questions provided here serve as a base from which 
additional follow-up questions may be asked.  
General Questions (for all participants):
How are you involved with free and open source software?
How long have you served in that role?
Do you know how to program or code using free and open source software?
Do you currently contribute to developing free and open source software?  If so, which 
project?
What are your thoughts about the relationship between corporations and the open source
community?
More broadly, do you think cooperation has a place in a competitive economy?
Do you think the relationship between corporations and the open source community has 
changed over time?
Questions Specifically For Participants Representing Corporations:
Why is your company supporting free and open source software projects?
How are these projects licensed?
How long has your company been contributing to or supporting open source software 
projects?
Do you currently employ people specifically responsible for open source projects?
How does your company benefit from open source projects?  
Do open source projects tend to be profitable?  If so, how?
How do you measure an open source project's benefits to your company?
Do you have any data about your company's open source projects?
Do you know how many people contribute to your projects from outside the company?
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Does your company plan to continue supporting open source projects?
Are there any risks to your company by becoming involved in open source projects?
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